THE  AMERICAN  BOOKS 

A  LIBRARY  OF  GOOD  CITIZENSHIP 

"  The  American  Books"  are  designed  as  a 
series  of  authoritative  manuals,  discussing 
problems  of  interest  in  America  to-day. 


THE  AMERICAN  BOOKS 

THE  AMERICAN  COLLEGE  BY  ISAAC  SHARPLESS 

THE  INDIAN   TO-DAY  BY  CHARLES  A.  EASTMAN 

COST  OF  LIVING  BY  FABIAN  FRANKLIN 

THE  AMERICAN  NAVY  BY   REAR-ADMIRAL   FRENCH 

E.  CHADWICK,  U.  S.  N. 

MUNICIPAL  FREEDOM  BY  OSWALD  RYAN 

AMERICAN  LITERATURE  BY  LEON  KELLNER 

(TRANSLATED  FROM  THE  GERMAN  BY  JULIA  FRANKLIN) 

SOCIALISM  IN  AMERICA  BY  JOHN  MACY 

AMERICAN  IDEALS  BY  CLAYTON  S.  COOPER 

THE  UNIVERSITY  MOVEMENT  BY  IRA  REMSEN 

THE  AMERICAN  SCHOOL  BY  WALTER  S.  HINCHMAN 

THE  FEDERAL  RESERVE  BY  H.  PARKER  WILLIS 

(For  more  extended  notice  of  the  series,  see  the  last  pages 
of  this  book.) 


The  American  Books 

The 
American  Navy 


By 

Rear-Admiral  French  E.  Chadwick 


((/.  S.  N.,  Rltifld) 


GARDEN  CITY  NEW   YORK 

DOUBLEDAY,  PAGE  &  COMPANY 
I9IS 


Copyright,  1915,  by 
DOUBLEDAY,  PAGE  &  COMPANY 

All  rights  reserved,  including  that  of 

translation  into  foreign  languages, 

including  the  Scandinavian 


TO 

MY  COMRADES  OF  THE  NAVY 

PAST,  PRESENT,  AND  FUTURE 


BIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

Rear-Admiral  French  Ensor  Chadwick  was 
born  at  Morgantown,  W.  Va.,  February  29, 
1844.  He  was  appointed  to  the  U.  S.  Naval 
Academy  from  West  Virginia  (then  part  of 
Virginia)  in  1861,  and  graduated  in  November, 
1864.  In  the  summer  of  1864  he  was  attached 
to  the  Marblehead  in  pursuit  of  the  Confederate 
steamers  Florida  and  Tallahassee.  After  the 
Civil  War  he  served  successively  in  a  number 
of  vessels,  and  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of 
Lieutenant-Commander  in  1869;  was  instruc 
tor  at  the  Naval  Academy;  on  sea-service,  and 
on  lighthouse  duty  (18701882);  Naval  Attache 
at  the  American  Embassy  in  London  (1882- 
1889);  commanded  the  Yorktozvn  (1889-1891); 
was  Chief  Intelligence  Officer  (1892-1893);  and 
Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Equipment  (1893-1897). 

During  the  war  with  Spain  he  was  Admiral 
Sampson's  Chief  of  Staff,  and  also  commanded 
the  flagship  New  York.  He  participated  in  all 
the  more  important  engagements  in  the  Atlan 
tic  during  the  war;  was  advanced  five  numbers 
in  rank  for  conspicuous  conduct  in  battle,  and 
was  presented  with  a  sword  of  honor  by  citizens 
of  his  native  state. 


viii  Biographical  Note 

From  1900  to  1903  he  was  President  of  the 
Naval  War  College  at  Newport;  was  promoted 
Rear-Admiral  October  n,  1903,  and  in  1904 
became  commander-in-chief  of  the  South  At 
lantic  squadron.  He  retired  February  28,  1906. 

Rear-Admiral  Chadwick  is  one  of  the  most 
influential  friends  of  the  United  States  navy;  he 
has  written  extensively  on  diplomatic  and  naval 
topics,  and  is  the  author  of  "Causes  of  the 
Civil  War"  in  the  "American  Nation  Series." 
He  is  also  much  interested  in  problems  of 
municipal  government,  is  a  member  of  the 
Newport  Representative  Council,  a  member  of 
the  National  Institute  of  Arts  and  Letters,  cor 
responding  member  of  the  Massachusetts  His 
torical  Society,  member  of  the  American 
Historical  Association,  etc. 


INTRODUCTION 

THE  navy  in  all  countries  has  ever  been,  and, 
as  far  as  we  can  now  judge,  ever  will  be,  a 
preeminent  instrument  of  government.  It  was 
through  her  navy  that  Greece  destroyed  the 
power  of  Persia;  Rome  that  of  Carthage;  the 
allies  at  Lepanto  that  of  the  Turks;  England 
that  of  Holland  and  later  that  of  France  in 
America;  the  navy  of  France,  in  turn,  caused  the 
relinquishment  of  Great  Britain's  sovereignty 
over  the  thirteen  colonies  which  formed  the 
United  States,  and  a  generation  later  it  was  the 
British  navy  which  made  the  efforts  of  the 
great  Napoleon  the  "baseless  fabric  of  a  vi 


sion." 


Coming  to  days  within  the  ken  of  many  still 
living,  the  navy  was  the  power  which  made 
possible  the  preservation  of  the  Union  in  our 
great  Civil  War  by  the  cutting  off  of  the  South 
ern  Confederacy  from  its  means  of  support  by 
sea  and  reducing  its  forces  thereby  to  practical 
inanition.  For  had  the  Confederacy  had  free 


IX 


x  Introduction 

access  to  the  sea  and  control  of  the  Mississippi 
River,  no  armies  of  the  North  could  have  con 
quered  well-supplied  armies  of  the  South.  So, 
too,  the  control  of  the  sea  decided  the  outcome 
of  the  Spanish  War.  When  Sampson's  fleet 
destroyed  Spain's  only  battle  squadron  off 
Santiago  de  Cuba,  Spain  could  no  longer  rein 
force  her  army  in  Cuba,  and  surrender  was  a 
necessity.  Even  as  this  is  written  Germany's 
every  sea  outlet  is  closed  by  the  British  fleet, 
so  superior  in  number  to  the  German,  and  Ger 
man  commerce  on  the  sea  is  for  the  time  en 
tirely  swept  away,  leaving  Great  Britain  for 
the  moment  navally  and  commercially  supreme 
upon  the  ocean.  As  one  attempts  to  look  into 
the  future  the  vastness  of  the  possible  changes 
startles  the  imagination,  but  in  it  all  is  ever 
present  the  power  that  goes  with  the  ubiquitous 
warship,  from  whose  threat  no  port  of  the  world 
is  free.  Military  power  fades  to  insignificance, 
through  its  narrow  limits  of  mobility,  when  com 
pared  with  the  meaning  of  a  great  fleet.  The 
present  sketch  of  history  is  to  show  what  the 
warship  has  done  for  us. 


THE  AMERICAN  NAVY 


CHAPTER  I 

WHEN  Great  Britain  attempted  to  reduce  to 
obedience  the  rebellious  colonies  which  were  to 
form  the  United  States  of  America  she  was  deal 
ing  with  a  people  who  in  the  North  at  least  had 
long  been  conversant  with  the  building  and  sail 
ing  of  ships.  A  New  England  built  ship  en 
tered  the  Thames  in  1638,  only  eighteen  years 
after  the  landing  of  the  Pilgrims  at  Plymouth, 
Massachusetts.  The  New  England  men,  with  a 
sterile  coast,  with  limitless  fishing  grounds  and 
unsurpassed  harbors,  turned  as  naturally  to  the 
sea  for  livelihood  as  did  the  South,  more  kindly 
treated  by  nature,  to  agriculture.  In  1670  it 
was  estimated  that  two  thirds  of  the  British 
shipping  was  employed  in  the  American  trade. 
The  Dutch,  who  had  been  great  carriers  on  the 
sea,  were  excluded  from  this  trade  by  the  navi 
gation  laws  of  the  period.  Scotland  was  not 
admitted  to  the  trade  of  the  American  planta 
tions  until  her  union  with  England  in  1707,  and 
Ireland  not  until  1780,  while  in  1670  nothing 

3 


4  The  American  Navy 

could  be  imported  into  the  American  colonies 
but  what  was  laden  in  England  in  English-built 
ships.  But  while  none  of  their  products  could 
be  carried  anywhere  (except  to  other  of  the 
plantations)  till  they  were  first  landed  in  Eng 
land,  the  ships  built  in  America  were  reckoned 
as  English,  and  this  fact  gave  great  impetus 
to  American  shipbuilding.  American  shipping 
prospered  amazingly.  But  while  thus  prosper 
ing,  it  was  the  attempted  repression  of  our 
commerce  afloat  and  ashore  (which  included 
such  things  as  forbidding  the  exportation  of 
hats,  restricting  the  manufacture  of  iron,  and 
forbidding  commerce  with  the  foreign-owned 
islands  of  the  West  Indies)  which  did  much 
more  to  develop  the  idea  of  independence  than 
did  the  Stamp  Act.  But  the  net  result  of  con 
ditions  was  to  foster  shipping,  and  our  compe 
tition  had  so  increased  by  1725  that  in  that  year 
"the  shipwrights  of  the  river  Thames  came  up 
to  Whitehall  with  a  complaint  that  their  busi 
ness  had  declined  and  their  workmen  emigrated 
because  the  plantations  furnished  England  with 
ships." 

On  the  register  of  the  underwriters  at  Lloyd's 
for  1775,  comprehending  the  shipping  of  the 
three  preceding  years,  there  were  3,908  British- 


The  American  Navy  £ 

built  vessels  of  605,545  tons,  and  2,311  of 
American  build  with  a  tonnage  of  373,618  tons. 
The  average  size  of  the  ship  of  the  time  was 
about  400  tons  displacement.  One  100  feet  in 
length  and  26  to  28  feet  broad  was  a  good-sized 
ship.  They  were  but  cockle  boats  in  compari 
son  with  the  vast  ships  of  to-day,  many  of  which 
are  full  a  hundred  times  400  tons  displace 
ment. 

The  foregoing  will  show  that  when  there  came 
a  time  to  dispute  the  sea  with  Great  Britain 
there  was  no  difficulty  in  supplying  the  ships, 
and  the  many  ironworks  which  had  been  estab 
lished,  particularly  in  Massachusetts  and  Penn 
sylvania,  despite  Great  Britain's  restrictions, 
could  furnish  guns  in  the  manufacture  of  which 
our  foundries  were  adepts  before  the  war. 

The  larger  men-of-war  of  the  period  were 
greater  in  size  than  the  largest  merchantmen. 
The  greater  ships-of-the-line  (by  which  expres 
sion  is  meant  those  which  could  take  their 
place  in  the  line  of  battle,  the  formation  of  which 
was  in  a  single  extended  column)  varied  from 
4,000  to  3,000  tons  displacement.  The  larger 
of  these,  which  carried  guns  on  three  main  decks 
and  some  light  guns  on  the  upper  deck,  to  the 
number  altogether  of  100,  or  even  120,  were  180 


6  The  American  Navy 

to  190  feet  on  the  gun  deck,  with  about  53  feet 
beam.  The  most  usual  size,  however,  was  the 
"74,"  carrying  nominally  that  number  of  guns, 
but  usually  six  or  eight  more,  on  two  main  decks 
(and  thus  known  as  a  two-decker).  This  class 
was  about  168  feet  long  on  the  gun  deck  and  47 
feet  broad.  Below  this  class  there  were  many 
ships  of  sixty,  fifty,  or  even  forty-four  guns,  with 
two  gun  decks.  Such,  for  a  long  period,  formed 
part  of  the  line  of  battle. 

The  frigates  had  but  one  covered  gun  deck. 
They  varied  in  length  from  115  to  130  feet  on 
the  gun  deck,  and  were  from  32  to  36  feet  beam, 
roughly  a  fourth  of  their  length.  They  formed 
no  part  of  a  line  of  battle,  their  duty  when  ac 
companying  a  fleet  being  to  remain  clear  of  the 
line  and  repeat  the  admiral's  signals.  There 
was  also  a  small  class  of  ship  called  a  sloop-of- 
war,  which  carried  guns  on  only  the  upper,  or 
spar,  deck  as  it  came  to  be  called.  These  vessels 
were  ship-rigged;  that  is,  they  had  three  masts 
with  square  sails  on  each.  They  were  usually 
about  100  feet  long  and  about  27  feet  beam. 

The  three-deckers,  or  loo-gun  ships,  carried 
about  900  men;  the  74*5  about  600;  the  frigates 
about  160.  The  guns  of  the  period  were  of 
course  all  smooth-bores  and  muzzle-loaders. 


The  American  Navy  7 

In  the  large  ships,  the  heavier  guns,  usually  32- 
pounders,  were  carried  on  the  lower  gun  decks 
to  give  stability  to  the  ship;  i8's  or  24/5  were 
carried  on  the  middle  deck,  9's  and  I2's  on  the 
upper,  9's  and  6's  on  the  quarter  deck,  which 
was  the  part  of  the  upper  deck  aft  of  the  main 
mast,  and  on  the  forecastle,  which  was  the  part 
of  the  upper  deck  forward  of  the  foremast;  the 
space  between  the  two  was  called  the  waist. 
The  larger  frigates  usually  carried  i8's  on  the 
gun  deck;  the  smaller,  I2*s  or  9*5.  The  sloops 
carried  9*5  or  6's.  The  greatest  range  of  even 
the  heavier  guns  was  but  little  over  2,000  yards, 
as  the  ports  rarely  allowed  more  than  8°  or  9° 
elevation.  Such  guns  were  but  toys  compared 
with  modern  ordnance,  but  they  were  common 
alike  to  all  nations,  and  all  were  thus  on  the 
same  footing. 

An  immense  difference  between  that  day  and 
this  was  in  the  motive  power  which  then  and 
for  two  and  a  half  generations  later  consisted  of 
lofty  wooden  masts,  reaching  skyward  in  the 
greater  ships  about  200  feet,  crossed  by  "yards," 
the  larger  of  which  were  about  100  feet  long,  the 
former  supported  by  a  great  mass  of  rigging 
known  as  shrouds  and  stays,  the  latter  moved 
by  "braces"  and  the  sails  worked  by  a  maze  of 


8  The  American  Navy 

running  rigging.  All  this,  of  course,  was  sub 
ject  to  being  shot  away,  and  ships  were  thus 
frequently  completely  dismasted  or  disabled 
in  action.  The  same  result  was  often,  too,  pro 
duced  by  a  gale  of  wind,  it  being  no  uncommon 
thing  for  a  fleet  to  be  thus  completely  inca 
pacitated  for  the  continuance  of  a  voyage. 

Weeks  or  fortnights  were  spent  in  a  voyage 
now  done  in  days.  Of  certainty  as  to  time  of 
reaching  port,  there  was  none.  And  amid  all 
there  was  the  danger  from  enemies,  legal  or 
piratical,  for  the  world  was  only  slowly  ridding 
itself  of  the  latter;  and  from  the  inherent  dan 
gers  of  the  sea  itself  to  the  clumsy  ships  which 
slowly  worked  their  way  across  it.  How  great 
these  last  were,  through  the  ignorance  at  that 
time  of  the  law  of  storms,  may  be  known  by  the 
fate  of  a  great  fleet  which  in  1782  left  the  West 
Indies  under  Admiral  Graves,  with  ten  line- 
of-battle  ships  convoying  nearly  a  hundred 
merchantmen.  Among  the  former  were  six  of 
the  prizes  taken  in  Rodney's  great  naval  battle 
of  April  12,  1782.  Caught  in  a  fierce  gale 
southeast  of  Nova  Scotia,  five  of  the  battleships 
foundered  with  nearly  all  on  board.  One  of 
those  which  went  down  with  every  soul  was  the 
Ville  de  Paris,  which  had  been  the  flagship  of 


The  American  Navy  9 

the  unfortunate  Count  de  Grasse.  The  total 
loss/bfmen  was  estimated  at  3,500. 
/Such  was  the  setting  of  the  period  which  saw 
the  birth  of  the  first  American  navy,  which  was 
to  have  an  existence  of  but  eight  short  years,  to 
be  succeeded,  however,  nine  years  after  (1794) 
by  the  modest  beginnings  which  have  grown  into 
the  great  fleet  of  to-day,  and  whose  history  is 
one  of  uninterrupted  success  and  honor. 


CHAPTER  II 

IN  SEPTEMBER,  1744,  there  met  at  Philadelphia, 
then  our  foremost  city,  representatives  of  each 
of  the  thirteen  colonies,  called  together  on  ac 
count  of  the  increasing  difficulties  which  had 
arisen  with  the  mother  country.  These  diffi 
culties  arose  mainly  from  the  tendency  of  par 
liament  to  govern  the  colonies  as  it  would,  say, 
any  county  of  England.  This  right  the  Amer 
icans  denied.  They  were  good  subjects  of  the 
King,  but  they  objected  to  parliamentary  rule. 
The  underlying  idea  which  governed  the  action 
of  the  Americans  was  thus  that  of  a  federal 
ism  which  only  in  these  latter  days  has  laid 
hold  in  any  considerable  degree  of  the  minds  of 
the  English,  who  now  debate  the  possibility 
of  England,  Scotland,  Wales,  Ireland,  Canada, 
Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  South  Africa  be 
coming  states  of  a  federation  somewhat  akin  to 
our  own.  But  at  the  time  of  the  outbreak  of 
our  Revolution  there  was  no  widespread  idea  of 
separation.  It  was,  however,  in  the  air,  and  by 

10 


The  American  Navy  n 

some  openly  advocated.  Had  there  been  a  com 
plete  renouncement  of  the  right  of  parliament 
to  make  laws  governing  the  colonies  there  would, 
for  the  time  at  least,  have  been  a  reconciliation. 
It  was  upon  this  principle  we  divided.  Thus 
the  war  began. 

There  was  at  this  time  on  our  coast  a  British 
naval  force  of  four  ships  of  from  seventy  to 
fifty  guns  (these  at  Boston),  and  twenty  from 
twenty  to  six  guns  distributed  from  New 
Hampshire  to  Florida.  The  whole  was  a  very 
moderate  force  considering  the  long-standing 
discontent  and  the  difficulties  of  the  existing 
situation.  The  British  navy,  in  which,  as  in 
the  administration  of  every  other  department 
of  the  British  public  service  of  the  period,  in 
efficiency  and  dishonesty  reigned  to  an  almost 
unbelievable  degree,  had  been  allowed  to  run 
down  sadly  after  the  Seven  Years'  War  which 
ended  in  1763.  The  total  number  of  ships  was 
but  270  and  the  number  of  seamen  but  18,000. 
Before  the  war  closed  the  ships  were  to  number 
468,  of  which  174  were  ships-of-the-line  (carry 
ing  from  sixty  to  one  hundred  guns),  and  the 
seamen  were  to  number  110,000. 

The  situation  of  the  United  States  was  much 
akin  to  that  of  the  Southern  Confederacy. 


12  The  American  Navy 

Its  resources  were  too  meagre  to  carry  on  a  war 
without  the  importation  of  much  that  was  neces 
sary  to  keep  an  army  in  efficiency.  Thus  the 
true  plan  of  England  was  a  strict  blockade  and 
the  reduction  to  inanition  of  our  forces,  such  as 
we  ourselves  carried  on  against  the  South  in  our 
Civil  War.  This  action  was  advocated  strongly 
by  Viscount  Barrington,  the  Secretary  for  War, 
who  urged  that  the  navy  only  should  be  em 
ployed,  and  that  the  ships  should  take  posses 
sion  of  all  our  ports  and  establish  a  complete 
blockade.  Fortunately  for  the  revolutionists, 
his  advice  was  not  heeded. 

On  April  19,  1775,  at  Concord  and  Lexington, 
the  long-prepared  fagots  of  revolution  were 
lighted  into  flame.  Two  months  later,  June 
I7th,  came  Bunker  Hill  and  the  immediate 
assembling  near  Boston  (where  lay  almost  the 
whole  of  the  British  force  in  America)  of  a  multi 
tude  of  country  people  ill-provided  with  every 
thing  that  goes  to  make  the  efficiency  of  an  army 
but  high  determination  and  spirit.  By  a  stroke  of 
prescience  which  would  seem  a  providence,  Wash 
ington  was  appointed  the  commander-in-chief. 

There  had  been  fights  afloat  between  the 
Americans  and  the  British  some  years  before 


The  American  Navy  13 

the  actual  outbreak  of  the  Revolution.  In 
1769  the  sloop  Liberty ,  employed  in  revenue 
protection,  had  been  seized  and  burned  by  the 
people  of  Newport,  Rhode  Island;  in  1772  a 
schooner,  the  Gaspee,  used  for  similar  service 
in  Narragansett  Bay  and  which  had  grounded 
while  in  chase  of  a  suspected  vessel  near  Provi 
dence,  was  boarded  by  a  party  of  men  who 
burned  her,  and  but  a  month  after  the  first 
fights  ashore  occurred  there  were' attacks  with 
some  loss  of  life  upon  an  armed  schooner  and 
barges  which  attempted  the  seizure  of  livestock 
on  the  islands  of  Boston  Bay.  /The  lively  fights 
at  Machias  in  June,  1775,  in  which  the  inhabi 
tants  had  captured  the  sloop  Unity  and  another 
which  had  been  sent  to  Machias  for  lumber  and 
which  were  under  the  escort  of  an  armed  tender, 
the  Margaretta,  were,  however,  the  first  of  the 
actual  War  of  the  Revolution.  They  are  proud 
recollections  of  local  history  and  have  caused 
the  name  of  the  town  to  appear  on  the  navy  list 
as  that  of  a  small  cruiser  of  to-day.  On  August 
9,  1775,  the  Falcon,  sloop-of-war  under  Cap 
tain  Linzee,  pursued  into  Gloucester  harbor 
two  schooners  bound  from  the  West  Indies; 
one  he  seized,  and  the  other  succeeding  in  get 
ting  into  the  harbor  was  attacked  by  boats  from 


14  The  American  Navy 

the  Falcon.  The  militia  and  inhabitants  gath 
ered,  and  tne  action  which  came  on  and  which 
lasted  several  hours  resulted  in  the  capture  of 
thirty-five  of  the  Falcon  s  men  who  had  come 
into  the  harbor  in  the  captured  schooner  and  in 
their  own  boats,  both  schooners  remaining  in 
the  hands  of  the  Americans. 

To  Washington  himself  was  due  the  first 
organized  force  of  the  Americans  in  the  Revolu 
tion  upon  the  sea.  Throughout  his  career  he 
recognized  the  importance  of  its  control,  and 
immediately  on  his  arrival  at  Cambridge  to  take 
the  command  of  the  American  army  then  col 
lected  before  Boston,  he  began  to  look  into  the 
question  of  a  naval  force,  with  a  view  to  cap 
turing  the  enemy's  supplies.  Such  capture 
would  not  only  be  a  deprivation  to  the  British 
forces,  but  a  much  needed  aid  to  the  Americans 
who  needed  everything  which  goes  to  support 
an  army,  excepting  food,  which  the  surrounding 
country  supplied  for  the  moment  plentifully 
enough.  But  arms,  both  small  and  great, 
clothing,  ammunition,  and  tentage  were  im 
peratively  needed.  Such  in  quantities  were  on 
the  ocean  on  their  way  to  America  for  the 
British  army,  and  the  first  need  was  to  bring 
them  into  American  hands.  Washington  thus 


The  American  Navy  15 

established  a  little  navy  of  his  own,  with  a  prize 
court  necessary  to  pass  upon  the  propriety  of  the 
capture  and  commissioners  to  take  charge  of 
captured  material.  He  continued  such  efforts 
even  after  the  transfer  of  the  army  to  New  York, 
and  did  not  cease  from  them  until  the  Continen 
tal  Congress  took  the  subject  in  hand. 

The  beginning  of  Washington's  fleet  was  the 
schooner  Hannah,  which  sailed  under  Captain 
Nicholas  Broughton  from  Beverly,  Massachu 
setts,  on  September  5,  1775,  and  returned  two 
days  later  with  a  prize.  Naturally  many  of 
the  improvised  army  assembled  at  Cambridge, 
which  was  mainly  made  up  of  New  Englanders, 
were  men  of  the  sea,  and  thus  soon  there 
were  eight  small  vessels,  officered  and  manned 
from  the  army  in  service.  The  administration 
of  this  improvised  navy  was  not  an  easy  task. 
Washington,  writing  to  the  President  of  the 
Congress  on  December  4,  1775,  says:  "The 
plague,  trouble,  and  vexation  I  have  had  with 
the  crews  of  all  the  armed  vessels  is  inexpres 
sible.  I  do  not  believe  there  is  on  earth  a 
more  disorderly  set."  Successes  came,  how 
ever,  and  with  these  greater  contentment 
among*  the  crews.  Captain  John  Manley  was 
particularly  successful,  especially  in  the  capture 


16  The  American  Navy 

of  the  brigantine  Nancy,  which  carried  ordnance 
stores  of  the  highest  value  to  our  poorly  equipped 
army.  The  inventory  of  her  cargo  gives,  among 
other  things,  2,000  muskets,  thirty-one  tons  of 
musket  shot,  3,000  round  shot,  a  considerable 
quantity  of  powder,  and  a  thirteen-inch  mortar, 
which  was  promptly  mounted  in  Cambridge 
and  called  the  "Congress." 

The  British  evacuated  Boston  through  want 
of  food,  on  March  17,  1776,  going  first  to  Hali 
fax  and  thence  to  New  York.  Washington  had 
already  transferred  his  army  thither  and  con 
tinued  his  navy,  such  as  it  was,  until  he  himself 
retreated  from  New  York  as  the  result  of  the 
unfortunate  battle  of  Long  Island. 

Rhode  Island  had,  however,  taken  action 
toward  a  sea  force  several  months  before  Wash 
ington  had  formed  his  little  fleet.  The  Rhode 
Island  Assembly  had,  on  June  15,  1775,  two 
days  before  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill,  ordered 
the  chartering  of  two  sloops  and  had  appointed 
Abraham  Whipple  to  the  chief  command. 
Whipple  was  prompt  to  act,  for  on  the  same  day 
he  captured  the  tender  to  the  frigate  Rose,  the 
first  prize  of  the  war.  His  evident  courage  and 
vigor  caused  his  appointment  later  as  captain 
in  the  regular  navy  which  was  soon  to  come. 


The  American  Navy  17 

Rhode  Island  has  also  the  honor  of  being  the 
first  state  to  take  action  toward  the  establish 
ment  of  a  national  navy.  Her  delegates  were 
instructed  on  August  26,  1775,  to  bring  the 
question  of  a  fleet  before  Congress.  This  was 
done  on  October  3d.  The  subject  received  an 
almost  immediate  impetus  through  the  arrival 
of  information  of  two  brigs  which  had  left 
England  for  Quebec  with  arms,  powder,  and 
stores.  A  committee  of  three  was  proposed  to 
prepare  a  plan  to  intercept  these,  but  the  idea 
met  with  strong  opposition  as  being  initiatory 
to  a  Continental  navy,  as  in  fact  it  was.  It  was 
declared  by  some  opposed  to  be  the  "most 
wild,  visionary,  mad  project  that  had  ever  been 
imagined.  It  was  an  infant  taking  a  mad  bull 
by  the  horns,  ...  it  would  ruin  the  char 
acter  and  morals  of  our  seamen;  it  would  make 
them  selfish,  piratical,  mercenary,  bent  wholly 
upon  plunder."  Much  of  such  criticism  of  the 
project  might  have  been  spared.  Our  seamen 
had  been  living  through  an  age  of  privateering, 
and  one  in  which  the  latter  often  recked  but  too 
little  of  legal  capture,  and  they  had  too  long 
been  accustomed  to  the  general  system  of  illicit 
commerce  with  the  islands  of  the  West  Indies 
belonging  to  France  and  Spain  to  have  their 


1 8  The  American  Navy 

morals  upset  by  fighting  for  their  country.  The 
better  sense  prevailed  and  the  three  men  who 
had  urged  most  strongly  the  proposed  action 
were,  on  October  5,  1775,  appointed  a  committee 
to  report  a  scheme  of  action.  These  were 
John  Adams  of  Massachusetts,  John  Langdon 
of  New  Hampshire,  and  Silas  Deane  of  Con 
necticut. 

The  immediate  advice  of  the  committee 
which  was  to  instruct  Washington  to  procure 
two  cruisers  in  Massachusetts,  one  to  carry  ten, 
and  the  other  fourteen,  guns,  for  the  purpose  of 
intercepting  the  two  brigs  mentioned,  was  soon 
changed  in  a  report  of  October  30,  1775,  ad 
vising  to  add  two  more  vessels,  one  to  mount 
not  more  than  twenty,  the  other  not  more  than 
thirty-six,  guns,  to  be  employed  "for  the  pro 
tection  and  defence  of  the  United  Colonies«J' 
The  question  of  the  capture  of  special  ships  had 
been  dropped;  the  subject  had  become  national. 

On  December  14,  1775,  the  "Naval  Com 
mittee"  was  replaced  by  a  committee  of  thir 
teen  chosen  by  ballot.  The  membership  was 
remarkably  like  that  of  some  naval  committees 
of  later  times.  Scarcely  any  on  it  were  really 
conversant  with  matters  of  the  sea,  but  it  held 
one  man,  Robert  Morris  of  Pennsylvania,  whose 


The  American  Navy  19 

energy,  resource,  and  ability  caused  Congress 
to  put  in  his  sole  control,  before  the  war  ended, 
all  the  affairs  of  the  navy.  Agents  were  em 
ployed  to  superintend  construction,  and  prize 
agents  were  appointed.  On  November  6,  1776, 
Paul  Jones  wrote  in  his  usual  vigorous  way 
to  Robert  Morris,  declaring  the  necessity  of  a 
Board  of  Admiralty,  and  on  October  28,  1779, 
one  was  established.  Two  of  the  members 
were  to  be  members  of  Congress;  the  other 
three,  called  commissioners,  were  to  be  men 
possessing  knowledge  of  naval  matters.  The 
Marine  Committee  then  came  to  an  end,  but 
the  navy  boards  at  Philadelphia  and  Boston, 
each  of  "three  persons  well-skilled  in  maritime 
affairs,"  appointed  by  Congress  "to  execute  the 
business  of  the  navy  under  the  direction  of  the 
Marine  Committee/'  in  what  became  known 
as  the  Middle  and  Eastern  districts,  and  the 
navy  agents  were  retained  under  this  reorgan 
ization.  The  Board  of  Admiralty,  however, 
never  materialized.  On  February  7,  1781, 
Congress  resolved  that  naval  affairs  should  be 
under  a  single  person,  to  be  called  the  Secretary 
of  Marine.  The  office  was  never  filled.  Naval 
matters  had,  as  just  said,  gradually  drifted  into 
the  efficient  hands  of  the  Superintendent  of 


2O  The  American  Navy 

Finance,  Robert  Morris,  and  there  they  re 
mained  until  the  navy  of  the  Revolution  dis 
appeared  in  the  sale  of  the  last  ship,  the  Alliance, 
in  August,  1785.  The  fact  is  that  naval  affairs 
in  the  Revolution  suffered  equally  with  those 
of  the  army  through  the  ineptitude  and  in 
efficiency  of  a  Congress  which  was  rather  a 
board  of  advice  than  a  government,  even  when 
the  Articles  of  Confederation  were  adopted, 
which  was  not  finally  done  until  March  2, 
1781. 

On  November  2,  1775,  $100,000  was  voted 
for  ships,  and  the  committee  was  authorized  to 
select  officers  and  seamen.  On  November  loth 
were  authorized  two  battalions  of  marines.  The 
first  intention  was  to  take  them  from  the  army, 
but  Washington  objecting  to  such  weakening  of 
his  force,  they  were  to  be  raised  independently 
and,  with  a  curious  misunderstanding  of  their 
use,  it  was  provided  that  they  should  be  "such 
as  are  good  seamen."  Rules  for  the  govern 
ment  of  the  navy  were  passed  November  28th, 
and  the  offices  of  Captain,  Lieutenant,  Master, 
Master's  Mate,  Surgeon,  Chaplain,  and  War 
rant  Officer  established.  The  monthly  pay  of 
captain  was  $32;  of  able  seaman  $6.67,  later 
raised  to  $8.  A  prize  court  was  established. 


The  American  Navy  21 

The  rules,  naturally,  were  taken  from  those  of 
the  British  service,  and  throughout  the  whole 
existence  of  our  navy  there  has  run  a  strong 
similarity,  until  of  late  years  when  there  have 
been  many  changes  in  the  nomenclature  of  the 
ratings  of  the  enlisted  men.  Both  services  had 
the  "  Banyan  day,"  when  no  meat  was  served,* 
though  in  the  American  navy  this  soon  ceased 
to  be  an  actuality.  Such  phrases  as  "Chips" 
(the  carpenter)  and  "  Jimmy  Legs"  (the 
master-at-arms)  were  among  the  many  common 
to  both  services;  but  one,  "Jack-of-the-Dust" 
(an  adjunct  of  the  paymaster's  department), 
which  is  to-day  a  rating  in  the  American  navy, 
is  no  longer  a  part  of  British  ratings. 

On  December  13,  1775,  Congress  authorized 
the  building  of  thirteen  frigates,  and  next  day, 
December  I4th,  a  committee  of  thirteen  was 
chosen  by  ballot  to  superintend  their  construc 
tion  and  equipment;  five  of  these  were  to  be  of 
32  guns;  five  of  28;  and  three  of  24.  The 
Raleigh,  of  32  guns,  was  built  at  Portsmouth, 
New  Hampshire;  the  Hancock,  32,  and  Boston, 
24,  at  Salisbury  and  Newburyport,  Massachu 
setts;  the  Warren,  32,  and  Providence,  28,  at 


*This  phrase  had  its  origin  in  the  advocacy,  by  a  Dr.  Banyan, 
of  a  purely  vegetable  diet. 


22  The  American  Navy 

Providence,  Rhode  Island;  the  Trumbull,  28, 
at  Chatham,  on  the  Connecticut  River;  the 
Montgomery,  24,  and  Congress,  28,  at  Pough- 
keepsie,  New  York;  the  Randolph,  32,  Wash 
ington,  32,  Effingham,  28,  and  Delaware,  24,  at 
Philadelphia;  the  Virginia,  28,  at  Baltimore. 
Six  of  these — the  Montgomery,  Congress,  Wash 
ington,  Effingham,  Delaware,  and  Virginia — 
never  got  to  sea,  all  being  destroyed  to  prevent 
capture  except  the  Virginia  which,  having 
grounded  and  lost  her  rudder  in  the  Chesapeake, 
was  taken  by  a  British  force  in  the  bay. 

These  ships  were  to  cost  on  the  average  but 
$66,666,  and  the  whole  were  expected  to  be 
ready  by  March,  1776.  They  varied  from  121 
to  132  feet  in  length  on  the  gun  deck,  with  a 
breadth  of  from  32.6  to  34. 5^.  Their  arma 
ment  was  that  of  the  frigates  of  the  day:  12- 
pounders  on  the  main  deck  and  6-pounders  on 
the  quarter  deck  and  forecastle.  All  should  have 
been  ready  by  the  time  named,  for  the  Raleigh 
was  launched  at  Portsmouth  but  two  months 
after  her  keel  was  laid.  But  ill-luck  pursued 
them  throughout,  and  particularly  in  that  the 
free  life  and  greater  gains  of  the  privateersman 
made  it  almost  impossible  to  get  crews. 

Thus  the  four  ships  the  purchase  of  which 


The  American  Navy  23 

was  authorized  on  October  30,  1775,  were  tne 
first  of  our  navy.  These  were  the  Alfred,  of 
24  guns;  Columbus,  20;  Andrew  Doria,  14,  and 
the  Cabot,  16. 

Such  was  the  beginning  of  the  Continental 
navy  which  was  to  have  a  life  of  but  ten  years. 
A  few  words  will  complete  our  story  of  naval 
construction.  On  November  20,  1776,  Con 
gress  resolved  to  build  "immediately"  a  74  in 
New  Hampshire;  a  74  and  a  36  in  Massachu 
setts;  a  74,  a  brig,  18,  and  a  packet  boat  in 
Pennsylvania;  two  frigates,  36  each,  in  Vir 
ginia;  and  two  frigates,  36  each,  in  Maryland. 
But  in  July,  1777,  on  account  of  the  high  cost 
of  wages  and  material,  Congress  authorized 
stopping  work  on  such  as  the  committee  might 
judge  proper,  and  the  final  result  was  the  com 
pletion  and  getting  to  sea  of  but  three:  the 
Alliance,  36,  the  General  Gates,  18,  both  built 
in  Massachusetts,  and  the  Saratoga,  16,  in 
Pennsylvania.  Only  one  74  was  built.  This 
was  the  America,  at  Portsmouth,  New  Hamp 
shire,  and  she  was  not  launched  until  the  war 
had  practically  ended. 

During  the  early  part  of  1776  there  were  built 
on  Lake  Champlain,  under  the  direction  of 
Benedict  Arnold,  two  schooners  with  eight  6 


24  The  American  Navy 

and  4  pounders;  a  sloop  with  ten  guns  of  like 
calibre;  a  cutter  with  one  12,  one  9,  and  two  6; 
one  galley  with  two  i8-pounders  and  eight  12, 
and  two  others  of  nearly  equal  armament; 
eight  gondolas  with  three  8  and  9  pounders,  and 
two  other  small  craft.  These,  as  will  be  seen 
later,  were  to  fight  a  memorable  action. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  ships  put  afloat  by  Congress  and  which  may 
be  taken  as  the  regular  navy  of  the  Revolution 
were,  however,  strongly  supplemented  by  the 
navies  of  the  states  (except  New  Jersey  and  Del 
aware),  and  by  the  multitude  of  privateers 
which  cruised  under  both  state  and  Continental 
commissions.  Massachusetts  led  in  the  num 
ber  of  state  ships;  but  South  Carolina  in  size 
and  importance.  Massachusetts  had  sixteen 
vessels,  the  only  one  of  any  size  being  the  Pro 
tectory  a  ship  carrying  26  light  guns.  All  the 
others  carried  but  from  ten  to  twenty.  This 
"navy"  made  about  seventy  captures  during 
the  war.  But  the  state  made  one  most  unfor 
tunate  venture,  the  Penobscot  Expedition,  to 
be  mentioned  later.  New  Hampshire  had  one 
small  ship,  the  Hampden,  of  22  guns;  Georgia, 
four  galleys  (vessels  propelled  by  both  sails  and 
oars).  Connecticut  had  a  navy  of  ten  vessels, 
the  largest  of  which  were  the  Oliver  Cromwell,  of 
1 8  guns,  and  the  Defence,  of  14.  All  had  dis- 

25 


26  The  American  Navy 

appeared  by  loss  or  capture  by  July,  1779,  after 
having  made  some  thirty  captures.  There 
was,  however,  throughout  the  war  great  activ 
ity  in  Long  Island  Sound  where  there  was  a 
warfare  of  boats  against  the  illicit  traffic  carried 
on  to  supply  the  British  at  New  York.  As  al 
ways,  greed  frequently  overcame  patriotism, 
and  smuggling  in  both  directions  was  rife 
throughout  the  war. 

The  situation  of  New  York,  with  its  one  port 
in  possession  of  the  enemy,  precluded  anything 
of  a  patriot  naval  force  except  a  few  galleys  on 
the  Hudson.  Pennsylvania,  however,  had  in 
1777  a  total  of  fifty-one  vessels  on  the  Dela 
ware,  the  only  important  one  in  size  being  the 
small  purchased  ship  Montgomery;  all  the 
others  were  but  armed  boats  of  the  type  known 
as  galleys.  In  1777  there  were  in  the  state 
naval  service  (which  was  administered  by  a 
board  of  six,  later  of  ten)  a  total  of  about  700 
officers  and  men.  The  activities  of  this  force 
were  confined  to  the  Delaware  River  and  Bay, 
and  when  the  British  army  was  transferred  to 
Philadelphia  in  1777  these  activities  were  very 
active  indeed,  including  the  burning  of  a  British 
line-of-battle  ship,  the  Augusta,  64,  and  the 
sloop-of-war  Merlin,  18,  which  had  grounded. 


The  American  Navy  27 

All  these  vessels  were  finally  driven  up  the  Del 
aware  by  an  overpowering  force,  except  the 
Montgomery  and  several  smaller  craft,  which  had 
to  be  burned  to  escape  capture.  What  re 
mained  after  the  British  evacuation  of  Phil 
adelphia  in  1778,  when  the  French  fleet  had 
appeared  on  our  coast  under  the  alliance  just 
made  with  France,  were  sold  in  December  of 
that  year.  This  remainder  consisted  of  ten 
galleys,  nine  armed  boats,  the  brig  Convention, 
the  sloops  Speedwell,  Sally,  Industry,  and  Black 
Duck,  and  the  schooner  Lydia* 

Maryland  in  1776  invested  in  a  ship  called  the 
Defence  carrying  twenty-two  6-pounders,  the 
largest  vessel  of  her  coming  small  navy;  two 
schooners  and  seven  row  galleys  formed  the  re 
mainder.  All  except  two  galleys  and  a  schooner 
were  sold  in  1779,  but  British  success  in  the 
South  renewed  depredations  in  the  Chesapeake, 
and  four  large  barges  to  carry  twenty-five  men 
each  and  9  and  18  pounders  and  a  schooner  to 
carry  ten  4-pounders  were  ordered.  In  1782, 
depredations  continuing,  a  ship  and  four  addi 
tional  barges  were  ordered,  and  in  November 
of  that  year  such  vessels  fought  a  severe  and 


"Colonial  Records  of  Pennsylvania,  XI,  quoted  by  Paullin,  389. 


28  The  American  Navy 

most  gallant  action  with  an  overpowering 
British  force  of  the  same  character,  the  Pro 
tector,  which  bore  the  brunt  of  the  action  on  the 
American  side,  losing  fifty-four  killed  and 
wounded  out  of  her  crew  of  sixty-five.  "Ex 
cept  when  used  for  commercial  purposes,  Mary 
land's  vessels  rarely  passed  outside  the  capes 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Chesapeake/'  Virginia 
entered  upon  the  question  of  a  navy  with  en 
thusiasm  and  a  number  of  vessels  were  author 
ized;  the  two  frigates  voted  were,  however, 
never  built.  Actual  construction  was  confined 
to  galleys  and  schooners;  the  number  first  and 
last,  though  very  considerable,  is  indefinite. 
The  state  established  a  navy  yard  on  the  Chick- 
ahominy,  operated  a  ropewalk,  and  established 
naval  magazines.  The  whole  force  practically 
disappeared  during  the  raid  by  Phillips  and 
Arnold  when  on  April  27,  1780,  a  few  miles  below 
Richmond,  six  ships,  eight  brigs,  five  sloops, 
two  schooners,  and  several  smaller  vessels  and 
the  ropewalk  at  Warwick  were  destroyed; 
twelve  were  captured  which  had  escaped  de 
struction,  and  but  one  vessel  remained  in  the 
Virginia  navy,  the  armed  boat  Liberty.  A 
small  force  later,  in  1782,  was  gathered  which 
operated  in  the  Chesapeake  (within  which  the 


The  American  Navy  29 

Virginia  force  remained  almost  entirely  during 
the  war)  until  peace  in  1783. 

Almost  foremost  in  naval  activity  and  ex 
penditure  was  South  Carolina.  The  state 
owned  in  all  some  fifteen  vessels,  of  which  the 
most  important  was  the  Bricole,  purchased  in 
France,  and  mounting  forty-four  24/5  and  i8's, 
though  pierced  for  sixty.  She,  with  nearly  all 
the  other  ships  of  the  state,  was  sunk  as  an  ob 
stacle  to  the  British  in  the  siege  ending  in  the 
surrender  of  May  1 1,  1780.  She  was  the  largest 
American  ship  of  the  Revolution  in  actual  ser 
vice.  There  survived  the  Indian,  "rented"  by 
Alexander  Gillon,  who  had  been  commissioned 
as  commodore  and  sent  abroad  to  raise  some 
£71,000  with  which  to  build  three  frigates. 
The  only  result  was  the  renting  of  the  Indian, 
which  had  been  built  by  Congress  in  Holland, 
but  which,  to  prevent  international  complica 
tions,  had  been  sold  to  the  King  of  France  and 
by  him  given  to  the  Chevalier  Luxembourg. 
The  Indian  was  renamed  the  South  Carolina 
and  given  an  armament  of  twenty-eight  32*5 
and  twelve  I2*s,  an  unusually  heavy  battery. 
It  was  not  until  August,  1781,  that  she  got  to 
sea,  cruised  for  a  time  in  the  North  Sea,  but 
arrived  at  Havana  on  January  12,  1782,  with 


30  The  American  Navy 

five  valuable  prizes.  She  formed  one  of  a  com 
bined  American  and  Spanish  expedition  in  May 
to  the  Bahamas,  which  was  successful.  On 
May  28th  she  arrived  at  Philadelphia,  where  an 
agent  of  Luxembourg  caused  the  removal  of 
Gillon  and  the  appointment  of  a  Captain  Joy- 
ner;  she  refitted  and  left  for  sea  in  December. 
Scarcely  outside  the  Capes  of  the  Delaware,  she 
was  chased  by  a  British  squadron  and  taken 
after  a  two  hours'  fight.  Luxembourg  de 
manded  under  the  contract  an  indemnity  of 
300,000  livres  (francs).  This  Gillon  denied, 
claiming  his  removal  to  be  a  breach  of  contract. 
The  claims  were  unsettled  until  December, 
1874,  when  the  state  of  South  Carolina  paid 
$28,894  to  tne  neirs  of  Luxembourg  as  a  final 
settlement.  South  Carolina  is  still  prosecuting 
her  claims  against  the  United  States  for  a 
reimbursement  of  her  expenditures  for  this 
ship.* 

The  efforts  at  a  state  navy  of  North  Carolina, 
Georgia,  and  Rhode  Island  were  of  too  moder 
ate  a  character  to  need  much  comment.  That 
of  the  first  consisted  of  three  brigantines  in 
1778  and  the  addition  of  a  small  ship,  the  Cas- 
well,  in  1778.  By  June,  1779,  all  had  disap- 

*See  Paullin,  "The  Navy  of  the  American  Revolution." 


The  American  Navy  31 

peared  by  sale  or  (in  the  case  of  the  Caswell)  by 
sinking  at  Ocracoke.  Georgia  had  but  four 
galleys.  But  two  sloops  and  two  galleys  were 
the  extent  of  Rhode  Island's  navy,  though  it  was 
this  state,  as  mentioned,  which  took  the  first 
steps  toward  naval  defence. 

Of  vastly  greater  importance  than  the  state 
navies  were  the  privateers,  a  service  congenial 
to  the  New  England  seamen  from  every  point 
of  view.  There  was  "more  money  in  it";  there 
was  the  absence  of  a  strict  and  irksome  disci 
pline,  and  the  cruises  were  short.  The  great 
number  of  privateers  fitting  out  made  it  a  mat 
ter  of  extreme  difficulty  to  find  men  for  the 
ships  of  the  regular  service,  which  thus  not  in 
frequently  had  to  lie  idle  and  unemployed. 
Had  a  tithe  of  the  effort  expended  upon  priva 
teers  been  expended  upon  the  building  and 
equipment  of  a  navy,  it  is  not  unfair  to  say  that 
the  general  results  would  probably  have  been 
much  better.  But  privateering  had  already 
been  a  much-indulged-in  occupation.  The 
Seven  Years'  War  had  ended  only  in  1763,  and 
during  this  period  many  American  privateers 
were  afloat.  The  slave  trade  also  was  a  favorite 
New  England  occupation,  and  piracy  itself  at 
the  period  was  not  altogether  disreputable  it 


32  The  American  Navy 

applied  only  to  those  "natural  enemies,"  the 
French  and  Spanish.  Nearly  all  the  officers  of 
the  new  Continental  navy  had  their  first  war 
training  in  privateers,  and  very  frequently 
during  the  Revolution  officers  took  a  hand  at 
privateering  in  the  moments  of  enforced  leisure 
when  there  was  no  naval  ship  to  which  they 
could  be  assigned. 

Congress  authorized  privateering  on  March 
23,  1776,  and  a  list  printed  by  the  Library  of 
Congress  shows  the  number  and  kind  of  vessels 
furnished  with  letters  of  marque  by  the  Con 
tinental  Congress.  This  gives  a  total  of  such 
of  1,697.  Of  these  there  were  ships  301;  brigs 
and  brigantines,  541;  schooners  and  sloops,  751; 
boats  and  galleys,  104.  These  are  accredited  to 
the  several  states  as  follows:  New  Hampshire, 
43;  Massachusetts,  626;  Rhode  Island,  15; 
Connecticut,  218;  New  York,  i;  New  Jersey,  4; 
Pennsylvania,  500;  Maryland,  225;  Virginia, 
64;  South  Carolina,  I.  Distributed  by  years 
there  were  afloat  in  1776,  34;  1777,  69;  1778, 
129;  1779,  209;  1780,  301;  1781,  550;  1783, 
22.  These  altogether  carried  14,872  guns  and 
58,400  men.  It  is,  of  course,  almost  a  cer 
tainty  that  many  of  these  vessels  were  dupli 
cated  in  this  list,  but  such  duplication  is  more 


The  American  Navy  33 

than  offset  by  the  issuance  of  letters  of  marque 
by  the  several  states  and  in  France  and  the 
West  Indies  which,  according  to  an  excellent 
authority,  would  carry  the  number  to  over 
2,000,  with  18,000  guns  and  70,000  men. 
"Judging  from  the  scanty  information  at  hand 
concerning  British  privateering,  it  is  probable 
that  their  vessels  engaged  in  this  form  of  war 
fare  were  considerably  less  numerous  but  de 
cidedly  superior  in  force  to  the  Americans;  the 
latter  seem  to  have  carried  on  an  average  be 
tween  eight  and  nine  guns  and  less  than  thirty- 
five  men;  the  British  about  seventeen  guns  and 
seventy-five  or  more  men."* 

The  value  of  the  captures  of  the  privateers 
was  about  $18,000,000;  that  of  the  captures  of 
the  navy,  which  had  thirty-one  ships  afloat  in 
1776,  thirty-four  in  1777,  and  but  seven  in 
1782,  was,  proportioned  to  the  number  of  ships 
employed,  much  greater,  being  some  $6,000,000. 
Altogether  (i.  e.,  by  both  services)  some  800  ves 
sels  were  captured.  Our  own  losses  were  also  very 
great,  but  not  nearly  so  great  as  those  of  Britain. 
About  16,000  prisoners  were  taken  afloat,  only 
6,000  less  than  those  taken  by  the  army. 

By  July,  1776,  the  British  fleet  in  the  vicinity 

•Allen,  i,  47- 


34  The  American  Navy 

of  New  York,  where  the  attack  was  about  to 
take  place  on  the  American  army  assembled  on 
Long  Island  near  Brooklyn,  which  resulted  in 
our  defeat  and  the  occupancy  of  New  York  for 
the  remainder  of  the  war,  consisted  of  nine  ships 
of  from  50  to  64  guns;  three  of  44;  twenty-seven 
of  from  28  to  32;  fourteen  of  20;  eleven  of  14  to 
1 8;  sixteen  of  from  8  to  10 — a  total  of  eighty 
ships  of  war.  This  fleet  was  under  the  com 
mand  of  Richard  Viscount  Howe,  whose  brother, 
General  Howe,  was  commander-in-chief  of  the 
army  of  34,614  men,  of  whom  13,167  were  of 
the  29,867  Hessians  hired  for  the  war  by  Great 
Britain.  These  two  brothers  were  for  some  two 
years  to  conduct  the  British  main  operations  in 
America.  One,  the  admiral,  was  an  officer  of 
great  ability  and  rose  to  high  distinction;  the 
General  was  handicapped  by  a  slothful  and  un 
enterprising  disposition  with  a  character  marred 
by  an  extreme  looseness  in  moral  conduct.  His 
want  of  enterprise  may  have  been  due  in  part 
to  the  attitude  of  the  Whig  party  in  England, 
to  which  he  was  attached,  and  which  was  op 
posed  in  general  to  the  use  of  force  against 
America.  In  any  case,  his  qualities  were  such 
that  they  went  a  long  way  toward  the  estab 
lishment  of  American  independence. 


The  American  Navy  35 

In  addition  to  Howe's  fleet  there  were,  under 
Commodore  Sir  Peter  Parker,  two  5O-gun  ships, 
four  of  28,  two  of  20,  and  three  of  8  guns.  These 
were  to  be  employed  against  Charleston,  South 
Carolina. 

On  Lake  Champlain  the  British  were  to  have 
during  1776  a  ship  of  eighteen  12-pounders,  a 
schooner  of  fourteen  6-pounders;  another  of  12; 
three  "Radeaux"  (flat-bottomed  craft),  one 
carrying  six  24-pounders,  one  six  12-pounders, 
and  one  two  howitzers.  There  were  also  a 
gondola  (with  oars)  carrying  seven  9-pounders, 
and  twenty  gunboats,  each  with  a  brass  field 
piece  of  from  24  to  9  pounds. 

The  naval  force  here  mentioned  was  at  times 
reinforced  by  accessions  of  line-of-battle  ships, 
as  many  as  twenty-one  being  at  times  available. 
The  British,  however,  with  an  unwise  concep 
tion  of  the  true  strategy  of  the  situation,  were 
constantly  diverting  these  to  the  West  Indies, 
which,  during  our  Revolution,  after  war  was 
declared  by  France  and  Spain,  was  the  great 
field  of  navai  action.  It  is  within  bounds  to 
say  that  they  lost  the  United  States  for  the  sake 
of  the  West  India  Islands. 


CHAPTER  IV 

IT  WAS  not  until  February,  1776,  that  what  may 
be  termed  a  strictly  naval  event  took  form  in 
the  sailing  of  the  little  fleet  in  command  of 
Commodore  Esek  Hopkins,  under  orders  which 
were  sufficiently  explicit  in  primary  meaning, 
viz.:  to  proceed  to  Chesapeake  Bay  and  destroy 
the  powerful  flotilla  which  the  royal  governor 
of  Virginia  had  gathered  together  and  with 
which  he  was  harassing  the  Chesapeake  shores. 
Hopkins  was  then  to  proceed  to  the  Carolinas 
and  act  in  like  manner  against  the  enemy's 
forces,  after  which  he  was  to  go  to  Rhode  Island. 
A  final  phrase,  however,  left  a  loophole  for 
other  action:  "if  bad  winds  or  stormy  weather" 
or  any  other  accident  should  prevent,  he  was  to 
use  his  own  judgment. 

Hopkins  flew  his  broad-pennant  in  the  Alfred, 
in  which  also  was  then  hoisted  by  the  hands  of 
Lieutenant  John  Paul  Jones  a  Continental  flag 
which  bore  a  rattlesnake  and  a  motto,  "Don't 
tread  on  me,"  on  a  yellow  ground.  The  exact 

36 


The  American  Navy  37 

date  of  this  incident  is  unknown.  The  other 
vessels  of  the  squadron  were  the  ship  Columbus, 
20;  the  brig  Andrew  Doria,  14;  brig  Cabot,  14; 
brig  Providence,  12;  sloop  Hornet,  10;  schooner 
Wasp,  8;  schooner  Fly,  8.  The  number  of 
men  was  about  880. 

Hopkins,  instead  of  going  to  the  Chesapeake, 
directed  his  course,  on  the  plea  of  bad  weather, 
to  New  Providence  in  the  Bahamas,  where 
there  were  considerable  stores  of  powder  and 
cannon  of  which  the  newly  formed  Continental 
army  was  in  utmost  need.  Though  blamed 
later  by  enemies,  Hopkins  took  the  wiser  course. 
His  advent  there  on  March  3d  was  a  complete 
surprise:  250  men  were  landed  and  possession 
taken  of  the  little  town  and  forts  without  re 
sistance.  Two  weeks  was  spent  in  getting 
aboard  the  guns,  of  which  there  were  seventy- 
one,  from  9  to  32  pounders.  There  were  also 
fifteen  brass  mortars  and  twenty-four  barrels  of 
powder.  The  governor,  unfortunately,  had 
succeeded  in  sending  away  150  of  the  latter. 
The  guns,  however,  were  an  extremely  impor 
tant  prize,  and  to  carry  these  and  other  public 
property  seized,  a  sloop  was  impressed.  Hop 
kins  sailed  north  on  March  iyth,  carrying  the 
governor,  lieutenant-governor,  and  another  offi- 


38  The  American  Navy 

cial.  By  this  time  Newport,  Rhode  Island, 
was  occupied  by  a  British  force,  and  New  Lon 
don  was  selected  instead  as  a  port  of  return. 
When  off  Block  Island  the  British  man-of-war 
Glasgow,  of  20  guns  and  1 50  men,  was  sighted, 
and  a  running  action  took  place,  in  which  the 
Glasgow,  though  much  injured,  escaped  into 
Newport.  The  explanation  of  the  American 
commander  was  that  the  firing  must  bring  aid 
from  Newport  to  the  Glasgow's  rescue,  and  in 
fact  two  vessels  in  the  harbor  did  get  under  way 
to  go  out.  The  force  in  Newport,  however, 
which  was  only  the  small  frigate  Rose,  of  20 
guns,  the  Nautilus  and  Swan,  of  16  each,  and 
several  tenders,  was  no  more  than  an  equal 
match  for  our  own.  As  far  as  one  can  read  into 
this  event,  there  was  not  the  energy  shown  by 
our  people  which  should  have  been.  Giving 
up  the  action,  the  American  squadron  reached 
New  London  with  all  its  prize  intact.  The 
Commodore's  practical  disobedience  of  orders 
was  fully  condoned  by  Congress,  and  he  re 
ceived  a  letter  of  congratulation  from  President 
John  Hancock. 

The  British  squadron,  suffering  a  good  deal 
from  fire  from  batteries  on  shore,  had  left  New 
port  on  April  5th,  and  Hopkins  entered  Nar- 


The  American  Navy  39 

ragansett  Bay,  going  to  Providence  on  April 
25th.  So  many  of  his  men  had  sickened  on  the 
cruise  from  the  poor  food,  bad  water,  and  want 
of  general  hygiene  aboard  ship  at  that  period, 
that  he  had  landed  200  at  New  London.  He 
now  found  it  impossible  to  get  men.  Some  sol 
diers  who  had  been  temporarily  lent  from  the 
army  were  demanded  back  by  Washington, 
and  there  ensued  a  painful  period  for  the  un 
happy  Commodore.  Great  complaints  of  ill- 
treatment  went  to  Congress.  Hopkins'  man 
ners  to  his  officers  were  severely  criticised,  and 
the  whole  ended  in  an  official  inquiry  which  in 
cluded  his  disobedience  of  orders,  his  allowing 
the  Glasgow  to  escape,  and  his  inactivity  since 
his  return.  He  was  not  entirely  cleared  on  the 
first  two  charges,  but  the  prevalent  sickness 
among  his  men  and  the  impossibility  of  getting 
new  crews  on  account  of  the  active  fitting  out 
of  privateers  were  certainly  sufficient  to  exon 
erate  him  from  the  third.  Notwithstanding, 
and  although  he  was  energetically  defended 
by  John  Adams,  he  received  a  formal  censure 
from  Congress,  but  was  allowed  for  the  moment 
to  retain  his  command.  In  regard  to  the  ques 
tion  of  roughness  toward  his  subordinates  which 
was  involved  in  the  charges,  it  must  be  consid- 


4-O  The  American  Navy 

ered  that  all  officers  of  the  period  had  entered 
the  Continental  service  from  the  rough  life  of 
the  merchantman  of  the  time;  many  had 
served  in  privateers;  the  officers  of  the  British 
navy  itself  were  themselves  not  altogether 
lamblike,  if  we  are  to  believe  Smollet,  who  had 
personal  experience  as  a  surgeon's  mate.  It 
was  in  many  ways  a  rough  age  afloat  and  ashore 
and  in  every  society,  and  such  charges  as  were 
brought  against  Hopkins  cannot  justly  be 
judged  from  our  present  standpoint.  Certainly 
John  Paul  Jones,  his  first  lieutenant,  wrote 
him  at  this  time  a  kindly  and  sympathetic 
letter  regarding  this  trial.  Though  Hopkins 
remained  yet  some  time  in  the  service,  it  was 
not  for  long.  His  enemies,  and  apparently  they 
were  not  few,  again  brought  charges  against 
him.  As  a  result,  Congress  on  March  26,  1777, 
resolved  that  he  be  suspended  from  his  com 
mand,  and  on  January  2,  1778,  he  was  dismissed 
from  the  service.  That  the  service  suffered 
thereby  can  hardly  be  said,  as  he  was  now  sixty 
years  old,  an  old  age  for  that  period,  and  was 
scarcely  equal  to  the  exercise  of  vigorous  com 
mand,  but  the  fact  remains  that  he  met  unduly 
harsh  treatment. 

Hopkins's    squadron  was   now    broken    up, 


The  American  Navy  41 

though  the  several  ships  had  remained  under 
his  general  orders  until  his  dismissal.  They 
cruised  chiefly  "down  East"  off  New  England 
and  Nova  Scotia,  making  a  number  of  prizes, 
one  of  which,  the  Mellish,  taken  by  the  Alfred, 
now  commanded  by  Jones,  carried  a  cargo  of 
soldiers'  clothing  for  Burgoyne's  army  of  13,000 
men  now  in  Canada,  intended  to  proceed  by 
Lake  Champlain  to  New  York  and  thus  occupy 
a  line  which  would  separate  New  England  en 
tirely  from  the  rest  of  the  country. 

A  considerable  fleet  chiefly  of  gunboats  had, 
as  mentioned,  been  built  by  the  British  for 
service  on  Lake  Champlain.  The  offset  to  this, 
by  the  building  of  a  flotilla  under  Arnold,  has 
also  already  been  noted.  The  building  of  this 
little  fleet  was  to  change  history. 

The  British  naval  preparations  were  so  de 
layed  that  it  was  not  until  October,  1776  (on 
the  nth  and  I3th),  that  the  two  forces  came  to 
gether,  with  the  result,  after  a  most  gallant 
contest,  of  a  defeat  to  the  Americans,  who  re 
treated  up  the  lake,  destroying  all  their  vessels 
but  one  galley,  a  sloop,  and  two  small  schooners, 
and  the  galley  Washington,  which  last  was  cap 
tured.  The  gallantry  of  the  American  force 
is  all  the  more  to  be  commended  as  it  was  one 


42  The  American  Navy 

gathered  from  raw  material,  most  of  which  was 
unaccustomed  to  work  of  the  kind  it  was  called 
upon  to  do;  the  British,  on  the  other  hand,  were 
all  men-of-war's  men  "detached  from  his  Maj 
esty's  ships  and  vessels  in  the  river  St.  Lawrence 
to  serve  on  Lake  Champlain,"  to  the  number  of 
670. 

As  the  Americans  were  about  700,  the  forces 
were  almost  equal  in  numbers.  It  was  far 
otherwise  in  strength,  the  British  in  numbers  of 
vessels,  in  size,  and  in  armament  far  outclassing 
the  Americans.  They  were  in  numbers  29  to 
15,  and  the  ship  Inflexible  alone,  which  carried 
eighteen  12-pounders,  was  able  to  look  after 
a  large  proportion  of  the  American  squadron. 
The  American  loss  was  over  eighty;  that  of  the 
British  did  not  exceed  forty.  The  former  had 
lost  all,  but  to  good  purpose,  for  this  little  fleet 
had  delayed  the  advance  southward  of  Bur- 
goyne's  army  another  year,  thus  giving  time 
to  prepare  resistance,  and  what  perhaps  was 
equally  to  the  purpose,  so  far  as  the  fortunes  of 
America  were  concerned,  affording  time  to 
General  Howe  to  carry  out,  in  July,  1777,  his 
views  as  to  the  necessity  of  occupying  Phila 
delphia;  for  had  Burgoyne,  as  proposed,  started 
from  Canada  in  the  summer  of  1776,  Howe, 


The  American  Navy  43 

with  his  whole  large  army  would  have  been  at 
New  York  within  easy  support  of  this  movement 
of  so  vital  moment  to  the  British.  As  it  was, 
in  1777,  the  forces  were  widely  separated,  and 
Burgoyne,  instead  of  being  aided  as  he  had  ex 
pected,  went  to  his  destruction.  Thus  "Never," 
says  Clowes  in  the  great  history  of  "The  Royal 
Navy,"  speaking  of  this  action,  "had  any  force, 
big  or  small,  lived  to  better  purpose  or  died  more 
gloriously."  "That  the  war  spread  from  Amer 
ica  to  Europe,  from  the  English  Channel  to 
the  Baltic,  from  the  Bay  of  Biscay  to  the  Med 
iterranean,  from  the  West  Indies  to  the  Miss 
issippi,  and  ultimately  involved  the  remote 
waters  of  Hindostan,  is  traceable,  through  Sar 
atoga,  to  the  rude  flotilla  which  in  1776  antici 
pated  its  enemy  in  the  possession  of  Lake 
Champlain." 

It  was  as  just  mentioned  when  Burgoyne 
most  needed  support  in  his  advance  south  the 
next  year  (1777)  that,  Sir  William  Howe  (the 
British  commander-in-chief  in  America)  em 
barked  14,000  men,  and  escorted  by  the  fleet 
under  command  of  his  brother,  Lord  Howe, 
sailed  from  Sandy  Hook,  the  expedition  num 
bering  280  ships,  including  the  transports  and 
men-of-war.  Eight  thousand  men  were  left 


44  The  American  Navy 

at  New  York  under  Sir  Henry  Clinton.  Howe's 
objective  was  Philadelphia.  His  first  intention 
was  to  go  up  the  Delaware,  but  obstructions 
in  the  river  being  reported  by  one  of  the  naval 
captains,  he  changed  to  the  very  roundabout 
way  of  the  Chesapeake  Bay.  He  was  not  able 
to  land  his  troops  at  the  head  of  the  bay  until 
August  25th.  He  defeated  Washington  at  the 
battle  of  the  Brandywine  on  September  I  ith,  and 
on  the  26th  occupied  Philadelphia. 

The  General's  brother,  Lord  Howe,  in  com 
mand  of  the  fleet,  was  a  good  month  returning 
from  the  head  of  the  Chesapeake  round  to  and 
up  the  Delaware  as  far  as  Chester,  where  he 
arrived  on  October  6th,  so  slow  and  uncertain 
were  the  movements  of  sailing  ships  in  those 
days.  A  small  squadron  had  been  sent  in 
advance  to  clear  the  channel.  This  move  on 
the  part  of  the  British  to  occupy  the  river  was 
necessary  to  keep  up  the  supplies  of  their  army. 
In  this  fleet  there  were  eleven  vessels,  two  of 
which  were  64*8,  one  50,  and  three  frigates  of 
28  to  44  guns.  The  total  of  their  armament  was 
364  guns,  74  of  which  were  24-pounders,  with 
somewhat  over  2,000  men.  To  resist  this 
powerful  force  there  were  in  the  river  the  new 
Continental  frigate  Delaware,  of  twenty-four 


The  American  Navy  45 

12-pounders;  the  brig  Andrew  Doria,  of  fourteen 
6-pounders;  and  the  sloop  Hornet,  with  twelve 
9-pounders;  besides  six  smaller  vessels  carrying 
from  four  to  ten  9-pounders,  and  twelve  galleys 
with  one  gun  each,  of  18,  24,  or  32  pounds. 
These  were  assisted  by  the  whole  of  the  Penn 
sylvania  navy,  which  consisted  of  the  ship  Mont 
gomery,  of  fourteen  14-pounders,  and  thirty-eight 
small  craft  carrying  fifty-one  guns  varying 
from  4  to  1 8  pounders.  The  total  armament 
was  175  guns.  The  combined  Continental  and 
state  fleets  were  under  the  command  of  Com 
modore  John  Hazelwood  of  the  latter.  To 
support  these  there  were  Fort  Mifflin  on  an 
island,  with  also  two  small  batteries  on  the  main 
land,  just  below  the  mouth  of  the  Schuylkill 
and  two  miles  from  League  Island  on  the  Penn 
sylvania  side,  and  opposite,  on  the  New  Jersey 
shore,  at  Red  Bank,  Fort  Mercer;  a  battery  op 
posite  Hog  Island,  and  three  and  a  half  miles 
below  this,  another.  Obstructions  of  heavy 
timbers,  shod  at  their  points  with  iron,  were 
placed  opposite  this  last  battery  and  in  the 
channel  near  Fort  Mifflin. 

The  Delaware  River  has  a  somewhat  tor 
tuous,  and  in  places  a  narrow,  channel.  Its  de 
fensive  advantages  are  thus  very  strong,  and 


46  The  American  Navy 

the  Americans  had  a  fair  chance  of  success. 
The  most  powerful  of  the  naval  defence  was 
lost  in  the  beginning  by  the  grounding  of  the 
Delaware  near  a  British  battery  on  the  city 
front. 

Notwithstanding,  the  Americans  made  a  fine 
defence  of  more  than  six  weeks.  It  was  not 
until  November  loth  that  the  British  succeeded 
in  clearing  the  river  to  Philadelphia  and  then 
with  heavy  loss  in  men  and  in  ships,  two  of 
which,  a  ship-of-the-line  and  a  sloop-of-war, 
were  burned.  Later,  in  May,  1778,  they  in 
vaded  the  river  above  Philadelphia.  The  frig 
ates  Washington  and  Ejffingham,  nearly  ready 
for  sea,  had  to  be  burned,  and  besides  these  a 
ship  of  1 8  guns,  and  brigs,  schooners,  and  small 
craft,  some  fifty-four  in  all,  destroyed;  a  sad 
ending  to  a  long  and  gallant  struggle. 

It  was  in  the  Delaware  that  in  December, 
1777,  David  Bushnell  made  a  second  trial  of  his 
torpedoes  (the  first  having  been  in  the  Hud 
son).  He  used  kegs  of  powder  fitted  with  a 
detonating  fuse,  which  should  have  succeeded. 
No  damage  was  done  through,  as  Bushnell 
claims,  bad  management.  The  British  fleet 
was  alarmed  enough,  however,  to  justify  Fran 
cis  Hopkinson,  one  of  the  signers  of  American 


The  American  Navy  47 

Independence,  in  producing  the  well-known 
poem  of  the  "Battle  of  the  Kegs,"  once  a 
favorite  with  our  fathers. 

The  Randolph,  Hancock,  Raleigh,  and  Boston 
were  the  only  frigates  at  sea  in  this  year.  The 
Hancock,  Captain  Manley,  was  captured  July 
7th,  on  this  her  first  cruise,  by  a  British  forty- 
four;  the  Raleigh,  under  Captain  John  Barry, 
during  an  action  with  two  British  ships,  one  of 
which  was  of  50  guns,  ran  on  a  rocky  islet  near 
Penobscot  Bay,  September  27,  1778.  Her  crew 
escaped  ashore,  but  the  ship,  though  an  effort 
had  been  made  to  burn  her,  was  hauled  off  by 
the  British.  Both  the  captured  ships  were 
taken  into  the  British  service.  The  Randolph, 
which  had  been  one  of  the  earliest  of  the  new 
frigates  to  get  to  sea,  had,  in  the  period  of  her 
sea  service,  been  actively  cruising  in  our  south 
ern  waters  under  the  command  of  Captain 
Biddle,  and  was  ordered  to  France  in  October, 
1777.  She  remained  there  but  a  short  time 
owing  to  the  protests  of  the  British  ambassador 
against  our  ships  remaining  in  French  ports,  and 
returned  to  Charleston,  whence  she  had  sailed. 
Here  a  squadron  was  organized  with  four  other 
small  vessels  of  the  South  Carolina  navy,  which 
went  to  sea  February  12,  1778,  and  cruised  in 


48  The  American  Navy 

the  vicinity  of  the  Windward  Islands.  On 
March  yth  was  met  the  Yarmouth,  64.  Biddle 
gallantly  engaged  the  ship  twice  his  force,  but 
the  Randolph  after  an  action  of  about  fifteen 
minutes  blew  up.  Only  four  men  were  saved, 
and  these  were  picked  up  five  days  after  the  ex 
plosion,  on  a  piece  of  wreckage,  by  the  Yar 
mouth,  which  meanwhile  had  been  actively 
cruising.  The  incident  is  certainly  among  the 
most  extraordinary  of  happenings  even  on  the 
sea,  so  prolific  in  adventures.  Three  hundred 
and  eleven  men  were  lost  besides  officers.  The 
loss  of  Captain  Biddle,  one  of  the  most  promis 
ing  of  our  sea  officers,  was  specially  deplored. 


CHAPTER  V 

SILAS  DEANE  had  been  the  first  American  agent 
abroad,  reaching  Europe  in  July,  1776.  Frank 
lin  and  Arthur  Lee  arrived  in  France  in  Decem 
ber  of  that  year,  the  former  in  the  brig  Reprisal, 
which  was  the  first  American  man-of-war  to 
visit  the  eastern  hemisphere.  Seldom  has  there 
been  a  ship  whose  safety  meant  so  much;  for 
upon  Franklin's  great  social  and  political  in 
fluence  was  to  depend  the  aid  of  France,  and 
upon  this  aid,  American  independence.  The 
Reprisal  had  taken  several  prizes  which  she  had 
carried  into  Nantes,  and  the  reception  of  these 
and  the  many  to  come  later  into  French  and 
Spanish  ports  caused  strong  protests  from  Eng 
land  to  which  these  governments  had  to  give 
heed.  The  commissioners  were  to  purchase  or 
hire  eight  line-of-battle  ships  as  well  as  a  frigate 
and  two  cutters,  but  their  endeavors  fell  far 
short  of  such  a  program.  Nevertheless,  all 
things  considered,  aid  in  money,  and  particu 
larly  in  much  needed  army  stores,  was  forth- 

49 


50  The  American  Navy 

coming  to  a  surprising  degree,  and  the  name  of 
Beaumarchais  in  France  and  that  of  Gardoqui 
in  Spain,  who  acted  at  Bilbao  as  Beaumarchais's 
agent,  deserve  lasting  remembrance  by  Amer 
icans.  In  1778  Deane  was  replaced  by  John 
Adams,  who,  accompanied  by  his  son,  John 
Quincy,  then  eleven  years  old,  sailed  from  Bos 
ton  on  February  I5th  in  the  frigate  Boston,  and 
reached  Bordeaux  on  April  ist.  Naval  inter 
ests,  after  Deane's  recall,  were  taken  over 
chiefly  by  Franklin. 

The  war  had  lasted  three  years,  but  now  in 
this  year  of  1778  it  was  to  take  a  new  develop 
ment.  The  immediate  cause  was  the  surrender 
of  Burgoyne  at  Saratoga  on  October  17,  1777. 
The  chain  of  causes  was,  as  already  mentioned, 
the  resistance  offered  on  Lake  Champlain  the 
previous  year  (1776)  by  the  flotilla  under  Ar 
nold,  the  transfer  of  the  main  part  of  the  British 
force  from  New  York  to  Philadelphia  when  it 
should  have  been  employed  to  support  Bur 
goyne,  and  the  too  leisurely  movement  of  Clin 
ton  up  the  Hudson  with  a  large  portion  of  the 
8,000  men  left  at  New  York.  Clinton  cap 
tured  the  forts  at  the  Highlands,  but  he  was  too 
late  to  save  Burgoyne,  who  surrendered  the  day 
after  the  British  army  burned  Kingston.  The 


The  American  Navy  51 

surrender  was  a  fitting  nemesis  for  such  an  act. 
A  greater  strategic  failure  than  was  this  cam 
paign  on  the  part  of  the  British  is  not  recorded 
in  history,  nor  has  there  ever  been  one  with 
more  momentous  consequences.  It  convinced 
the  French  Government,  smarting  under  its 
loss  of  Canada  in  the  treaty  of  1763,  that  there 
was  now  a  fair  chance  of  American  success,  and 
on  February  6,  1778,  was  signed  the  treaty  of 
alliance  which  brought  the  ships  the  aid  of 
which  was  so  vital  to  our  success.  Two  months 
later,  April  13,  1778,  Vice-Admiral  Charles 
Henri  Theodat  d'Estaing  du  Saillans,  gener 
ally  known  to  us  as  the  Count  d'Estaing,  sailed 
from  Toulon  with  twelve  battleships  and  five 
frigates.  Two  of  these  ships  were  of  80  guns, 
six  of  74,  three  of  64,  and  one  of  50.  The  naval 
story  of  our  Revolution,  though  its  greatest 
exploits  in  the  cruise  of  Paul  Jones  and  the  cap 
ture  of  the  Serapis  were  yet  to  come,  must, 
henceforward,  be  largely  of  French  ships. 

The  French  commander  had  one  of  the  great 
est  chances  in  history.  The  British  fleet  was 
in  the  Delaware  awaiting  the  preparation  of  the 
British  army  to  return  to  New  York  from  Phila 
delphia.  Howe  had  but  six  64*8,  three  50*5, 
and  six  frigates.  They  had  been  a  sure  prey  to 


52  The  American  Navy 

the  French  had  there  been  in  command  a  man 
of  greater  energy.  But  d'Estaing  had  been 
transferred  at  the  mature  age  of  thirty-five 
from  the  army  to  the  navy,  the  profession  of  all 
others  which  requires  a  lifelong  familiarity, 
and  where  the  rigidity  and  formality  of  the 
army  school  of  the  period  were  wholly  out  of 
place.  There  have  been  rare  exceptions  to  the 
general  rule,  Blake  being  a  notable  example,  but 
d'Estaing  was  not  one  of  these.  He  was,  says  a 
French  writer,  "detested  from  the  first — the 
word  is  not  too  strong — by  most  of  his  officers."* 

Whether  through  bad  luck  or  want  of  energy, 
he  was  more  than  a  month  (thirty-three  days) 
in  even  reaching  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar,  700 
miles  from  Toulon,  thus  making  an  average  of 
but  twenty-one  miles  a  day. 

A  British  frigate  was  noted  by  the  French  in 
passing  Gibraltar,  which  "tranquilly  and  com 
fortably  watched  the  French  fleet  defile  by  in 
three  columns."  But  this  same  ship  followed 
for  ninety  leagues  into  the  Atlantic,  to  make 
sure  of  the  French  course,  and  then  hastened  to 
England.  It  arrived  there  on  June  5th,  fifty- 
three  days  after  d'Estaing  had  left  Toulon  and 

*Lacour-Gayet,  "La  Marine  Militaire  de  la  France  sous  le 
Regne  de  Louis  XVI,"  142. 


The  American  Navy  53 

twenty  after  he  had  passed  the  Straits.  This 
knowledge,  however,  was  not  necessary  to 
British  action.  A  force  equal  to  d'Estaing's 
and  to  be  commanded  by  Vice-Admiral  Byron 
had  already  been  in  preparation,  though  it  had 
been  hampered  as  much  by  poor  dockyard  ad 
ministration  and  want  of  men  as  was  d'Estaing 
by  his  own  want  of  push. 

It  was  not  until  July  7,  1778,  that  the  French 
fleet  anchored  at  the  Capes  of  the  Delaware. 
But  the  quarry  had  gotten  away.  The  British 
army  had  left  Philadelphia  on  June  i8th  on  its 
march  to  Sandy  Hook.  The  scores  of  trans 
ports  carrying  the  army  baggage  and  stores  had 
started  down  the  Delaware  next  day.  They  did 
not  get  clear  of  the  Capes  until  June  28th,  and, 
convoyed  by  the  men-of-war,  reached  inside  of 
Sandy  Hook  on  June  joth.  Never  was  greater 
opportunity  lost.  A  little  earlier  and  with 
Howe's  fleet  captured,  the  fall  of  New  York, 
practically  undefended,  was  a  certainty.  But 
for  d'Estaing's  want  of  push  the  war  would 
have  ended  in  1778  instead  of  five  years  later. 

Howe  had  heard  of  d'Estaing's  approach. 
He  made  admirable  preparations  to  resist  the 
entry  of  New  York  Bay.  D'Estaing  arrived 
off  Sandy  Hook,  but  though  offering  the  large 


54  The  American  Navy 

sum  of  150,000  francs,  pilots  were  unobtainable, 
probably  by  reason  of  fearing  the  vengeance  of 
the  British  if  they  should  be  taken.  On  July 
22d  there  was  a  fresh  northeast  wind  and  a 
spring  (a  highest)  tide.  There  was  ample 
water  for  any  ship  of  his  fleet,  but  d'Estaing 
and  his  officers  were  unacquainted  with  the 
region  and  did  not  dare  to  venture.  "At  eight 
o'clock,"  wrote  an  eyewitness  in  the  British  fleet, 
"d'Estaing,  with  all  his  squadron,  appeared 
under  way.  He  kept  working  to  windward  as 
if  to  gain  a  proper  position  for  crossing  the  bar 
by  the  time  the  tide  should  serve.  The  wind 
.  blew  from  the  exact  point  from  which 
he  could  attack  us  to  the  greatest  advantage. 
The  spring  tides  were  at  the  highest. 
We  consequently  expected  the  hottest  fray  that 
had  been  fought  between  the  two  nations.  On 
our  side  all  was  at  stake.  Had  the  men-of-war 
been  defeated,  the  fleet  of  transports  and  vict- 
ualers  must  have  been  destroyed,  and  the 
army  of  course  fallen  with  us.  D'Estaing, 
however,  had  not  spirit  equal  to  the  risk;  at 
three  o'clock  we  saw  him  bear  off  to  the  south 
ward,  and  in  a  few  hours  he  was  out  of  sight."* 
Naturally  Washington's  disappointment  over 

*Clowes,  "The  Royal  Navy,"  III,  401. 


The  American  Navy  55 

d'Estaing's  failure  was  great.  The  great  prize 
had  been  lost.  He  had,  however,  arranged  with 
d'Estaing  that  should  the  latter  not  attack 
New  York,  he  would  go  to  Newport,  Rhode  Is 
land,  and  assist  General  John  Sullivan  in  at 
tacking  the  British  force  of  some  6,000,  which, 
supported  by  six  ships-of-war,  held  Newport. 

D'Estaing  anchored  off  Newport  (outside  the 
bay)  on  July  29,  1778.  The  next  day  SufFren, 
with  two  ships-of-the-line,  went  into  the  channel 
west  of  Conanicut  Island,  and  two  frigates  and 
a  sloop-of-war  entered  Sakonnet;  whereupon 
the  British  burned  the  Kingfisher,  of  16  guns, 
and  some  galleys  stationed  there.  The  British 
general,  Sir  Robert  Pigot,  withdrew  1,500  Hes 
sians  from  Conanicut  and  concentrated  his 
forces  about  the  town.  Goat  Island,  where  is 
now  the  United  States  Torpedo  Station  and 
where  for  many  years  was  a  fort,  was  also  occu 
pied,  as  this  commanded  the  main  channel  and 
the  entrances  to  the  inner  harbor.  On  August 
5th  SufFren  with  his  two  ships  went  into  the 
main  channel  near  the  north  end  of  Conanicut, 
two  others  taking  his  former  place.  Captain 
John  Brisbane,  the  senior  British  naval  officer, 
now  destroyed  four  frigates,  the  Flora,  Juno, 
Lark,  and  Orpheus,  of  32  guns  each,  and  the 


56  The  American  Navy 

corvette  Falcon,  of  16  guns,  two  being  sunk  at 
the  south  end  of  Goat  Island.  Five  transports 
were  sunk  between  Goat  and  Coasters'  Harbor 
Island,  thus  closing  both  entrances  to  the  inner 
harbor.  The  guns,  ammunition,  and  the  thou 
sand  or  so  men  of  their  crews  went  to  strengthen 
the  forces  of  the  batteries. 

It  was  not  until  August  8th  that  d'Estaing 
with  the  eight  remaining  ships-of-the-line  ran 
the  batteries  and  anchored  between  Coasters' 
Harbor  Island  and  Conanicut.  He  was  now 
joined  by  the  others  except  one  which  remained 
as  a  lookout  in  the  West  Channel.  The  long  de 
lay  of  ten  days  from  the  time  of  arrival  had 
been  at  Sullivan's  request,  who  was  not  yet 
ready.  Two  thousand  men  had  been  sent  by 
Washington  under  Lafayette,  but  the  expected 
militia  were  slow  to  come  in.  Things  now 
looked  very  black  for  the  British,  but  the  delay 
had  been  fatal. 

D'Estaing  on  August  9th  landed  on  Conani 
cut  such  of  his  thousand  soldiers  in  the  fleet  as 
were  fit  for  duty  and  some  two  thousand  sea 
men,  in  readiness  for  the  morrow's  attack  as 
arranged.  Scarcely  were  these  landed  when 
the  lifting  of  the  fog  revealed  the  English  fleet 
at  anchor  off  Point  Judith,  seven  miles  south- 


The  American  Navy  57 

west  of  Narragansett  Bay.  Though  there  were 
some  thirty  ships,  there  were  but  one  74,  six 
64/5,  and  five  5o's,  a  force  wholly  inadequate 
to  meet  d'Estaing's.  Howe,  thus  inferior, 
could  not  have  ventured  into  the  bay,  but  his 
presence  caused  d'Estaing  to  lose  his  judgment. 
The  latter  had  begun  to  get  his  ships  into  posi 
tion  for  defence,  in  the  prevailing  calm,  but 
next  morning  when  the  wind  came  out  from  the 
northeast,  fair  for  leaving  port,  but  making  it 
impossible  for  Howe  to  come  in  even  had  his 
force  allowed,  d'Estaing  in  over  haste  cut  his 
hemp  cables  and  went  to  sea.  Howe,  unable  to 
meet  him,  did  the  same,  and  now  the  day  and 
part  of  the  next  were  spent  in  maneuvering  for 
position  in  face  of  a  rising  storm.  The  wind 
had  gradually  increased  and  finally  blew  with 
such  force  as  to  make  action  impossible.  Next 
day  (August  I2th)  it  developed  into  an  "August 
storm,"  a  West  India  hurricane,  which  had 
taken  its  usual  course  up  our  coast,  scattering 
both  fleets  and  inflicting  heavy  damage,  par 
ticularly  upon  the  French,  whose  flagship,  the 
Languedoc,  completely  dismasted  and  with 
tiller  broken,  came  near  being  taken  on  the 
1 3th  by  a  much  weaker  but  wholly  manage 
able  British  5o-gun  ship,  the  Renown.  Only 


58  The  American  Navy 

night  saved  her.  D'Estaing,  with  several  ships 
under  jury  masts,  anchored  east  of  Cape  May 
and  gradually  collected  his  damaged  fleet.  He 
was  seen  here  by  Howe,  who  had  now  but  two 
of  his  ships  in  company.  By  August  2Oth 
d'Estaing  was  again  off  Newport,  but  only  to 
hold  a  council  of  war  at  which  were  present 
Sullivan  and  Lafayette.  D'Estaing  was  will 
ing  to  remain  two  days  if  the  American  officers 
would  guarantee  the  surrender  of  Newport  in 
that  time.  This  they  could  not  do,  and  the 
fleet  left  for  Boston,  which  was  mentioned  in  the 
admiral's  orders  as  the  place  in  which  he  was  to 
refit  in  case  of  need.  It  is  of  no  use  to  dwell 
upon  the  bitter  feeling  aroused  among  the 
Americans,  who  felt  that  the  British  army  at 
Newport  was,  with  the  aid  of  the  fleet,  in  their 
power.  In  all  fairness,  however,  the  failure  was 
really  due  to  Sullivan's  own  delay,  which 
changed  completely  naval  conditions.  The 
siege  was  raised;  the  great  effort  had  gone  for 
nothing  but  the  destruction  of  a  few  unimpor 
tant  British  ships.  The  British  fleet,  now  heavily 
reinforced  by  the  thirteen  powerful  ships  under 
Byron  which  had  left  England  in  June,  had 
command  of  the  sea. 

D'Estaing    spent    two    months    refitting    at 


The  American  Navy  59 

Boston,  and  then  following  the  letter  of  his 
orders,  left  on  November  4,  1778,  for  the  West 
Indies,  where  he  was  much  more  fortunate,  but 
where  we  cannot  follow  him.  His  departure  left 
our  coast  open  to  invasion  at  every  point,  and 
thus  Savannah  was  occupied  in  December  by  a 
strong  British  force;  it  was  the  beginning  of  the 
Southern  invasion  which  was  to  cost  us  dear. 

Pressed  by  our  people,  d'Estaing  in  the 
summer  of  1779,  though  he  had  received  orders 
to  return  with  his  own  particular  squadron  to 
France,  determined  to  attempt  to  dislodge  the 
British  at  Savannah.  He  thus  left  Santo 
Domingo  with  twenty  ships-of-the-line  and 
seven  frigates,  and  anchored,  on  August  31, 
1779,  off  Tybee  at  the  mouth  of  the  Savannah 
River,  on  which,  eighteen  miles  from  the  sea,  is 
Savannah,  then  but  a  small  village.  Troops 
were  landed  by  the  French,  an  attack  made,  and 
an  expedition,  expected  to  be  completed  in 
eight  days,  extended  to  two  months.  It  ended 
in  disaster;  gale  after  gale  crippled  the  French 
fleet  here  on  an  unprotected  coast,  until  on 
October  28th  it  was  wholly  dispersed.  The 
flagship  was  driven  to  sea  with  the  loss  of  both 
her  only  remaining  anchors,  and  it  was  not  until 
well  into  December  that  the  main  portions  came 


60  The  American  Navy 

together  again  in  the  West  Indies.  D'Estaing 
himself,  however,  was  driven  so  far  to  sea  that 
he  determined  to  return  alone  to  France.  This 
he  did,  fortunately  meeting  the  Provence  which 
gave  him  an  anchor,  and  reached  Brest  on 
December  7,  1779. 

He  returned,  having  accomplished  nothing  in 
aid  of  the  United  States  itself,  however  fortu 
nate  in  the  West  Indies.  He  was  severely 
judged  by  naval  officers  of  his  service.  One, 
however,  need  not  go  to  the  extent  of  Captain 
La  Clocheterie,  whom  the  Vicomte  de  Charlus 
(who  kept  a  journal  when  crossing  the  Atlantic 
with  Rochambeau's  expedition  next  year)  re 
ports  as  saying:  "He  was  a  coward  and  a  man  of 
no  talent."  His  failure  is  found  rather  in  the  mot 
of  a  really  great  French  sailor,  Suffren:  "If  he 
had  only  been  as  much  of  a  seaman  as  he  was 
brave " 

The  whole  conduct  of  d'Estaing's  campaign 
illustrates  what  superior  strength  at  sea  might 
accomplish  but,  in  this  case,  did  not.  If  he 
had,  in  going  to  America,  pressed  westward, 
even  to  the  extent  of  towing  his  slow  sailers,  he 
would  have  made  one  of  the  great  successes  of 
history,  and  have  ended  the  war  in  America. 
Failing  this,  he  could,  at  once  on  his  arrival, 


The  American  Navy  61 

have  forced  the  surrender  of  Newport,  upon 
which  he  had  but  to  close  his  hand  and  the  place, 
with  its  7,000  soldiers  and  sailors,  and  the  bay 
would  have  been  in  possession  of  the  allies.  His 
fault,  militarily  considered,  was  in  acceding  to 
Sullivan's  request  for  delay.  Reading  into  the 
psychics  of  the  question,  this  request  had  its 
basis  in  Sullivan's  desire  to  make  as  good  a  show 
ing  as  possible  in  the  combined  operations,  and 
not  from  actual  necessity,  as  the  powerful 
French  fleet  in  itself  commanded  the  situation, 
and  d'Estaing's  compliance  came  from  a  nat 
ural  desire  to  meet  the  wishes  of  the  American 
commander.  But  on  neither  side  was  it  war. 
His  leaving  the  bay  at  the  crisis  of  events  was 
an  unfortunate  want  of  judgment.  His  later 
action  was  but  part  of  the  ill-judged  strategy  of 
the  time  which  ended  in  the  fall  of  Charleston  and 
the  British  occupancy  of  the  whole  South,  its 
wholesale  devastation  and  well-nigh  subjugation. 
But  neither  side,  British  nor  French,  could 
understand  how  completely  the  whole  was  a 
question  of  naval  domination.  Washington 
saw,  but  he  was  powerless  to  do  more  than  pro 
claim  again  and  again  the  truth,  until  finally 
in  1781  he  was  listened  to,  the  result  of  which  was 
one  of  the  decisive  triumphs  of  all  time. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  new  treaty  with  France  was  to  bring  into 
special  prominence  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
characters  of  his  time,  John  Paul  Jones.  On 
October  10,  1776,  he  had  been  made  the  eigh 
teenth  captain  on  a  list  of  twenty-four  then  es 
tablished.  He  considered  himself  ill-treated, 
and  justly  so,  as  having  been  first  on  the  list  of 
lieutenants  he  should  have  been  placed  higher. 
His  animadversions  on  the  subject,  in  a  letter 
to  Robert  Morris,  are  worth  quoting.  It 
showed  along  with  some  very  just  criticisms 
that  he  had  a  high  and  fitting  estimate  of  his 
duties  as  a  sea  officer,  and  of  the  demands  of  his 
calling.  He  said: 

"I  cannot  but  lament  that  so  little  delicacy 
hath  been  observed  in  the  appointment  and 
promotion  of  officers  in  the  sea  service,  many  of 
whom  are  not  only  grossly  illiterate,  but  want 
even  the  capacity  of  commanding  merchant  ves 
sels.  I  was  lately  on  a  court-martial  where  a 
captain  of  marines  made  his  mark  and  where 

62 


The  American  Navy  63 

the  president  could  not  read  the  oath  which  he 
attempted  to  administer  without  spelling  and 
making  blunders.  As  the  sea  officers  are  so  sub 
ject  to  be  seen  by  foreigners,  what  conclusions 
must  they  draw  of  Americans  in  general,  from 
characters  so  rude  and  contracted?  In  my 
judgment  the  abilities  of  sea  officers  ought  to 
be  as  far  superior  to  the  abilities  of  officers  in 
the  army  as  the  nature  of  a  sea  service  is  more 
complicated  and  admits  of  a  greater  number  of 
cases  than  can  possibly  happen  on  the  land; 
therefore  the  discipline  by  sea  ought  to  be  the 
more  perfect  and  regular,  were  it  compatible 
with  short  enlistments."^ 

On  June  14,  1777,  Jones  was  assigned  to  the 
command  of  the  little  cruiser  Ranger,  just  com 
pleted  at  Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire.  On  the 
same  day  Congress  established  the  Stars  and 
Stripes  as  the  national  flag,  and  it  is  said,  and  is 
probable,  that  Jones  was  the  first  to  hoist  this 
flag  on  a  man-of-war.  His  ship  was  but  1 16  feet 
overall  and  28  feet  broad.  She  mounted  eigh 
teen  6-pounders. 

The  delay  in  fitting  out  is  not  to  the  credit 
of  the  energy  of  those  charged  with  providing 
the  ship's  equipment.  The  sails  were  not  ready 
until  late  in  October.  With  a  crew  of  about 


*  Jones  Mss.,  July  28,  1777,  quoted  by  Allen,  i,  183. 


64  The  American  Navy 

one  hundred  and  forty,  "nearly  all  full-blooded 
Yankees,"she  sailed  on  November  i  st,  for  France, 
carrying  dispatches  from  Congress  and  taking 
two  prizes  on  the  way.  Jones  arrived  at  Nantes 
on  December  2,  1777. 

He  had  a  long  wait  in  France  before  he  again 
got  to  sea,  but  his  frequent  consultations  with 
our  commissioners,  his  always  excellent  advice 
in  naval  matters,  and  his  general  activity  were 
worth  the  delay.  It  was  not  until  April  loth 
that  he  got  to  sea,  starting  on  his  famous  cruise 
in  the  Irish  Sea  during  which  he  took  a  number 
of  prizes,  among  them  the  Drake,  a  sloop-of- 
war  carrying  twenty  6-pounders.  He  landed 
at  Whitehaven,  Scotland,  and  burned  a  ship, 
one  of  many  which  he  had  hoped  to  destroy  in 
this  port,  and  made  the  famous  descent  upon 
Lord  Selkirk's  estate,  where  his  men  carried 
off  the  family  silver.  But  Jones  had  a  muti 
nous  crew,  thirsting  for  booty,  and  his  concession 
of  plunder  was  a  case  of  force  majeure.  He 
later  redeemed  the  silver,  giving  to  the  crew 
several  hundred  pounds  as  its  valuation  as 
prize,  and  returned  it  to  the  family.  Jones  had 
had  much  difficulty  with  both  officers  and  crew, 
partially  no  doubt  through  his  own  roughness 
(mentioned  in  Fanning's  narrative)  toward  the 


The  American  Navy  65 

former,  and  particularly  through  the  peculiar 
ideas  of  liberty  prevalent,  which  sometimes  went 
so  far  as  to  claim  that  the  movements  of  the 
ship  should  be  put  to  a  vote. 

Jones  having  arrived  at  Brest  in  May,  1778, 
with  his  prize,  the  Drake,  sought  a  larger  com 
mand.  He  had  to  wait  a  year  for  it.  After 
many  strivings,  one  was  found  in  the  Due  de 
Duras,  a  fourteen-year-old  East  Indiaman, 
which  was  bought,  fitted  as  a  man-of-war,  and 
renamed  the  Bonhomme  Richard  in  compliment 
to  Franklin  as  being  the  nearest  approach  in 
French  to  the  "Poor  Richard"  of  the  famous 
almanac.  The  ship  was  far  from  meeting  re 
quirements,  being  slow  and  weakly  built,  so 
that  she  finally  carried  twenty-eight  12  and  9 
pounders  instead  of  i8's  on  the  gun  deck,  eight 
6's  on  the  forecastle,  and  on  the  after  part  of  the 
lower  deck  six  i8's,  forty-two  guns  in  all.  She 
was  provided  with  a  mixed  crew  of  Americans, 
French,  English,  a  few  Scandinavians,  and 
eighty-three  Irish  and  Scotch,  Jones  himself 
being  of  the  latter  by  birth.  Of  the  first  there 
were  in  the  beginning  but  seventy-nine,  chiefly 
exchanged  prisoners.  Later,  owing  to  muti 
nous  conduct  of  the  British  element,  many  of 
these  were  discharged  and  replaced  by  forty- 


66  The  American  Navy 

three  newly  arrived  Americans  just  released 
from  prison,  and  thirty  Portuguese.  The  total 
was  227  officers  and  seamen,  besides  130  French 
soldiers  placed  aboard  to  serve  as  marines. 

Jones's  ideas  were  large:  they  included  the 
fitting  out  of  a  large  French  squadron  to  act  in 
concert  and  carrying  a  considerable  number  of 
troops  to  make  an  attack  upon  the  English 
coast.  This,  however,  fell  through,  and  a  squad 
ron  was  organized  of  the  Bonhomme  Richard, 
42;  the  Alliance,  32;  the  Pallas,  32;  the  Cerf, 
cutter,  1 8,  and  the  Vengeance,  brigantine,  of  12 
guns. 

The  Alliance  had  arrived  at  Brest,  twenty- 
three  days  from  Boston,  carrying  Lafayette, 
on  February  6,  1779.  She  had  an  unreliable 
crew,  with  many  English  and  Irish,  and  a  still 
more  unreliable  captain,  Landais,  who  had  been 
an  officer  in  the  French  navy.  He  had  been 
appointed  a  captain  in  the  American  service 
on  the  recommendation  of  Silas  Deane,  who 
seemed  to  have  a  faculty  for  making  errors  of 
the  kind.  Landais  was  to  give  much  and  con 
tinuous  trouble. 

The  squadron  did  not  finally  get  off  until 
August  14,  1779.  Its  orders,  prepared  by 
Franklin,  with  the  advice  of  Sartine,  the  French 


The  American  Navy  67 

Minister  of  Marine,  were  to  cruise  to  the  north 
of  the  British  islands  and  after  six  weeks  to  go 
into  the  Texel,  Holland.  There  were  varying 
incidents  of  capture  of  prizes,  designs  to  attack 
Leith,  insubordinations  of  the  French  captains, 
etc.,  but  on  September  23d,  when  a  convoy  of 
forty  vessels  accompanied  by  two  men-of-war 
was  discovered  off  Flamborough  Head,  a  prom 
inent  point  a  few  miles  south  of  Scarborough, 
England,  Jones's  moment  had  come. 

It  was  not  until  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening 
that  the  Bonhomme  Richard  came  within  gun 
shot  of  the  larger  ship  which  turned  out  to  be 
the  Serapis,  Captain  Richard  Pearson,  of  50 
guns,  1 8  of  which  were  i8-pounders.  She  car 
ried  320  men.  There  then  ensued  the  most  re 
markable  duel  in  naval  history.  Jones  was 
left  unsupported  by  his  accompanying  subor 
dinates,  and  he  went  into  action  short  sixteen 
of  his  best  men  and  a  lieutenant,  Lunt,  who  had 
been  sent  to  secure  a  prize.  The  story  of 
this  remarkable  battle  must  of  necessity  here  be 
short;  the  full  details  must  be  sought  else 
where.  But  short  as  it  must  be,  there  is 
enough  of  it,  however  baldly  told,  to  stir  the 
blood. 

Jones  closed  with  his  antagonist  early  in  the 


68  The  American  Navy 

action,  and  as  they  came  in  contact  the  two  ships 
were  lashed  together  by  Jones,  the  stern  of  the 
Serapis  being  at  the  bow  of  the  Bonhomme 
Richard.  The  latter's  main  deck  battery  of  12- 
pounders  was  silenced,  two  of  the  old  six  18- 
pounders  on  the  lower  deck  had  burst,  killing 
nearly  all  the  guns'  crews.  Only  three  9- 
pounders  on  the  quarter  deck  could  be  used, 
and  one  of  these  had  to  be  shifted  from  the  off 
side.  The  guns  of  the  Serapis  were  still  active, 
but  her  upper  deck  had  been  cleared  by  the 
musketry  fire  from  the  tops  of  the  Bonhomme 
Richard.  The  latter's  prisoners  (some  200) 
were  released  without  orders,  and  in  their  fright 
that  the  ship  was  sinking,  willingly  worked  the 
pumps;  both  ships  were  frequently  afire.  The 
men  in  the  Bonhomme  Richard's  tops  crawled 
along  the  yards  into  the  tops  of  the  Serapis  and 
dropped  hand  grenades  whenever  any  one  ap 
peared  on  deck;  these  grenades,  at  times  going 
down  the  hatches  and  exploding  on  the  lower 
deck,  finally  brought  about  an  explosion  of 
cartridges  below  which  ran  from  gun  to  gun. 
This  went  far  toward  determining  the  battle. 
Meantime  the  erratic  Landais  fired  three  broad 
sides,  chiefly  to  the  damage  of  the  Bonhomme 
Richard,  as  the  shot  holes  were  found  in  the 


The  American  Navy  69 

latter's  unengaged  side.  There  can  be  little 
question  that  he  hoped  this  ship  would  sur 
render  when,  with  his  own  unharmed,  he  would 
capture  both.  Jones's  doggedness  won  the  day: 
at  half-past  ten  Captain  Pearson,  influenced  no 
doubt  somewhat  by  the  presence  of  the  Alliance, 
surrendered.  He  stated  that  an  incomplete 
list  of  his  killed  and  wounded  were  forty-nine 
of  the  former  and  sixty-eight  of  the  latter,  or 
more  than  a  third  of  the  whole  320.  Jones  es 
timated  his  loss  at  about  150,  without  stating 
the  proportions. 

While  this  action  was  going  on,  the  Pallas, 
30,  Captain  Cottineau,  had  engaged  and  taken 
the  Countess  of  Scarborough,  of  20  guns.  The 
Baltic  fleet  under  convoy  was  not  attacked,  as 
it  should  have  been  by  the  Alliance  or  the 
Vengeance,  a  curious  instance  of  inertia  and  in 
capacity  or  worse,  so  long  as  neither  chose  to 
take  part  in  the  main  action. 

Both  the  Serapis  and  Bonhomme  Richard  were 
terribly  mauled.  The  latter's  rudder,  stern 
frame,  and  transoms  were  cut  away,  and  the 
sides  between  the  ports  were  at  points  driven  in. 
It  was  ten  next  morning  before  the  fires  could  be 
extinguished.  On  examination  it  was  decided 
that  it  would  be  impossible  to  keep  the  ship 


jo  The  American  Navy 

afloat  if  rough  weather  should  come  on(which 
in  fact  was  the  case),  and  during  the  night  and 
next  morning  the  wounded  were  removed.  The 
men  who  had  been  brought  from  the  Pallas  to 
work  the  pumps  were  taken  ofF  the  evening  of 
the  25th  (two  days  after  the  battle).  Says 
Jones: 

"They  did  not  abandon  her  until  after  nine 
o'clock;  the  water  was  then  up  to  the  lower  deck, 
and  a  little  after  ten  I  saw  with  unexpressible 
grief  the  last  of  the  Bonhomme  Richard.  No 
lives  were  lost  with  the  ship,  but  it  was  impos 
sible  to  save  the  stores  of  any  sort  whatever. 
I  lost  even  the  best  part  of  my  clothes,  books 
and  papers;  and  several  of  my  officers  lost  all 
their  clothes  and  effects." 

The  masts  of  the  Serapis  fell  soon  after  the 
surrender,  and  jury  masts  were  rigged  from 
spars  furnished  by  the  Alliance,  all  the  spare 
spars  of  the  Serapis  being  too  badly  cut  by  shot. 
On  September  26th  she  was  able  to  steer  for 
Holland  in  company  with  the  rest  of  the  squad 
ron,  and  on  October  3d  entered  the  Texel  after 
some  demur  on  the  part  of  the  Dutch.  Though 
Jones's  instructions  gave  the  Texel  as  the  port 
to  be  made  at  the  end  of  his  six  weeks'  cruise, 


The  American  Navy  71 

his  own  wish  was  to  go  into  Dunkirk  and  thus 
be  under  the  shelter  of  an  ally.  The  other  cap 
tains  adhered  to  the  letter  of  the  instructions, 
and  Jones  felt  obliged  to  yield.  Much  trouble 
would  have  been  saved  had  his  views  prevailed. 
As  an  offset,  however,  to  such  disabilities  as 
arose  from  the  inability  of  Jones  to  dispose  of 
the  Serapis,  the  anger  of  the  British  Govern 
ment  against  the  Dutch  as  to  the  reception  of 
the  squadron  in  Dutch  waters  went  far  to  bring 
ing  later  the  declaration  of  war  by  England 
against  Holland.  Jones  was  allowed  to  land  his 
sick  and  wounded,  who  were  cared  for  on  an 
island  in  the  bay,  as  were  the  prisoners,  number 
ing  537,  sufficient  to  release  by  exchange  all  the 
American  seamen  who  were  prisoners  in  Eng 
land. 

For  Jones's  further  history,  his  having  to  put 
all  his  ships  but  the  Alliance  under  the  French 
flag  to  avoid  the  difficulties  raised  by  Great 
Britain  with  Holland;  his  going  in  the  Alliance 
to  Lorient,  France;  the  arrival  there  and  sale  of 
the  Serapis',  the  charges  against  Landais;  his 
short  cruise  in  the  Alliance;  his  unjust  treat 
ment  by  Arthur  Lee,  by  which  Landais  regained 
command  of  the  Alliance;  Lee's  embarkation  in 
the  Alliance  for  America  and  the  necessitv 


72  The  American  Navy 

during  the  voyage  of  depriving  Landais  of  the 
command  on  account  of  evident  insanity;  the 
dismissal  of  Landais  from  the  service;  Jones's 
arrival  in  command  of  the  Ariel  at  Philadelphia, 
February  18,  1781,  after  more  than  three  years' 
absence,  and  his  reception  of  the  thanks  of 
Congress;  his  appointment  to  the  command  of 
the  new  line-of-battle  ship  America  which  he 
lost  through  its  presentation  to  France;  his  re 
turn  to  Europe,  and  the  rest  of  his  adventurous 
career  must  be  read  in  the  many  books  devoted 
to  the  history  of  his  life,  not  the  least  interest 
ing  part  of  which  is  to  be  found  in  Fanning's 
graphic  narrative.  He  will  always  stand  out 
boldly  as  one  of  the  most  fearless  spirits  of  the 
sea,  and  had  he  lived  in  the  Napoleonic  epoch 
he  would  have  been  met  by  Napoleon  as  a 
kindred  soul  who  might  have  saved  him  the 
great  misfortune  of  Trafalgar,  which  so  changed 
the  history  of  Europe  and  the  world. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  activity  of  American  privateers  as  well  as 
Continental  ships  in  British  waters  during 
1777-1779  was  very  great,  that  of  the  Reprisal, 
Lexington,  Dolphin,  and  Revenge  (the  first  two, 
Continental  brigs)  being  particularly  notable. 
France  was  at  this  period  (1777)  made  a  basis 
for  the  fitting  out  of  Continental  vessels  and 
privateers,  and  for  the  supply  of  men  in  a  way 
which  would  be  far  from  possible  to-day.  Cap 
tain  Lambert  Wickes  of  the  Continental  brig 
Reprisal  and  Gustavus  Conyngham  of  the  Con 
tinental  lugger  Surprise  and  cutter  Revenge, 
both  of  which  latter  were  bought  and  fitted  out 
by  our  commissioners  in  France,  were  two  of 
those  most  active  and  prominent  in  the  oper 
ations  on  the  British  coast.  Their  names  have 
come  down  to  this  day  as  specially  brave  and 
adventurous  men.  The  former  had  cruised 
very  successfully  on  our  own  coast  and  in  the 
West  Indies  in  1776,  and  had  been  the  first,  as 
mentioned,  to  carry  a  ship  of  the  regular  navy 

73 


74  The  American  Navy 

to  Europe,  December,  1776,  though  privateers 
had  preceded  him.  Two  prizes  taken  into 
Nantes  caused  strong  protests  from  Great 
Britain.  The  treaty  of  Utrecht,  1713,  ex 
pressly  closed  the  ports  of  either  power  to  the 
enemies  of  the  other,  so  that  the  British  case 
had  a  very  sound  basis.  Vergennes  unques 
tionably,  before  our  alliance,  had  to  hold  a 
course  favoring  the  Americans  which  was  full 
of  difficulties.  The  details  of  the  diplomacy 
of  the  moment  cannot  be  entered  upon.  Suf 
fice  that  the  Reprisal  refitted  went  to  sea  early 
in  1777,  and  brought  in  five  prizes  to  add  to 
Vergennes's  difficulties.  The  British  Ambas 
sador,  Stormont,  demanded  their  release.  He 
was  answered  that  both  captor  and  captured  had 
been  ordered  to  leave  port  and  were  probably 
already  at  sea,  to  which  Stormont  was  later 
able  to  make  reply  that  the  Reprisal  was  under 
going  repairs  at  Lorient,  and  that  the  five  prizes 
had  been  sold.  The  questions  were  bandied 
to  and  fro  between  the  American  commission 
ers,  the  French  Minister,  and  the  British  Am 
bassador,  with  the  result  that  the  Reprisal 
received  orders  not  to  cruise  near  the  French 
coast,  but  apparently  the  prizes  remained  in 
the  hands  of  the  purchasers.  On  May  28th 


The  American  Navy  75 

Wickes  sailed  in  the  Reprisal  from  St.  Nazaire 
with  the  Continental  brig  Lexington,  Captain 
Henry  Johnson,  and  the  cutter  Dolphin,  Cap 
tain  Nicholson,  all  under  Wickes  as  senior  officer, 
for  a  cruise  through  the  Irish  Channel.  They 
were  back  in  St.  Malo  on  June  27th,  having 
captured  twenty  prizes,  of  which  three  were  re 
leased  and  seven  sunk.  In  July  the  commis 
sioners  were  obliged  to  give  orders  that  the 
Reprisal  and  Lexington  should  return  directly 
to  America,  for  which  the  Dolphin  had  already 
sailed  as  a  packet,  and  to  cruise  no  longer  in 
Europe.  They  left  in  September;  when  only 
two  days  out  the  Lexington  was  captured.  The 
Reprisal  was  lost  on  the  Newfoundland  Banks, 
but  one  man  being  saved.  The  loss  of  her  en 
terprising  captain  was  keenly  felt  and  deplored. 
Gustavus  Conyngham  had  been  selected  to 
command  the  lugger  Surprise  fitting  at  Dun 
kirk,  and  was  given  one  of  the  commissions,  of 
which  a  number  had  been  sent  out  in  blank 
signed  by  Hancock,  President  of  Congress,  and 
dated  March  i,  1777.  He  got  to  sea  by  May 
and,  returning  almost  at  once  with  two  prizes, 
was,  on  the  demand  of  the  British  Ambassador, 
with  most  of  his  crew,  put  in  prison.  His  vessel 
was  seized  and  the  prizes  released.  His  com- 


76  The  American  Navy 

mission  was  taken  from  him  and  not  returned. 
Released,  he  was  at  once  put  in  command  of  a 
newly  purchased  cutter,  the  Revenge,  with  a  crew 
of  106  men.  He  was  given  a  new  commission 
which  was  dated  May  2, 1777.  He  cruised  off  the 
coast  of  Spain  with  remarkable  success  and  then 
went  to  the  West  Indies.  He  was  reported  to 
have  captured,  by  the  time  of  his  arrival  there, 
sixty  vessels,  twenty-seven  of  which  had  been 
sent  into  port  and  thirty-three  sunk  or  burned. 
After  cruising  successfully  in  the  West  Indies  he 
arrived  at  Philadelphia  on  February  21,  1779. 
The  Revenge  was  sold,  but  the  purchaser  fitted 
her  out  as  a  privateer  with  Conyngham  in  com 
mand,  using  his  Continental  commission,  dated 
May  2,  1777;  this  nearly  caused  Conyngham  to 
lose  his  life,  for  he  was  captured  by  a  British 
frigate  in  April,  taken  to  New  York,  confined  in 
irons,  and  was  sent  to  England  under  an  accusa 
tion  of  piracy  in  that  his  cruise  and  captures  in 
the  Revenge  early  in  1777  had  been  before  the 
date  of  this  commission.  In  November,  1779,  he 
escaped  from  Mill  prison,  where  he  had  been  con 
fined.  His  active  career,  however,  was  ended.* 

*The  identical  commission  for  which  Conyngham  came  near 
suffering  was  found  a  few  years  since  in  a  Paris  bookshop  and  is 
now  in  the  collection  of  Navalia  formed  by  the  late  Captain  John 
S.  Barnes  of  New  York. 


The  American  Navy  77 

In  1779  occurred  one  of  the  great  naval  dis 
asters  of  the  war.  Some  800  British  troops  con 
voyed  by  ships-of-war  had  in  June  taken  posses 
sion  of  Penobscot  Bay  to  establish  there  some 
of  the  many  loyalists  who  had  gone  to  Halifax, 
their  chief  refuge  during  the  war.  Maine  was 
then  a  part  of  Massachusetts,  and  it  was  this 
state  which  took  on  the  burden  of  dislodging 
the  enemy.  The  Navy  Board  at  Boston  lent 
the  Warren,  32;  the  Providence  (sloop),  14;  and 
the  Diligent,  12.  These  and  three  state  brig- 
antines,  of  14  or  16  guns  each,  and  thirteen 
privateers  (insured  by  the  state)  made  up  the 
naval  part.  In  all  they  mounted  324  guns  and 
were  manned  by  over  2,000  men.  Captain 
Dudley  Saltonstall  was  in  chief  command. 
There  were  about  1,000  militia  commanded  by 
General  Solomon  Lovell.  This  carefully  pre 
pared  effort  was  a  complete  failure  through  the 
incompetency  and  want  of  push  of  Saltonstall. 
Arriving  in  the  bay  on  July  25,  1779,  the  attack 
on  three  British  vessels  present  and  on  the  fort 
which  was  now  ready  was  so  dilatory  and  in 
effective  that  at  length,  on  August  I3th,  a  Brit 
ish  fleet  which  had  had  time  to  come  from  New 
York  appeared  and  drove  the  American  vessels 
up  the  river,  where  all  except  two,  which  were 


78  The  American  Navy 

captured,  were  burned.  The  American  loss  was 
474  men.  The  remainder  had  to  find  their  way 
back  with  great  hardship  through  the  Maine 
woods.  This  humiliating  affair  cost  Massachu 
setts  a  debt  estimated  at  $7,000,000. 

The  year  1779,  however,  had  been  the  most 
brilliant  of  the  war  for  the  small  American  navy. 
The  exploits  of  John  Paul  Jones,  of  Gustavus 
Conyngham  and  Lambert  Wickes  in  European 
waters  made  an  undying  page  of  history;  nor 
should  those  of  our  small  frigates,  the  Queen  of 
France,  Deane  (later  the  Hague},  Warren,  Bos 
ton,  and  Ranger  on  our  own  coasts  as  well  as  of 
the  swarms  of  privateers  in  this  year  (289  of 
which  were  commissioned  by  Congress  alone)  and 
whose  sweeping  captures  of  the  enemy's  com 
merce  went  so  far  to  supply  the  needs  of  our 
ever-dwindling  army,  be  forgotten. 

American  affairs  were  now  (at  the  beginning 
of  1780)  at  their  lowest  ebb.  The  struggle 
had  lasted  nearly  five  years.  It  was  with  diffi 
culty  that  an  army,  nominally  of  6,000  men,  could 
be  kept  together.  The  men  were  "half-  starved, 
imperfectly  clothed,  riotous,  and  robbing  the 
country  people  .  .  .  from  sheer  necessity. 
Desertion  was  continual,  from  one  to  two  hun- 


The  American  Navy  79 

dred  men  a  month  going  over  to  the  enemy. 
.  .  .  Only  a  miracle,  thought  Washington, 
could  keep  America  from  the  humiliation  of 
seeing  her  cause  upheld  solely  by  foreign  arms. 
Throughout  the  land  there  was  a  weariness  of 
war,  a  desire  for  peace  at  any  price."* 

At  least  a  third  of  our  population  is  estimated 
to  have  been  loyalist,  and  another  third  luke 
warm.  At  several  periods  there  were  more 
loyalists  in  the  British  service  than  in  our  own. 
Nor  was  this  situation  wholly  confined  to  the 
army,  for  in  1779  there  were  fitted  out  at  New 
York  one  hundred  and  twenty-one  privateers 
in  British  employ,  thirty-four  of  which  carried 
from  twenty  to  thirty-six  guns.  The  whole 
were  manned  by  between  9,000  and  10,000 
men. 

The  navy  was  reduced  almost  as  much  as  the 
army.  The  Boston,  Providence,  Ranger,  and 
Queen  of  France  had  arrived  at  Charleston  on 
December  23,  1779.  The  first  three  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  enemy  on  the  surrender  of 
Charleston  on  May  n,  1780,  and  became  part 
of  the  British  navy,  the  fourth  along  with  the 
South  Carolina  ships  Bricole,  44;  the  Truite,  26; 

*Van  Tyne,  "The  American  Revolution,"  305,  referring  to 
Washington  Writings  (Spark's  ed.)  VI,  441  and  VII,  159.  N.  Y. 
Docs.  Rel.  to  Col.  Hist.,  VIII.  800. 


8o  The  American  Navy 

General  Moultrie,  20,  and  Notre  Dame,  16,  had 
been  sunk  in  the  river,  as  also  two  small  French 
ships-of-war  L'Aventure  and  Polacre.  There 
thus  remained  in  the  latter  part  of  1780  but  one 
of  the  original  thirteen  frigates,  the  Trumbull, 
which  with  the  Dean,  Confederacy,  Alliance,  and 
Saratoga  (the  last  a  sloop-of-war),  formed  in  this 
year  the  entire  Continental  navy  in  service. 
The  Deane  (renamed  the  Hague)  and  the  Alli 
ance  were  the  only  two  of  these  to  survive  the 
year. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  now  unopposed  command  of  the  sea 
by  the  British  navy  and  the  consequent  in 
vasion  and  overrunning  of  the  South  brought 
darkest  gloom  and  despondency  to  the  American 
cause. 

It  was  well  that  Providence  had  given  Amer 
ica  Washington  who,  when  all  things  seemed  to 
fail,  held  firm  and  carried  us  to  victory.  With 
out  him  the  nation  could  not  have  survived  the 
throes  of  birth.  Calm  and  undismayed,  he 
made  up  for  the  inefficiency  of  Congress,  the 
lethargy  of  the  states,  the  discontent  of  all. 
Whatever  our  national  shortcomings — past, 
present,  or  future — America  can  ever  be  proud 
of  having  produced  this  king  of  men,  the  great 
est  character  in  history.  He  was,  in  fact,  the 
Revolution  personified.  The  war  was  fought 
without  even  the  semblance  of  a  government, 
for  even  the  "Articles  of  Confederation  and 
Perpetual  Union"  reported  on  July  12,  1776, 
by  a  committee  appointed  on  June  loth  (the 

81 


82  The  American  Navy 

same  day  as  that  on  which  the  committee  was 
appointed  to  draft  the  Declaration  of  Inde 
pendence),  were  not  agreed  to  by  Congress  until 
November  17,  1777,  and  a  sufficient  number  of 
states  under  the  conditions  of  these  articles  did 
not  ratify  the  action  of  Congress  until  March  I, 
1781.  Thus  nearly  six  years  of  war  passed 
before  we  had  anything  approaching  a  confed 
eracy,  and  even  then,  as  Washington  well  said, 
it  was  "but  a  shade  without  a  substance." 
"The  organized  and  carefully  barricaded  im 
potence  of  this  scheme  of  government,"  says 
an  able  authority,  "is  probably  unequalled  in 
history,  with  any  nation  surviving."  Congress 
could  only  "request"  of  the  several  states,  and 
but  too  often  these  requests  bore  no  fruit  what 
ever.  Attendance  in  Congress  lagged,  interest 
dwindled,  and  by  1780  but  for  Washington,  so 
far  as  mortal  can  judge,  the  Revolution  would 
have  come  to  a  dismal  end. 

But  Washington's  time  of  cheer  was  at  hand. 
From  February,  1779,  to  March,  1780,  La 
fayette  was  in  France  and  unceasing  in  his  ef 
forts  in  support  of  the  American  cause.  It  was 
chiefly  due  to  his  efforts  that  on  May  2,  1780, 
seven  line-of-battle  ships  and  three  frigates  left 
Brest  under  the  Chevalier  de  Ternay,  convoy- 


The  American  Navy  83 

ing  thirty-six  transports  carrying  5,027  troops, 
officers  and  men,  under  Lieutenant-General 
Count  de  Rochambeau.  The  enemy  had,  on 
October  25,  1779,  withdrawn  from  Narragansett 
Bay  to  New  York  fearing  an  attack  by 
d'Estaing's  great  fleet  after  its  operations 
against  Savannah.  The  French  fleet  anchored 
at  Newport  on  July  nth. 

The  death  of  de  Ternay  in  December,  due, 
in  Lafayette's  judgment,  to  despondency  caused 
by  his  hopeless  view  of  things;  the  treason  of 
Arnold  which  came  to  light  in  September;  the 
blockade  for  most  of  the  coming  winter  of  the 
French  squadron  by,  now,  a  superior  British 
force;  the  arrival  in  the  West  Indies  at  the  end 
of  April,  1781,  of  the  Count  de  Grasse  with  a 
powerful  addition  to  the  French  fleet;  the  in 
formation  that  he  expected  to  come  on  to  the 
American  coast;  the  pressing  messages  to  him 
from  Washington  and  Rochambeau  to  hasten 
his  departure;  the  reply  received  on  August  I4th 
that  he  would  sail  on  August  I3th  for  the  Ches 
apeake  with  3,300  troops,  artillery,  and  siege 
guns,  and  1,200,000  livres  (francs)  in  money, 
determined  the  move  of  the  small  allied  armies 
to  Virginia,  where  Cornwallis,  now  some  months 
in  that  state,  was  finally  to  take  up  an  en- 


84  The  American  Navy 

trenched  position  at  Yorktown,  his  move  from 
Portsmouth  being  completed  on  August  22d. 

The  American  and  French  armies,  after  a 
whole  year's  inaction,  joined  on  July  6,  1781, 
taking  position  on  a  line  from  Dobbs'  Ferry  to 
the  Bronx,  The  Fates  were  surely  with  America. 
Everything  conspired  for  the  allies'  success;  the 
position  taken  had  convinced  Clinton  that  New 
York  was  to  be  attacked;  he  pressed  Cornwal- 
lis  to  send  him  every  man  he  could  spare,  but 
Cornwallis  could  spare  none.  Rodney  in  the 
West  Indies,  misinformed  as  to  De  Grasse's  in 
tentions,  and  thinking  he  was  to  take  but  half 
his  fleet  instead  of  the  whole,  detached  but  four 
teen  of  his  own  command  to  go  north  under  Sir 
Samuel  Hood  to  reinforce  Admiral  Graves  at 
New  York.  Rodney  himself  left  for  England 
on  leave  of  absence,  carrying  four  ships  with 
him.  The  two  vessels  dispatched  to  Graves 
with  information  of  British  intentions  never 
reached  him.  He  was  east  with  his  squadron 
when  one,  arriving  at  New  York,  was  sent  on  to 
him  but  was  driven  ashore  on  Long  Island  by 
a  superior  force  and  destroyed;  the  other  and 
more  important  one,  giving  word  of  Hood's 
departure,  was  captured.  For  this  reason, 
though  Graves  returned  to  New  York  on  August 


The  American  Navy  85 

i6th,  he  still  remained  in  the  dark  as  to  Hood's 
movements.  The  whole  was  a  marvel  of  good 
fortune  for  the  Americans,  while  every  move  of 
De  Grasse's  fleet  and  of  the  allied  armies  were 
to  fit  with  the  perfection  of  mechanism. 

Hood  left  the  West  Indies  on  August  loth. 
On  the  25th  he  looked  into  the  Chesapeake 
and,  finding  nothing,  went  on  to  Sandy  Hook, 
where  he  arrived  August  28th.  That  same 
evening  word  was  received  that  De  Barras  (who 
had  arrived  from  France  as  the  successor  of  De 
Ternay)  had  sailed  from  Newport  with  his  whole 
division  of  eight  of  the  line,  four  frigates,  and 
eighteen  transports.  It  was  now  known  to 
the  British  general  that  the  allied  armies  were 
on  their  way  south  and  that  De  Grasse  was 
bound  for  the  Chesapeake.  Graves,  with  five 
of  the  line  and  a  5<>gun  ship,  all  that  could  be 
got  ready  in  the  time,  joined  Hood  off  Sandy 
Hook  on  August  3ist  and  started  south.  He 
had  nineteen  ships-of-the-line  to  De  Grasse's 
twenty-eight.  But  De  Grasse  was  already  in 
side  the  capes,  which  he  had  reached  on  August 
3Oth,  and  was  at  anchor  in  Lynnhaven  Bay,  just 
within  Cape  Henry.  He  had  at  once  landed  his 
troops  and  had  stationed  cruisers  in  James 
River  to  prevent  Cornwallis  attempting  to  es- 


86  The  American  Navy 

cape  to  North  Carolina.  His  dispositions  re 
duced  his  available  ships  to  twenty-four  of  the 
line.  At  this  moment  Washington  "was  cross 
ing  the  Delaware  on  his  way  south,  with  6,000 
regular  troops,  2,000  American  and  4,000 
French,  to  join  Lafayette,"  who  now,  with  the 
3,300  French  from  the  fleet,  had  8,000  regulars 
and  militia. 

On  September  5th  Admiral  Graves's  fleet  was 
sighted  by  the  French  in  the  northeast.  It  was 
at  first  thought  to  be  that  of  De  Barras,  but,  on 
discovering  the  mistake,  De  Grasse  took  a  course 
which  risked  all  by  getting  under  way  and  going 
outside  the  capes  to  fight  a  battle.  To  get 
twenty-four  heavy  sailing  ships  under  way  and 
attempt  to  get  them  in  any  formation  in  a  rea 
sonable  time,  even  with  the  ebb  tide  which  was 
running,  was,  with  the  wind  north-northeast,  a 
difficult  operation.  Several  had  to  tack  in 
order  to  clear  Cape  Henry,  and  by  the  time  they 
reached  the  open  sea  the  French  ships  must 
have  been  in  very  straggling  condition.  Graves 
failed  to  take  advantage  of  such  an  opportunity. 
Instead  of  crowding  sail,  with  a  wind  as  fair  as 
he  could  wish,  and  pressing  down  for  the  French, 
whom  he  might  have  attacked  in  detail,  he 
formed  ,a  line  heading  out  to  sea,  to  fight  a 


The  American  Navy  87 

battle,  partially  under  the  old  rule  of  parallel 
columns  with  each  ship  engaging  her  opposite, 
and  partially  under  new  ideas  of  tactics  which 
Graves,  just  from  England,  had  imbibed  but 
which  most  of  his  captains  had  scarcely  heard 
of. 

The  action  began  about  four  o'clock,  signals 
were  not  understood,  and,  taken  all  in  all,  the 
handling  of  the  British  fleet  was  badly  botched. 
Furthermore,  Sir  Samuel  Hood,  who  commanded 
the  rear  division  and  was  an  officer  of  highest 
reputation,  showed  no  initiative  such  as,  in  the 
circumstances,  might  have  been  expected,  his 
division  getting  scarcely  into  gunshot.  Thus 
at  sunset,  when  the  battle  ceased,  the  British 
were  in  decidedly  the  worse  plight,  with  a  loss 
of  90  killed  and  246  wounded,  against  about 
200  killed  and  wounded  of  the  French,  and  with 
several  ships  very  severely  injured,  one,  the 
Terrible,  74,  so  much  so  that  she  was  in  sinking 
condition,  and  five  days  later  was  burned. 
Though  the  two  fleets  were  yet  in  sight  of  each 
other  for  four  days,  neither  showed  a  wish  to 
renew  the  action.  On  September  loth,  when 
morning  broke,  the  French  were  out  of  sight. 
Next  day  they  reentered  the  Chesapeake,  captur 
ing  near  the  entrance  two  frigates^  sent  by 


88  The  American  Navy 

Graves  to  reconnoitre,  one  of  which  was  the  Iris 
which  had  been  the  American  Hancock.  They 
found  at  anchor  within  the  capes  the  division 
of  Barras  which  the  day  before  had  arrived 
from  Newport  with  the  siege  artillery  intended 
for  use  at  Yorktown.  On  the  I3th  the  British 
fleet  stood  in  for  the  capes  and  sighted  the 
French  at  anchor.  There  was  nothing  to  do 
but  to  return  north.  On  the  I9th  it  was  again 
at  Sandy  Hook,  and  American  independence 
was  won. 

Washington  had  not  heard  until  September 
5th  of  De  Grasse's  arrival.  "Standing  on  the 
river  bank  at  Chester,  he  waved  his  hat  in  the 
air  as  the  Comte  de  Rochambeau  approached, 
and  with  many  demonstrations  of  uncontrol 
lable  happiness  he  announced  to  him  the  good 
news."  Had  he  known  that  at  that  moment 
De  Grasse  was  under  way  to  go  to  sea  and  fight 
a  battle,  he  would  have  been  less  joyous.  For 
it  was  only  the  want  of  initiative  on  the  part  of 
the  British  admiral  that  saved  the  situation. 
For  had  the  latter  at  any  time  in  the  six  days 
which  the  French  spent  at  sea  himself  entered 
the  Chesapeake,  he  could  have  held  the  posi 
tion,  and  De  Grasse's  venture  would  have  gone 
for  nought.  It  is  highly  improbable  that  in  such 


The  American  Navy  89 

circumstances  de  Grasse  would  have  shown  such 
initiative  as  to  attack  New  York.  It  is  clear 
that  neither  admiral  had  a  clear  sense  of  the 
strategy  involved,  for  De  Grasse  himself  but  a 
little  later  was  again  desirous  of  leaving  the 
Chesapeake  to  seek  the  British  fleet,  and  was 
only  held  by  the  most  earnest  remonstrances  of 
Washington.  As  it  was,  the  army  was  trans 
ported  by  September  26th  to  Williamsburg,  and 
on  October  I9th  Lord  Cornwallis  surrendered, 
thus,  virtually?  closing  the  war.  De  Grasse  sailed 
November  4th  to  the  West  Indies  and  to  ruin; 
for  on  April  12,  1782,  he  was  signally  defeated  by 
Rodney  and  became  a  prisoner. 

The  French  army  was  an  aid  to  our  success; 
the  French  navy  was  a  necessity.  The  result 
completely  filled  the  dictum  of  Washington, 
who  foresaw  by  a  hundred  years  that  which  is 
to-day  an  axiom  and  one  particularly  applicable 
to  our  own  country:  "In  any  operation  and  un 
der  all  circumstances,  a  decisive  naval  superior 
ity  is  to  be  considered  a  fundamental  principle 
and  the  basis  upon  which  every  hope  of  success 
must  ultimately  depend.*  He  would  have 
made  a  great  admiral,  a  career  he  narrowly  es- 


*Memorandum  dated  July  15,  1780,  sent  by  the  hands  of  La 
fayette  to  Rochambeau. 


90  The  American  Navy 

caped  when  it  was  proposed  that  he  should  go 
as  midshipman  under  Admiral  Vernon.  The 
Fates  fortunately  decreed  otherwise. 

The  operations  of  the  Continental  navy  were 
now  confined  to  very  few  ships.  The  Alliance, 
under  Captain  Barry,  had  left  Boston  February 
II,  1781,  carrying  Colonel  John  Laurens  and 
Thomas  Paine.  The  former  bore  a  letter  which, 
addressed  by  Washington  to  Laurens,  was  to  be 
shown  Vergennes,  putting  strongly  the  neces 
sity  of  money  and  ships,  and  giving  the  whole 
logic  of  the  situation  in  the  sentence:  "Indeed, 
it  is  not  to  be  conceived  how  [the  British]  could 
subsist  a  large  force  in  this  country  if  we  had  the 
command  of  the  seas  to  interrupt  the  regular 
transmission  of  supplies  from  Europe/* 

The  Alliance  was  unhappy  in  the  character 
of  her  crew,  which  illustrated  the  exigencies  to 
which  we  were  now  driven.  A  large  number 
were  British  prisoners.  These  on  the  return 
voyage  formed  a  conspiracy  to  carry  the  ship  to 
Ireland,  in  the  suppression  of  which  Barry  ex 
hibited  courage  and  qualities  for  command  of  a 
high  order.  On  the  way  he  captured  two  Brit 
ish  cruisers,  of  16  and  14  guns,  the  smaller  of 
which  was  made  a  cartel  to  carry  his  prisoners, 
now  about  250,  into  Halifax.  The  larger  was 


The  American  Navy  91 

retaken  by  a  squadron  near  Cape  Cod.  The 
Marquis  de  Lafayette,  a  French  privateer  which 
had  left  France  at  the  same  time  as  the  Alliance, 
with  a  valuable  cargo  of  military  stores,  suf 
fered  the  same  fate. 

The  Deane,  Confederacy,  and  Saratoga  cruised 
this  year  in  the  West  Indies,  with  small  fortune, 
which  was  turned  into  very  bad,  by  the  capture 
of  the  Confederacy  by  a  British  squadron  on 
April  1 5th.  The  Trumbull,  at  sea  on  her  first 
cruise,  with  a  mixed  crew  of  wretched  quality, 
was  dismasted  in  a  gale  and  was  taken  on  August 
8th  by  the  Iris  and  the  General  Monk,  both  of 
which  were  captured  American  ships  taken  into 
the  British  service,  one,  as  just  said,  being  the 
Hancock,  and  the  latter  a  privateer,  the  General 
Washington.  The  Iris,  as  but  just  mentioned 
above,  was  taken  by  the  French  only  a  month 
later  and  the  General  Monk  on  April  7th  of  the 
next  year  by  the  Ryder  Ally,  under  Captain 
Joshua  Barney,  in  one  of  the  notable  actions 
of  the  war. 

Up  to  the  peace  signed  September  3,  1783, 
privateering  had  continued  active,  383  letters 
of  marque  being  granted  by  Congress  in  1782, 
but  the  Continental  navy  had  practically  dis 
appeared.  There  were  but  five  ships  remain- 


92  The  American  Navy 

ing:  the  frigates  Alliance,  Hague,  and  Bourbon 
(the  last  not  yet  launched),  and  the  ships  Gen 
eral  Washington  and  Due  de  Lauzun.  Only  the 
first  two  were  in  commission.  Our  only  line-of- 
battle  ship,  the  newly  launched  America,  had 
been  given  to  France  to  replace  the  Magnifique, 
wrecked  coming  into  Boston  harbor.  The  few 
ships  mentioned  gradually  disappeared :  the  Due 
de  Lauzun  was  sent  to  France  as  a  transport  and 
sold;  the  Bourbon,  launched  at  Middletown, 
Connecticut,  July  31,  1783,  was  advertised  for 
sale  two  months  later,  as  was  the  Hague  in 
August;  the  General  Washington  was  sold  the 
next  year.  Sentiment  preserved  the  Alliance 
until  August,  1785,  when,  with  her  sale,  the  Con 
tinental  navy  passed  into  history. 

To  recapitulate  some  data  of  the  first  chapter: 
The  British  navy  had  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war  270  ships,  of  which  131  were  of  the  line 
(from  100  to  60  guns),  and  but  18,000  seamen. 
At  the  end,  January  20,  1783,  there  were  468 
ships,  of  which  174  were  of  the  line,  and  110,000 
seamen.  They  had  lost  (taken,  destroyed, 
burned,  foundered,  or  wrecked)  202  ships  carry 
ing  5,130  guns.  The  Continental  and  state 
navies  had  lost  (taken,  destroyed,  burned, 


The  American  Navy  93 

foundered,  or  wrecked)  39  ships,  carrying  876 
guns.  The  French  had  lost  (in  all  the  ways  just 
mentioned)  72  ships,  with  2,636  guns;  the 
Spanish  24,  with  960  guns;  the  Dutch  9,  with 
364  guns. 

The  British  during  the  war  lost  3,087  mer 
chant  vessels,  taken  by  Americans,  French, 
Dutch,  and  Spanish;  879  of  these  were  retaken 
or  ransomed.  They  lost  89  privateers,  of  which 
14  were  retaken  or  ransomed.  They  captured 
1,135  merchantmen,  of  which  only  27  were  re 
taken  or  ransomed,  and  216  privateers,  of  which 
only  one  was  retaken.*  The  net  result  was  heav 
ily  against  them. 

The  navy  of  the  Revolution,  however  insuffi 
cient  and  ineffective  as  an  instrument  of  real 
war,  served  a  good  purpose.  It  kept  up  our  com 
munication  with  Europe;  made  many  captures 
of  material  in  ordnance,  ammunition,  and  stores 
of  utmost  importance  to  our  forces,  and  fought 
many  gallant  actions.  But  actions  between 
small  cruisers  and  captures  of  merchantmen  are 
not  the  means  which  bring  control  of  the  sea. 
The  action  of  greatest  moment  was  that  of  the 
little  flotilla  on  Lake  Champlain  in  1776,  and 
this,  even  though  defeated,  was  a  main  instru- 

*Clowes,  "The  Royal  Navy,"  III,  396. 


94  The  American  Navy 

ment  in  gaining  the  French  alliance  and  thus 
our  independence.  It  is  the  battleship,  in  that 
day  known  as  the  ship-of-the-line,  which  decides 
the  question  of  command  of  the  world's  highway 
and  thus  decides  the  outcome  of  war  between 
powers  separated  by  the  ocean.  The  services  of 
the  small  Continental  navy  thus  from  the  very 
nature  of  things  could  effect  comparatively  little 
so  long  as  the  ship-of-the-line  could  go  and  come 
as  it  pleased.  It  was  the  French  battleship  in  lar 
ger  numbers  than  the  English  that  completely 
changed  the  melancholy  outlook  of  1780  and 
1781.  In  July  of  the  latter  year  Rochambeau, 
in  a  letter  to  De  Grasse  urging  him  to  come 
north,  could  use  the  words:  "General  Washing 
ton  has  but  a  handful  of  men.  .  .  .  This 
country  has  been  driven  to  bay  and  all  its  re 
sources  are  giving  out  at  once."  He  told  but  the 
painful  fact.  The  presence  of  a  dominating 
fleet  gave  us  victory  and  independence;  without 
it  the  Revolution  would  have  failed.  It  took 
us  a  hundred  years  to  realize  the  truth  of  the 
principle  here  stated,  and  we  have  yet  to  frame 
a  policy  in  accord  with  its  meaning. 

With  the  passing  of  the  ships  passed  all  sem 
blance  of  naval  organization.    The  Board  of  Ad- 


The  American  Navy  95 

miralty  had  really  consisted  of  Robert  Morris 
only,  and  the  Congress  of  the  loosely  bound  Con 
federation  was  itself  almost  moribund.  The 
United  States  found  itself  free,  but  it  was 
the  freedom  of  disorganization,  an  atrophy  of 
government.  The  Revolution  had  been  fought 
until  March,  1781,  without  an  established  gov 
ernment.  This  is  a  remarkable  fact.  We  had 
yet  to  wait  four  years  from  the  peace  for  a  real 
instrument  of  government,  the  Constitution  of 
1787.  The  adoption  of  this  on  September  13, 
1787,  was  the  true  birthday  of  the  Republic 
rather  than  the  4th  of  July,  1776.  The  Rev 
olution  of  1787  was  quite  as  momentous  as  that 
of  the  war  just  ended. 


The  American  Navy 


I    §    II    4E    4jg    I 

S    1     IS    Jiiilj 


o>  C 

M  2 

1 1 

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The  American  Navy 


97 


CHAPTER  IX 

STRETCHING  along  the  southern  shore  of  the 
Mediterranean  some  1,800  miles,  in  the  latitude, 
roughly  speaking,  of  Cape  Hatteras,  are  the  re 
gions  known  to  our  forefathers  as  Barbary.  The 
westernmost  was  Morocco,  then  Algiers,  Tunis, 
and  Tripoli.  The  last  three  were  nominally  ap 
panages  of  the  Turkish  Empire.  Anciently 
there  had  been  along  these  shores  a  high  civiliza 
tion.  Carthage  (now  Tunis)  had  disputed  with 
Rome  the  empire  of  the  Mediterranean;  she 
failed  through  Rome's  final  dominancy  at  sea, 
and  her  power  was  utterly  wrecked,  as  was  the 
city  itself.  Rome  ruled  and  built  thriving  cities 
throughout  the  coastline  mentioned,  the  re 
mains  of  which  now  mark  but  dimly  the  foot 
steps  of  civilization  and  history. 

With  the  rise  of  Mohammedanism,  the  Arab 
power  swept  westward  over  the  entire  region. 
The  antagonism  of  religion  brought  a  continuous 
warfare  between  the  European  and  African 
shores  which  developed  into  a  piracy  which 

98 


The  American  Navy  99 

lasted  almost  to  our  own  days.  A  relic  of  the 
fear  which  Europe  had  for  these  bold  corsairs, 
who  captured  vessels  of  all  nations  and  carried 
crews  and  passengers  into  cruel  slavery,  is  in  the 
many  towers  of  refuge  still  along  the  French  and 
Italian  rivieras,  and  the  memory  is  yet  in  the 
Litany  in  the  prayer-book  of  the  Episcopal 
Church  in  England  and  America,  where  we  pray 
for  "all  prisoners  and  captives."  Long  after  the 
writer  entered  our  navy,  the  Saturday  evening 
toast,  after  "Sweethearts  and  Wives,"  was, 
"Here's  to  the  downfall  of  the  barbarous  Moor." 
It  was  an  echo  of  the  epic  period  of  the  American 
navy.  For  we  once  did  great  things  in  Barbary, 
of  which  the  average  American  to-day  (and  more's 
the  pity)  is  almost  wholly  ignorant.  It  is  in  its 
earlier  phase  a  tale  of  national  humiliation  in 
which  all  Europe  also  had  full  share,  but  in  which 
our  navy  had  no  part;  its  later  phase  in  which 
the  navy  came  into  action  is  a  very  proud  story. 
The  depredations  of  the  Barbary  powers  were 
not  confined  to  the  Mediterranean,  but  extended 
into  the  North  and  Irish  seas,  many  inhabitants 
being  carried  from  these  coasts  into  slavery. 
There  were  various  efforts  to  punish  these  raid 
ing  powers  in  the  seventeenth  century  by  Dutch, 
French,  and  English,  and  as  late  as  1775  a  great 


loo  The  American  Navy 

expedition  was  fitted  out  by  Spain  of  nearly  four 
hundred  vessels,  against  Algiers,  which,  how 
ever,  ended  in  disaster.  This  has  special  interest 
to  us,  as  Joshua  Barney,  who  was  to  act  a  con 
spicuous  part  in  our  naval  annals,  was  impressed, 
with  the  Baltimore  ship  which  he  commanded, 
to  assist  in  the  transport  of  troops. 

The  Barbary  vessels  were  in  general  large, 
narrow  rowboats,  carrying  usually  two  masts, 
with  the  lateen  sail  of  the  Mediterranean  for 
use  in  fair  winds.  The  name  "galley"  was  ap 
plied  in  Europe  to  the  largest  of  such  in  ordinary 
use.  There  was, however,  a  much  larger  develop 
ment  in  the  galleasse,  some  few  of  which,  used  by 
the  Neapolitans,  carried  700  men,  300  of  whom 
would  be  convicts  at  the  oars.  There  was  finally 
the  galleon,  the  precursor  of  the  frigate,  which 
had  masts  and  sails  alone  for  propulsion.  In 
the  large  galleys  there  might  be  as  many  as  six 
men  at  an  oar.  It  may  be  said  that  in  general  the 
development  of  the  corsair  ship  followed  slowly 
but  fairly  closely  that  of  the  ship  of  Europe, 
and  in  later  years  they  had  a  number  of  the 
usual  square-rigged  vessels.* 

The  Christian  slaves  were  employed  not  only 

*For  a  full  description  of  vessels  of  the  galley  period,  see  Ad 
miral  Jurien  de  la  Graviere,  "Deniers  Jours  de  la  Marine  a  Rames," 
and  Lane-Poole,  "  Barbary  Corsairs,"  Chap.  XII. 


The  American  NaVy  101 

in  the  galleys,  but  did  all  kinds  of  labor;  the 
crew  of  our  frigate  Philadelphia,  which  in  1803 
grounded  near  Tripoli  and  thus  was  captured, 
was  employed  in  building  one  of  the  defences 
against  our  own  ships,  which  took  the  name  of 
the  American  fort.  In  the  main,  however,  the 
captivity  was  humane  and  not  oppressive. 

The  claim  of  the  Barbary  powers  was  ex 
pressed  in  a  statement  of  their  envoy  while  in 
London  in  1786,  to  our  minister,  John  Adams: 
"That  Turkey,  Tripoli,  Tunis,  Algiers,  and  Mo 
rocco  were  the  sovereigns  of  the  Mediterranean; 
and  that  no  nation  could  navigate  that  sea  with 
out  a  treaty  of  peace  with  them."*  Europe  had 
practically  accepted  a  situation  of  the  most  de 
grading  kind;  every  nautical  power  paid  tribute 
in  money  or  presents  and  all  had  representatives 
among  the  Barbary  slaves.  Even  as  late  as 
1816,  when  the  English  finally  acted,  there  were 
eighteen  Englishmen  among  the  slaves  released 
by  Lord  Exmouth's  expedition. 

But  England's  attitude  had  not  been  one  of 
honor.  There  was  no  time  when  she  might  not 
have  ended  the  foul  situation.  Franklin  could 
say  in  a  letter  on  July  25,  1783,  to  our  secretary 
of  foreign  affairs:  "I  think  it  not  improbable  that 

*Adams,  "Works,"  VIII,  373. 


IO2  The  American  Navy 

these  rovers  may  be  privately  encouraged  by 
the  English  to  fall  upon  us  and  to  prevent  our 
interfering  in  the  carrying  trade;  for  I  have  in 
London  heard  it  is  a  maxim  among  the  mer 
chants,  that  if  there  were  no  Algiers  it  would  be 
worth  England's  while  to  build  one.  I  wonder, 
however,  that  the  rest  of  Europe  do  not  com 
bine  to  destroy  those  nests  and  secure  commerce 
from  their  future  piracies."*  Three  years  later 
John  Adams,  our  minister  in  London,  was  writ 
ing  Secretary  Jay  (February  17,  1786):  "There 
are  not  wanting  persons  in  England  who  will 
find  means  to  stimulate  this  African  [the  Tripoli- 
tan  envoy]  to  stir  up  his  countrymen  against 
American  vessels."!  British  statesmanship,  then 
as  ever,  was  jealous  of  rival  commerce  on  the 
seas.  Lord  Sheffield,  in  a  pamphlet  on  Ameri 
can  commerce,  could  say:  "It  will  not  be  in  the 
interest  of  any  of  the  great  maritime  powers  to 
protect  [Americans]  from  the  Barbary  States. 
If  they  know  their  interests,  they  will  not  en 
courage  the  Americans  to  be  carriers — that  the 
Barbary  States  are  advantageous  to  the  mari 
time  powers  is  obvious." 

It  is  odd  that  at  this  period  two  men  whose 


*"Dip.  Corres.  of  the  Revolution,"  IV,  pp.  95,  149. 
I"  Works,"  VIII,  372. 


The  American  Navy  103 

lives  were  of  a  sort  that  one  would  have  sup 
posed  they  would  have  advised  each  directly 
otherwise,  exchanged  characters.  Thus  while 
Thomas  Jefferson,  our  minister  to  France,  ad 
vised  in  1785  force  as  the  best  protection,  John 
Adams  in  England,  influenced  perhaps  by  his 
surroundings,  advised  following  the  usual  plan 
of  paying  an  annual  tribute.  Jefferson  later, 
most  unhappily  for  his  country,  was  violently 
antagonistic  to  the  establishment  of  a  navy. 
Adams  was,  and  always  had  been,  quite  the  re 
verse.  But  he  now  felt  that  the  country  was 
too  poor  and  too  embarrassed  by  debt  to  use 
force.  He  wrote  John  Jay,  Foreign  Secre 
tary,  December  15,  1784:  "As  long  as  France, 
England,  Holland,  the  Emperor,  etc.,  will  sub 
mit  to  be  tributaries  to  these  robbers  and  even 
encourage  them,  to  what  purpose  should  we 
make  war  upon  them?  The  resolution  might  be 
heroic  but  would  not  be  wise  .  .  .  we  can 
not  hurt  them  in  the  smallest  degree. 
Unless  it  were  possible,  then,  to  persuade  the 
great  maritime  powers  of  Europe  to  unite  in  the 
suppression  of  these  piracies,  it  would  be  very 
imprudent  for  us  to  entertain  any  thoughts  of 
contending  with  them."* 

*Adams,  "Works,"  VIII,  218. 


104  The  American  Navy 

The  two  ministers  had  an  extended  corre 
spondence,  and  though  Adams  said:  "I  will  go 
all  lengths  with  you  in  promoting  a  navy, 
whether  it  be  applied  to  the  Algerines  or  not,"  he 
still  doubted  the  economy  of  dealing  with  Bar- 
bary  by  force.  Jefferson 'stone  was  now,  for  him, 
strangely  combative.  He  wrote,  August  20, 1785 : 
"The  question  is  whether  their  peace  or  war  will 
be  cheapest?  But  it  is  a  question  which  should 
be  addressed  to  our  honor  as  well  as  our  avarice, 
nor  does  it  respect  us  as  to  these  pirates  only, 
but  as  to  the  nations  of  Europe.  If  we  wish  our 
commerce  to  be  free  and  uninsulted,  we  must 
let  these  nations  see  that  we  have  an  energy 
which  at  present  they  disbelieve.  The  low  opin 
ion  they  entertain  of  our  powers  cannot  fail  to 
involve  us  soon  in  a  naval  war." 

Jefferson's  views  involved  an  association 
which  would  furnish  one  or  more  cruisers  each 
to  act  against  piracy  in  the  Mediterranean.  It 
included  Portugal,  Naples,  the  two  Sicilies, 
Venice,  Malta,  Denmark,  and  Sweden,  an  ex 
tremely  difficult  combination;  but  he  doubted 
the  good  faith  of  others.  In  a  letter  to  Monroe, 
August  n,  1786,  he  says:  "I  think  every  power 
in  Europe  would  soon  fall  into  it  except  France, 
England,  and  perhaps  Spain  and  Holland.  Of 


The  American  Navy  105 

these  there  is  only  England  who  would  give  any 
real  aid  to  the  Algerines.  .  .  ."  He 
added:  "Were  the  honor  and  advantage  of  es 
tablishing  such  a  confederacy  out  of  the  question, 
yet  the  necessity  that  the  United  States  should 
have  some  marine  force,  and  the  happiness  of 
this,  as  the  ostensible  cause  of  beginning  it, 
would  decide  on  its  propriety.  It  will  be  said 
there  is  no  money  in  the  treasury.  There  never 
will  be  money  in  the  treasury  till  the  confeder 
acy  shows  its  teeth.  .  .  .  Every  rational 
citizen  must  wish  to  see  an  effective  instrument 
of  coercion  and  should  fear  to  see  it  on  any  other 
element  than  the  water.  A  naval  force  can  never 
endanger  our  liberties  nor  occasion  bloodshed;  a 
land  force  would  do  both."* 

This  was  Jefferson  at  his  best.  It  is  extraor 
dinary  that  when  the  time  came  to  really  assert 
ourselves  against  the  seizure  of  our  seamen  and 
property  by  other  powers  than  those  of  Barbary, 
he  should  have  so  completely  failed.  But  in  any 
case,  at  the  time  he  was  proposing  his  floating 
confederacy,  our  inchoate  system  of  government 
of  the  period,  which  required  each  state  to  be 
solicited  by  Congress  for  funds,  would  no  doubt, 
as  Adams  thought,  have  made  it  impossible  to 

"Jefferson's  Correspondence  "Definitive  Ed.,"  V,  88  and  386. 


106  The  American  Navy 

provide  the  needed  ships.  Our  vessels  continued 
to  be  seized  and  their  crews  enslaved. 

It  would  be  unjust  to  the  memory  of  John 
Adams,  to  whom  the  Continental  navy  chiefly 
owed  its  beginnings,  and  who  was  ever  the  vig 
orous  supporter  of  the  newer  navy,  not  to  record 
his  life-long  views  as  expressed  to  the  House  of 
Representatives  in  November,  1800:  "I  con 
fidently  believe  that  few  persons  can  be  found 
within  the  United  States  who  do  not  admit  that 
a  navy,  well-organized,  must  constitute  the 
natural  and  efficient  defence  of  this  country 
against  all  foreign  hostility."  To  this  he  was 
consistent  through  the  whole  of  his  long  life.  In 
1785  he  was  simply  doubtful  of  the  travesty  of 
government  which  then  existed  and  was  to  have 
two  more  years  of  its  ineffective  life. 

In  January,  1791,  the  United  States,  having 
now  through  its  newly  formed  Constitution  of 
1787  crystallized  into  a  real  nationality,  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Mediterranean  Trade 
agreed  that  our  trade  could  "be  protected  but 
by  a  naval  force,  and  that  it  will  be  proper  to  re 
sort  to  the  same  as  soon  as  the  state  of  the  public 
finances  will  admit."  But  a  year  later  the  Senate 
was  stating  its  "readiness  to  ratify  treaties  with 
Algiers  providing  for  peace  at  a  cost  of  forty 


The  American  Navy  107 

thousand  dollars  at  the  outset  and  annual  trib 
ute  of  twenty-five  thousand;  and  also  for  the 
ransom  of  the  captives,  then  thirteen  in  number, 
for  forty  thousand/' 

Fifty  thousand  dollars  was  appropriated  to 
begin  with,  and  Paul  Jones  was  appointed  consul 
at  Algiers  and  as  our  envoy  to  make  a  peace. 
But  Jones  died  at  Paris,  July  18,  1792.  Thomas 
Barclay,  our  consul  in  Morocco,  was  appointed; 
he  also  died  very  shortly,  and  David  Humphreys, 
our  minister  to  Portugal,  succeeded  him.  But 
the  Dey  of  Algiers  refused  to  receive  him.  The 
seizures  continued,  and  in  1793  eleven  vessels 
were  captured  and  the  crews  enslaved.  There 
were  now  in  Algiers  over  a  hundred  American 
captives.  The  English  consul,  who  of  course 
was  acting  on  orders  from  home,  was  blamed  by 
Humphreys  for  the  situation.  Finally  the  House 
resolved  on  January  2,  1792,  but  only  by  a  ma 
jority  of  two,  that  a  naval  force  should  be  pro 
vided.  A  bill  providing  for  six  ships  at  a  cost  of 
$600,000  was  finally  passed  with  a  proviso  that 
if  peace  could  be  arranged  with  Algiers  work  on 
these  should  stop.  There  had  been  much  oppo 
sition,  many  arguing  "that  we  should  follow  the 
example  of  Europe  by  buying  peace,  or  should 
hire  a  European  navy  to  protect  our  trade;  that 


io8  The  American  Navy 

a  navy  was  a  menace  to  liberty.  .  .  ."  Mad 
ison  opposed  the  bill,  partly  on  the  ground  that 
a  navy  would  lead  to  international  complica 
tions,  particularly  with  England,  and  this  opin 
ion  was  shared  by  others.  The  opposition 
was  chiefly  from  the  South,  the  New  England 
members,  who  represented  a  constituency  which 
was  suffering  from  the  depredations,  naturally 
favored  the  action.  The  bill  provided  for  four 
ships  to  carry  forty-four  guns  and  two  to  carry 
thirty-six  each,  with  full  complements,  pay,  and 
rations,  and  $688,888.82  was  finally  voted.  The 
date  of  the  approval  of  this  bill,  March  27,  1794, 
marks  the  establishment  of  the  American  navy. 
Joshua  Humphreys  of  Philadelphia  was  the  for 
tunate  selection  as  naval  architect.  His  view 
was  that  these  ships  should  be  the  most  powerful 
of  their  class  afloat,  and  this  was  finally  sup 
ported  by  General  Knox,  the  Secretary  of  War, 
whose  department  was  for  some  years  to  control 
the  navy. 

But  notwithstanding  this  action,  we  continued 
the  negotiation  of  a  treaty  with  Algiers,  Thomas 
Humphreys  being  authorized  July  19,  1794,  to 
spend  $800,000  (the  cost  of  two  ships-of-the- 
line)  to  effect  it.  Washington  was  at  this  time 
President,  and  Jefferson  Secretary  of  State.  The 


The  American  Navy  109 

treaty  was  concluded  after  much  insulting  con 
duct  on  the  part  of  the  Dey,  on  September  5, 
1795,  and  only  on  the  offer,  as  an  additional  pres 
ent,  of  a  36-gun  frigate.  It  was  ratified  by  the 
Senate  on  March  6,  1796,  and  had  "cost  up  to 
January,  1797,  nearly  a  million  dollars,  includ 
ing  $525,000  for  ransom  of  the  captives,  various 
presents,  and  miscellaneous  expenses;  this  was 
exclusive  of  the  annuity  in  naval  stores  valued 
at  something  over  $21,000,  according  to  the  es 
timate,  which  afterward  proved  far  too  low."* 
Truly  weakness  came  high. 

Notwithstanding  the  proviso  of  cessation  of 
building  in  case  a  treaty  should  be  made,  Wash 
ington's  advice  to  continue  the  building  of  the 
ships  was  accepted  by  Congress,  and  in  1797 
there  were  launched  the  United  States,  the  Con 
stitution,  and  Constellation^  all  to  become  famous 
in  our  country's  history.  The  last  two  are  still 
afloat  and  their  old  age  proudly  cared  for. 

In  his  annual  message  of  December,  1796, 
Washington  urged  a  naval  force  as  indispen 
sable,  saying:  :'To  secure  respect  to  a  neutral 
flag  requires  a  naval  force,  organized  and  ready 
to  vindicate  it  from  insult  or  aggression.  This 
may  even  prevent  the  necessity  of  going  to  war 

*Allen,  56. 


no  The  American  Navy 

by  discouraging  belligerent  powers  from  com 
mitting  such  violations  of  the  rights  of  the  neu 
tral  party  as  may,  first  or  last,  leave  no  other 
option." 

The  following,  which  illustrates  the  result  of 
the  meanness  of  spirit  in  Congress,  is  scarcely 
pleasant  reading  for  an  American  to-day.  Says 
the  Portsmouth  newspaper  of  January  20,  1798: 
"On  Thursday  morning,  about  sunrise,  a  gun 
was  discharged  from  the  Crescent  frigate  as  a 
signal  for  getting  under  way,  and  at  10  A.  M. 
she  cleared  the  harbor  with  a  fine  leading  breeze. 
Our  best  wishes  follow  Captain  Newman,  his 
officers  and  men.  May  they  arrive  in  safety  at 
the  place  of  their  destination  and  present  to  the 
Dey  of  Algiers  one  of  the  finest  specimens  of 
naval  architecture  which  was  ever  borne  upon 
Piscataqua's  waters. 

"  Blow  all  ye  winds  that  fill  the  prosperous  sail, 
And  hush'd  in  peace  be  every  adverse  gale. 

"The  Crescent  is  a  present  from  the  United 
States  to  the  Dey  as  a  compensation  for  delay 
in  not  fulfilling  our  treaty  stipulations  in  proper 
time  [!]... 

"The  Crescent  has  many  valuable  presents  on 
board  for  the  Dey,  and  when  she  sailed  was  sup- 


The  American  Navy  in 

posed  to  be  worth  at  least  three  hundred  thou 
sand  dollars.  Twenty-six  barrels  of  dollars 
constituted  a  part  of  her  cargo.  It  is  worthy  of 
remark  that  the  captain,  chief  of  the  officers,  and 
many  of  the  privates  of  the  Crescent  frigate  have 
been  prisoners  at  Algiers/'* 

There  must  be  few  Americans  who  do  not 
blush  for  the  want  of  public  spirit  which  in  this 
ship  was  so  concretely  exhibited. 

A  treaty  had  been  concluded  with  Tripoli  in 
November,  1796,  at  a  cost  of  nearly  fifty-six 
thousand  dollars,  and  one  arranged  with  Tunis 
in  August,  1797,  at  an  estimated  expense  of  one 
hundred  and  seven  thousand  dollars,  but  these 
estimates  were  much  increased  by  our  yielding 
to  later  demands.  This  treaty,  finally  concluded 
March  26,  1797,  was  ratified  by  our  Senate  on 
January  10,  1800.  Its  conclusion  was  due 
largely  to  the  efforts  of  William  Eaton,  who  had 
been  appointed  consul  to  Tunis  in  July,  1797. 
He  held  true  views  of  the  situation.  "The 
United  States  set  out  wrongly  and  has  pro 
ceeded  so.  Too  many  concessions  have  been 
made  to  Algiers.  There  is  but  one  language 
which  can  be  held  to  these  people  and  this  is 


terror." 


*  Cooper,  I,  240. 


H2  The  American  Navy 

Eaton,  born  in  Connecticut  in  1764,  was  a 
Revolutionary  soldier  at  sixteen,  a  graduate 
later  of  Dartmouth  College,  and  in  1792  a  captain 
in  the  army.  He  was  a  most  interesting  char 
acter  whom  it  would  have  been  well,  on  account 
of  his  bold  and  active  spirit,  to  have  put  in  entire 
control  of  our  diplomatic  affairs  in  Barbary.  We 
shall  hear  of  him  later. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  depredations  of  the  new  French  Republic 
had  come  to  give  an  impetus  to  our  new  navy, 
and  on  April  27,  1798,  $950,000  was  appro 
priated  for  its  increase,  and  a  regular  navy  de 
partment  created.  Benjamin  Stoddart,  of 
Georgetown,  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  was  the 
first  secretary.  War  against  France  was  formally 
declared,  in  so  far  as  authorizing,  on  July  9, 
1798,  the  capture  of  French  ships,  and  authoriz 
ing  the  President  to  issue  commissions  for  priva 
teers.  On  the  same  day  a  marine  corps  of  88 1 
of  all  ranks  was  established,  to  be  commanded 
by  a  major.  By  July  i6th  the  total  force  au 
thorized  then  and  previously  was  twelve  frigates, 
twelve  sloops  of  war  from  20  to  24  guns,  six 
smaller  sloops,  besides  galleys  and  revenue  cut 
ters;  a  total  of  thirty. 

The  first  ship  to  get  to  sea  under  the  new  or 
ganization  was  the  Ganges,  a  purchased  India- 
man,  which  sailed  under  command  of  Captain 
Richard  Dale  on  May  22,  1798,  on  a  coasting 

113 


114  The  American  Navy 

cruise  with  orders  to  capture  all  French  cruisers 
on  our  coast  with  hostile  intent.  The  Constella 
tion,  38,  Captain  Truxton,  and  Delaware,  20, 
Captain  Decatur,  followed  in  June.  The  last 
made  the  first  capture,  a  French  privateer  of  14 
guns  and  70  men.  She  was  condemned  and 
bought  into  the  navy  under  the  name  of  Retalia 
tion,  with  Lieutenant  Bainbridge  in  command. 
The  United  States,  44,  Captain  Barry,  went  to 
sea  early  in  July,  followed  by  the  Constitution, 
44,  on  the  2Oth,  with  four  revenue  brigs  of  from 
10  to  14  guns  each.  There  were  at  sea  in  all,  in 
1798,  fifteen  ships  of  the  navy  and  eight  revenue 
vessels,  many  of  which  latter  were  finally  taken 
into  the  navy.  It  is  worthy  of  note  that  one  of 
these,  the  Pickering,  was  Treble's  first  command. 

All  of  these  vessels  except  the  George  Washing 
ton,  Merrimack,  and  Ganges,  the  Montezuma, 
Baltimore,  and  Delaware,  and  the  Herald,  Rich 
mond,  and  Retaliation  were  built  by  the  Govern 
ment.* 

One  of  the  first  affairs  of  the  new  navy  was 
a  notable  case  of  impressment  of  British  seamen 
from  the  Baltimore,  acting  as  convoy  to  a  number 

*The  following  is  the  full  list:  United  States,  44;  the  Constitution, 
44;  Constellation,  38;  George  Washington,  24;  Portsmouth,  24; 
Merrimack,  24;  Ganges,  24;  Montezuma,  20;  Baltimore,  20;  Dela 
ware,  20;  Herald,  18;  Norfolk,  18;  Pinckney,  18;  Retaliation  (cap 
tured),  14;  and  eight  revenue  vessels  of  from  10  to  14  guns. 


The  American  Navy  115 

of  merchantmen.  Meeting  a  powerful  British 
squadron  off  Havana,  Captain  Phillips  of  the 
Baltimore  was  informed  by  the  British  commo 
dore  of  his  intention  to  remove  all  British  sea 
men  from  his  ship.  Phillips  announced  his  inten 
tion  of  surrendering  his  ship  rather  than  to 
submit  to  the  outrage.  Unfortunately  there  was 
a  lawyer  on  board  as  passenger,  and  Phillips 
asked  his  judgment  as  to  the  legality  of  the  Brit 
ish  commander's  procedure.  Had  Phillips  acted 
as  he  at  first  intended,  viz.:  to  resist  to  the  ut 
most,  short  of  an  engagement  which  would  have 
been  folly  against  three  line-of-battle  ships,  he 
would  have  done  well,  but  his  legal  friend  found 
reasons  for  yielding,  which  was  done.  Five  men 
were  taken,  and  three  ships  of  the  convoy  seized, 
for  what  actual  reason  Cooper,  who  gives  this 
case  in  great  detail,  does  not  say.  Phillips  was 
handicapped  by  his  inexperience  as  a  naval  offi 
cer,  having  been  only  just  appointed  into  the 
navy  from  the  merchant  service.  There  were, 
too,  dissentient  opinions  even  among  patriotic 
Americans  of  standing  as  to  the  justice  of  the 
British  claims,  many  upholding  the,  then,  Brit 
ish  doctrine  of  inalienable  allegiance.  Even  so 
considerable  a  person  as  Gouverneur  Morris, 
one  of  the  ablest  men  America  has  produced  and 


n6  The  American  Navy 

of  large  diplomatic  and  political  experience, 
maintained  the  view.  It  was  the  first  of  many 
cases  which  had  so  large  a  part  in  bringing  on  the 
War  of  1812. 

In  November  the  Retaliation  was  captured  by 
a  French  squadron,  and  Bainbridge  was  a  pris 
oner  for  the  first,  though  not  for  the  last,  time  in 
his  career.  By  the  good  fortune  of  the  release 
of  his  schooner  as  a  cartel  he  was  enabled  to  re 
turn  home. 

During  1799  we  had  twenty-eight  vessels  in 
active  service.  Most  of  the  captains  and  many 
of  the  officers  of  lesser  rank  were  men  who  had 
seen  service  during  the  Revolution,  which,  it 
must  be  remembered,  had  ended  but  sixteen  years 
before;  many  of  them  of  course  were  men  with 
no  experience  of  naval  life,  which  differs  from 
that  of  the  merchant  service  much  as  does  that 
of  the  raw  militiaman  from  that  of  the  seasoned 
soldier. 

There  was  a  squadron  often  ships  under  Com 
modore  Barry,  with  his  broad-pennant  in  the 
United  States;  a  second  of  five  under  Captain 
Truxton  in  the  Constellation;  and  a  third  of  three 
under  Captain  Tingey.  A  number  of  French 
privateers  were  captured  by  each,  but  on  Feb 
ruary  8,  1799,  the  Constellation  sighted  near  the 


The  American  Navy  117 

island  of  Nevis  the  French  frigate  L' Insurgent?, 
of  forty  12-pounders  and  409  men,  which,  after  a 
hot  action  of  an  hour,  surrendered.  The  Constel 
lation  carried  38  guns,  those  on  her  main  deck 
being  24-pounders,  and  a  crew  of  only  309.  She 
was,  however,  distinctly  superior  in  weight  of 
gunfire.  Among  her  midshipmen  was  David 
Porter  of  future  fame,  who  was  to  be  .the  father 
of  an  even  more  famous  son.  The  Insurgente 
was  carried  into  St.  Kitts  under  very  difficult 
circumstances  by  Lieutenant  Rodgers,  later  one 
of  the  navy's  worthies,  and  the  progenitor  of  a 
famous  family  with  now  its  sixth  successive  gen 
eration  in  the  naval  service. 

It  was  now,  in  1799,  that  Preble,  promoted  to 
be  a  captain  and  in  command  of  the  Essex,  32, 
carried  the  first  American  man-of-war  east  of 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  By  the  beginning  of 
1800  France  was  disposed  to  peace,  and  on 
November  3d  the  United  States  sailed  with  the 
American  envoys. 

The  victory  of  the  Constellation  had  warmed 
the  American  blood,  and  Congress  in  1800  ap 
propriated  $2,482,593.90  for  the  naval  service. 
This  strictly  naval  war  had  now  lasted  a  year 
and  a  half,  and  during  1800  we  had  thirty-five 
ships  in  the  West  Indies.  Again  the  Constella- 


n8  The  American  Navy 

tion,  and  under  the  same  captain,  was  the  lucky 
ship.  On  February  i,  1800,  she  sighted  offGua- 
daloupe  a  French  frigate,  La  Vengeance^  of  5  2 
guns,  which,  deep  with  valuables  which  she  was 
transporting  to  France,  tried  to  avoid  action. 
This,  however,  after  a  chase  extending  into  the 
evening  of  the  next  day,  was  brought  on,  and 
lasted  until  I  :oo  A.  M.  of  the  3d,  when  the  French 
frigate  hauled  by  the  wind.  In  the  endeavor  to 
follow,  the  Constellation  s  mainmast,  every  shroud 
of  which  had  been  shot  away,  went  by  the  board 
despite  the  efforts  to  repair  damages,  carrying 
with  it  midshipman  Jarvis  and  the  topmen  aloft, 
all  but  one  of  whom  were  lost.  The  Constellation 
had  fourteen  men  killed  and  twenty-five  wounded, 
eleven  of  whom  died  later  of  their  wounds.  Her 
quarry  got  into  Curacao  dismasted  and  in  a 
sinking  condition  with  fifty  killed  and  one  hun 
dred  and  ten  wounded.  The  engagement  had 
lasted  five  hours  within  pistol  shot. 

These  brilliant  actions  not  only  brought 
Truxton  a  gold  medal  from  Congress  and  a  great 
name,  but  greatly  increased  the  popularity  of 
the  navy,  service  in  which  was  now  sought  by 
the  best  young  manhood  of  the  country. 

There  were  many  other  successes  in  this  year 
which  included  the  capture  of  nearly  fifty  pri- 


The  American  Navy  119 

vateers,  for  the  detail  of  which  there  is  no  space; 
but  one  of  these  actions,  the  cutting  out  of  a 
French  privateer,  the  Sandwich,  in  Puerto  Plata, 
Santo  Domingo,  is  notable  as  being  brilliantly 
carried  out  by  Isaac  Hull,  the  first  lieutenant  of 
the  Constitution,  and  who,  as  captain  of  the  same 
ship  twelve  years  later,  was  to  capture  the 
Guerriere. 

The  only  other  capture  of  special  note  was 
that  of  the  French  cruiser  Le  Berceau,  "a  sin 
gularly  fine  vessel  of  her  class,"  by  the  Boston, 
on  October  12,  1800,  which  was  returned  to 
France  under  the  treaty  of  peace  which  had  al 
ready  been  signed  on  September  3Oth. 

The  year  involved  some  sea  losses.  The  In- 
surgente,  which  had  been  taken  into  the  service, 
sailed  in  July  and  was  never  again  heard  of;  the 
Pickering  sailed  in  August  to  a  like  fate. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  ending  of  the  war  with  France  was  but  to 
find,  shortly,  another  on  our  hands,  for  which 
the  former,  however,  was  an  admirable  prepara 
tion  at  a  minimum  cost;  for  it  had  caused  pro 
vision  of  the  absolute  essentials  to  meet  the  new 
emergency:  ships,  officers,  and  men.  The  les 
son  to  be  learned  was,  however,  largely  to  be 
disregarded  by  those  now  to  come  into  political 
power. 

Fenimore  Cooper  began  the  seventeenth  chap 
ter  of  his  classic  history  of  the  navy  by  some 
words  of  political  wisdom  which  are  applicable 
to  this  day,  and  apparently  always  will  be: 
"Every  form  of  government,"  he  says,  "has 
evils  peculiar  to  itself.  In  a  democracy  there 
exists  a  standing  necessity  for  reducing  every 
thing  to  the  average  comprehension,  the  high 
intelligence  of  a  nation  usually  conceding  as 
much  to  its  ignorance  as  it  imparts.  One  of  the 
worst  consequences  in  a  practical  sense,  of  this 
compromise  of  knowledge,  is  to  be  found  in  the 

1 20 


The  American  Navy  121 

want  of  establishments  that  require  foresight 
and  liberality  to  be  well  managed,  for  the  his 
tory  of  every  democracy  has  shown  that  it  has 
been  deficient  in  the  wisdom  which  is  dependent 
on  those  expenditures  that  foster  true  economy, 
by  anticipating  evils  and  avoiding  the  waste  of 
precipitation,  want  of  system,  and  a  want  of 
knowledge."  In  every  epoch  of  difficulty — the 
French  spoliations,  the  British  impressments, 
the  War  of  1812,  the  Mexican  War,  our  Civil 
War,  and  the  Spanish  War — this  truth  has  been 
painfully  apparent  in  the  want  of  foresight  and 
preparation  of  an  adequate  army  and  navy.  It 
has  cost  us  dear. 

In  1801  came  into  power  a  new  political  school 
of  which  Jefferson  was  the  great  exponent.  With 
strong  French  sympathies,  he  had  not  favored 
the  naval  war  with  France,  and  his  party  was 
bent  upon  naval  economy.  Thus  an  early  act 
of  his  administration,  which  began  March  4, 
1801,  was  to  carry  into  effect  a  law  passed 
toward  the  close  of  the  Congress  which  had  just 
expired,  it  is  true,  but  which  had  been  elected 
under  the  new  political  inspiration.  The  law 
referred  to  empowered  the  President  to  sell  all 
or  any  of  the  vessels  of  the  navy  with  the  ex 
ception  of  thirteen  frigates,  and  obliged  him  to 


122  The  American  Navy 

reduce  the  list  of  officers  to  nine  captains,  thirty- 
six  lieutenants,  and  one  hundred  and  fifty  mid 
shipmen.  The  selling  of  twenty  of  the  smaller 
ships  was  not  so  great  an  evil  in  itself,  as  new 
ordnance  was  coming  into  use  and  small  guns 
of  light  calibre,  carrying  balls  from  six  to  nine 
and  twelve  pounds,  were  being  superseded  by 
carronades — short  guns  with  thin  walls  and  very 
small  charges.  They  were  of  two  calibres,  32 
and  24  pounders.  The  former  with  a  powder 
charge  of  two  pounds  had  a  range  of  about  300 
yards.  It  is  evident  that  at  long  range  the 
long  gun  with  a  much  heavier  charge  had  a 
great  advantage.  The  carronade  was  only  fit 
for  close  quarters.  This  change  required  ves 
sels  of  much  stouter  build  than  the  light  sloops- 
of-war  such  as  most  of  those  sold  were.  But  the 
mistake  was  that  they  were  not  replaced.  The 
law  of  1798  had  authorized  the  building  of  six 
ships-of-the-line  to  carry  74  guns  each.  This 
was  now  unhappily  suspended;  an  error  bitterly 
to  be  repented. 

It  was  a  period  of  utmost  world  unrest  when 
we  were  to  be  ground  between  the  upper  and 
nether  millstones  of  Napoleonic  authority  and 
British  arrogance.  Depredations  upon  our 
commerce  were  constant,  not  only  by  Barbary 


The  American  Navy  123 

corsairs  but  by  highly  civilized  France  and 
England  which  latter  also  for  years  impressed 
our  seamen  at  will.  It  was  a  period  when  true 
statesmanship  demanded  a  powerful  naval 
force;  when  but  a  mere  fraction  of  the  losses  by 
seizure  of  our  merchant  marine  and  of  the  cost 
of  the  War  of  1812  would  have  built  a  fleet  of 
ships-of-the-line  and  would  have  saved  us  both 
the  spoliation  and  the  war.  But  Jefferson, 
though  he  had  taken  the  finer  stand  as  to  the 
Barbary  outrages,  seemed  incapable  of  under 
standing  that  his  views  as  to  these  were  of  uni 
versal  application,  and  that  they  held  good 
against  Britain  and  France  as  well  as  against 
Algiers  and  Tripoli.  He  seemed  obsessed  with 
an  enmity  to  any  naval  force.  He  expressed 
the  view  that  a  navy  was  "a  ruinous  folly/" 
And  in  his  annual  message  of  December  15, 
1802,  advised  "to  add  to  our  navy  yard  at 
Washington  a  dock  within  which  our  vessels 
may  be  laid  up  dry  and  under  cover  from  the 
sun."  Perhaps  no  more  extraordinary  views 
as  to  national  defence  ever  came  from  any  one 
with  a  claim  to  be  a  statesman. 

Jefferson's  election  had  only  just  been  pre 
ceded  by  one  of  the  most  extraordinary  inci- 

*Letter  to  Paine,  September  6, 1807,  "Writings,"  IX,  136. 


124  The  American  Navy 

dents  of  our  naval  history:  the  impressment  in 
1800  of  the  frigate  George  Washington  by  the 
Dey  of  Algiers  to  carry  a  shipload  of  tribute  to 
the  Sultan  of  Turkey.  This  ship,  commanded 
by  Captain  William  Bainbridge,  one  of  the  most 
capable  officers  of  our  service,  had  been  sent 
with  our  own  tribute  to  Algiers,  where  he  ar 
rived  September,  1800.  The  Dey  had  got  into 
disfavor  by  making  peace  with  France  while 
Turkey  was  at  war  with  that  country  on  account 
of  the  occupancy  of  Egypt  by  Bonaparte. 
Hence  the  desire  of  the  Dey  for  restoration  to 
favor.  He  threatened  instant  war  against  the 
United  States  in  case  of  Bainbridge's  refusal. 
The  George  Washington  lay  under  the  guns  of 
the  port  and  escape  was  extremely  doubtful; 
there  was  the  strong  probability  of  the  seizure 
of  the  ship,  the  slavery  of  the  officers  and  crew, 
and  the  consequent  subjection  of  our  large  com 
merce  in  the  Mediterranean  to  destruction. 
Bainbridge,  gallant  man  as  he  was,  esteemed  it 
his  duty  to  sacrifice,  possibly,  his  good  name  and 
comply.  Our  consul  advised  his  so  doing  and 
he  finally  yielded,  though  in  bitterness  of  spirit, 
aggravated  by  the  attitude  of  the  Dey,  who 
said:  "You  pay  me  tribute  by  which  you  be 
come  my  slaves.  I  have  therefore  a  right  to 


The  American  Navy  125 

order  you  as  I  please."  The  situation  was  but 
the  outcome  of  years  of  compliance  with  such  a 
system. 

Bainbridge  sailed  on  October  19,  1800,  for 
Constantinople  with  a  mixed  cargo:  an  ambas 
sador  and  suite  of  a  hundred,  a  hundred  negro 
women  and  children,  four  horses,  a  hundred  and 
fifty  sheep,  twenty-five  cattle,  four  lions,  four 
tigers,  four  antelopes,  twelve  parrots,  and 
funds  and  specie  and  presents  amounting  to 
nearly  a  million  dollars;  all  this  in  a  small  ship 
with  accommodations  for  a  crew  of  131.  An 
element  of  humor  in  the  situation  was  the 
necessity  of  laying  the  ship's  head  to  point 
to  Mecca  at  the  frequent  times  of  prayer, 
one  being  stationed  at  the  compass  to  insure 
correctness  of  direction.  The  fact  that  the  ship 
was  named  George  Washington  added  to  the  in 
congruity  of  the  situation.  Death  had  saved 
Washington  himself  from  the  pain  of  knowledge. 
The  cruise,  however,  had  one  benefit,  in  making 
known  our  flag  and  country  to  the  Turks.  Dur 
ing  his  stay  in  Constantinople,  Bainbridge's 
personal  qualities  and  the  excellent  order  of  his 
ship  made  a  deep  impression  and  were  of  lasting 
benefit  to  his  country. 

Throughout  the  year  1800  the  attitude  of  the 


126  The  American  Navy 

Dey  of  Tripoli  had  become  steadily  more 
threatening,  and  by  February,  1801,  he  was 
demanding  a  new  treaty  with  a  payment  of 
$250,000  and  an  annual  tribute  of  $20,000.  On 
May  10,  1801,  he  declared  war,  and  about  June 
1st  Captain  Richard  Dale  (Paul  Jones's  first 
lieutenant  in  the  Bonhomme  Richard)  sailed 
from  Hampton  Roads  with  three  frigates:  the 
President,  Philadelphia,  and  Essex,  and  the 
schooner  Enterprise,  to  protect  our  commerce 
by  blockade  of  Tripoli  and  Tunis  if  necessary. 
A  humiliating  element  of  the  situation  was  the 
carrying  of  $30,000  which  it  was  hoped  the  Dey 
of  Tripoli  would  accept  as  a  compensation  for 
the  annuity  of  naval  stores. 

Dale's  arrival  off  Tripoli  caused  much  dis 
turbance  in  the  mind  of  the  Dey,  but  nothing 
occurred  until  on  August  ist,  when  the  Enter 
prise  captured  a  Tripolitan  vessel  of  14  guns  and 
80  men,  after  an  action  of  three  hours,  which 
was  returned  to  Tripoli  an  empty  hulk,  Dale's 
orders  not  allowing  him  to  take  prizes,  but  to 
sink,  burn,  or  destroy.  This  curious  phase  of 
things  arose  from  the  extraordinary  views  of 
President  Jefferson  as  to  his  constitutional 
powers.  War,  as  he  saw  things,  could  not 
exist  except  by  declaration  of  Congress,  how- 


The  American  Navy  127 

ever  active  the  enemy  in  seizing  American 
ships  and  making  slaves  of  American  citizens 
and  seamen.  The  situation  was  remedied  by 
Congress  on  February  6,  1802,  which  gave  the 
President  full  powers  to  act,  and  was  practically 
a  declaration  of  war. 

Dale  had  orders  to  sail  for  home  in  October  if 
things  should  become  peaceful,  and  was  to  leave 
the  Mediterranean  in  any  case  by  December 
1st.  For  this  there  were  two  reasons:  it  was 
deemed  unsafe  to  cruise  in  the  Mediterranean 
in  winter,  and  the  crews  were  enlisted  for  but 
one  year.  Meanwhile,  however,  and  despite 
the  extraordinary  views  of  the  President,  Dale 
carried  out  his  semi-peaceful,  semi-warlike 
orders,  so  far  as  to  blockade  Tripoli  and  capture 
ingoing  vessels.  In  one  of  these  were  twenty 
Tripolitan  soldiers  and  an  officer,  who  were 
exchanged  for  three  American  prisoners.  Dale 
completed  his  orders  so  far  as  to  return  in 
December  with  two  ships  only,  leaving  the 
Philadelphia  and  Essex;  the  first  to  watch  Trip 
oli  from  Syracuse  as  a  base,  the  second  to 
observe  two  Tripolitan  vessels  blockaded  at 
Gibraltar. 

A  new  squadron  was  now  formed  with  crews 
enlisted  for  two  years.  Commodore  Morris 


128  The  American  Navy 

was  ordered  to  the  command  with  his  broad- 
pennant  in  the  Chesapeake  of  such  later  ill- 
fortune.  The  other  ships  were  the  Constellation, 
New  York,  John  Adams,  Adams,  and  Enterprise. 
It  is  not  often  that  a  family  finds  itself  so 
honored  as  was  the  Adams  family  in  this  in 
stance,  with  two  ships  of  the  name  in  the  same 
squadron.  Isaac  Chauncey  commanded  the 
Chesapeake,  John  Rodgers  the  John  Adams, 
Isaac  Hull  was  first  lieutenant  of  the  New  York, 
and  Oliver  Hazard  Perry  was  a  midshipman  in 
the  Adams.  All  of  these  were  to  rise  to  high 
distinction. 

The  ships  of  the  new  squadron  sailed  as  they 
could  be  got  ready,  the  Chesapeake  on  April  27, 
1802,  the  John  Adams  not  until  September  iQth. 
There  is  no  special  need  to  follow  the  blockade 
of  Tripoli  by  Morris's  squadron:  the  many  at 
tacks  upon  the  galleys,  generally  so  close  in 
shore  as  to  make  it  difficult  to  absolutely  destroy 
them;  the  rough  experiences  and  dangers  on 
such  a  coast  from  heavy  weather.  There  were 
conspicuous  cases  of  gallantry  and  of  conduct 
which  went  far  to  form  the  character  of  the 
service  yet  in  its  infancy.  Lieutenant  David 
Porter  particularly  gave  evidence  of  his  coming 
fame.  Morris,  relieved  temporarily  by  Com- 


The  American  Navy  129 

modore  Rodgers,  went  home  in  October,  1803, 
to  meet  undeserved  charges  of  want  of  vigor  in 
his  command,  which  ended  in  wrongful  dis 
missal  from  the  service. 

By  the  middle  of  1803  a  new  squadron  was 
formed  of  the  Constitution,  Philadelphia,  and 
of  five  brigs  and  schooners,  the  Argus,  Siren, 
Nautilus,  Vixen,  and  Enterprise.  Edward  Pre- 
ble  was  the  commodore  in  command. 

It  is  a  habit  with  some  to  call  Paul  Jones  or 
John  Barry  the  "father  of  the  navy  "  as  race 
sentiment  or  particular  inclination  may  rule,  ^ 
but  neither  has  a  claim  of  the  sort.  Jones  never 
served  in  the  newly  established  service  or  had 
anything  to  do  with  its  organization.  The 
ephemeral  navy  of  the  Revolution  had  entirely 
passed  away;  the  navy  of  1794  was  not  a 
reconstitution;  it  was  a  new  birth,  and  with 
this  Barry's  connection  was  without  special 
distinction.  Jones  was  a  Scot  by  birth;  Barry 
was  an  Irishman.  Both  are  in  the  first  rank  as 
naval  officers,  but  neither  did  anything  to  form 
the  new  navy.  This  was  the  work  of  Edward 
Preble,  American  by  long  descent,  tradition,  and 
training.  Born  in  Portland,  Maine,  August 
15,  1761,  he  ran  away  when  seventeen  to  go  to 
sea  in  a  privateer;  he  was  shortly  made  a  mid- 


130  The  American  Navy 

shipman  in  the  Protector,  the  largest  ship  of 
the  Massachusetts  state  navy;  was  in  several 
actions,  and  when  the  Protector  was  captured 
became  a  prisoner  in  the  prison  ship  Jersey,  at 
New  York.  When  released  he  was  imme 
diately  again  at  sea,  this  time  in  the  state 
privateer  Winthrop,  and  was  of  the  party  which 
cut  out  an  armed  British  brig  from  under  the 
British  fort  in  Penobscot  Bay.  When  the 
United  States  navy  came  to  life  again  he  was 
commissioned  one  of  the  first  five  lieutenants. 
In  1799  he  was  promoted  to  captain  and  in 
command  of  the  Essex  convoyed  fourteen  val 
uable  merchantmen  to  China.  His  high  temper 
and  strict  discipline  were,  in  the  early  part  of 
his  Mediterranean  service,  to  make  him  some 
what  unpopular,  but  his  great  qualities  soon 
brought  an  admiration  and  regard  which  have 
come  down  as  a  cherished  tradition  of  the  ser 
vice,  as  warm  to-day  as  a  hundred  years  since. 
It  is  to  him  should  be  given  the  credit  of  estab 
lishing  the  character  of  the  little  navy  which 
fought  the  War  of  1812,  covering  itself  with 
fame,  and  bringing  a  new  respect  to  our  coun 
try  which  owes  his  memory  every  honor,  and 
continues  to  owe  it  in  much  greater  measure 
than  ever  paid. 


The  American  Navy  131 

The  Philadelphia  was  one  of  the  first  of  the 
new  squadron  to  arrive  abroad.  Her  haste 
brought  good  fortune.  Hearing  at  Gibraltar 
of  Tripolitan  vessels  off  Cape  de  Gatt,  the 
southeastern  corner  of  Spain,  Captain  Bain- 
bridge  at  once  left,  and,  on  the  night  of  August 
26th,  came  in  contact  not  with  Tripolitans 
but  with  a  Moorish  ship,  the  Meshboha,  of 
twenty-two  guns  with  a  crew  of  120  men,  and  a 
captured  brig  from  Boston,  the  Celia.  We  were 
not  at  war  with  Morocco,  but  the  Moorish 
captain  said  that  he  had  made  the  capture 
anticipating  war.  The  Philadelphia  secured 
her  prizes  at  Gibraltar  and  went  to  her  station 
off  Tripoli. 

When  the  Constitution  reached  Gibraltar, 
Preble  of  course  learned  at  once  of  the  occur 
rence  mentioned,  and  with  his  flagship  and 
three  other  vessels,  one  of  which  was  the  John 
Adams ,  flying  the  broad-pennant  of  Commodore 
Rodgers,  who,  though  the  senior  officer,  cheer 
fully  gave  his  services  to  the  new  commander- 
in-chief,  went  to  Tangier  and  demanded  satis 
faction.  The  result  was  the  complete  disavowal 
by  Morocco  of  the  hostile  action. 


CHAPTER  XII 

WE  NOW  come  to  the  other  and  vastly  more 
honorable  phase  of  our  relations  with  the  Bar- 
bary  powers  and  to  a  series  of  actions  which 
form  one  of  the  most  dramatic  chapters  of 
American  naval  history.  The  Philadelphia  and 
schooner  Vixen  were  the  only  two  vessels 
blockading  Tripoli.  It  was  October,  with  much 
rough  weather.  Carried  by  the  gales  well  to 
the  eastward  of  Tripoli,  the  Philadelphia  on 
October  3ist  was  returning,  with  the  wind  now 
shifted  into  the  east,  to  her  station.  Sighting 
a  vessel  inshore,  she  gave  chase  and  pursued 
until  the  soundings  decreased  to  a  danger 
point  and  the  ship  was  hauled  off  shore.  The 
coast  was  practically  uncharted.  The  depth 
increased  and  then  again  suddenly  decreased 
and  the  ship  drove  on  to  a  reef  which  was  one 
of  several  to  the  eastward  of  the  port,  and  be 
tween  which,  as  in  most  coral  formations,  was 
deep  water.  The  chase,  knowing  well  the 
water,  reached  the  harbor  in  safety.  The  firing 

132 


The  American  Navy  133 

had  brought  out  nine  gunboats  and  no  time 
was  to  be  lost  if  the  ship  were  to  be  saved.  She 
had  driven  up  the  smooth  eastern  slope  of  the 
reef  her  entire  length.  Guns  were  thrown 
overboard,  a  few  only  being  reserved  for  de 
fence,  anchors  cut  from  the  bows,  the  foremast 
cut  away,  and  every  means  taken  to  lighten  the 
ship  without  avail.  The  hostile  gunboats  took 
positions  from  which  they  could  safely  fire; 
night  was  at  hand;  the  Vixen  was  unfortunately 
absent  in  search  of  a  Tripolitan  cruiser,  and  the 
situation  became  such  that  it  was  imperative  to 
surrender  to  save  the  lives  of  the  ship's  com 
pany.  The  magazine  was  "drowned/5  holes 
bored  in  the  ship's  bottom,  and  all  done  which 
it  was  thought  would  insure  the  loss  of  the 
ship.  The  colors  were  then  lowered.  The 
Tripolitan  crews  acted  in  their  usual  manner, 
stripping  the  men  of  their  clothing  and  seizing 
everything  valuable,  snatching  even  from  Bain- 
bridge  his  epaulets,  gloves,  watch,  and  money 
when  in  the  boat  of  his  captors.  It  was  ten  at 
night  when  the  307  prisoners  were  landed  at 
the  town.  The  officers  were  very  civilly  re 
ceived  in  state  by  the  Pacha,  given  supper,  and 
at  one  o'clock  of  the  morning  taken  to  the 
former  American  consulate,  a  house  good 


134  The  American  Navy 

enough  in  itself  but  almost  destitute  of  furni 
ture  and  other  comforts.  But  for  the  kindness 
then  shown  by  Mr.  Nicholas  C.  Nissen,  the 
Danish  consul,  then  as  ever  an  unswerving 
friend  of  American  prisoners,  their  condition 
would  have  been  greatly  more  trying.  His 
name  should  be  held  in  grateful  remembrance. 
He  did  indeed  receive  the  thanks  of  Congress 
and  had  the  lasting  gratitude  of  the  officers  of 
the  Philadelphia,  who,  after  their  release,  pre 
sented  him  in  grateful  recognition  of  his  kind 
ness  with  a  handsome  testimonial  of  silver. 

The  men  were  confined  in  a  warehouse  much 
too  small  but  were  later  transferred  to  a  larger. 
They  were  set  to  various  kinds  of  work,  even 
to  the  building,  as  mentioned,  of  a  fort  which 
came  to  be  known  as  the  American  fort  and 
received  much  maltreatment,  particularly  after 
the  burning  of  the  Philadelphia  in  the  harbor, 
which  soon  came  to  pass. 

The  ship  had  been  floated  largely  through 
the  influence  of  a  northerly  gale  which  had 
raised  the  water-level  on  the  coast  and  had  on 
November  5th  been  brought  into  the  harbor. 
Her  guns  and  anchors  were  weighed,  the  former 
mounted,  and  work  begun  to  put  the  ship  in 
order.  It  is  seldom  that  the  soul  of  man  is 


The  American  Navy  135 

more  sorely  tried  than  was  that  of  her  gallant 
captain  when  he  became  conscious  of  this  suc 
cess  of  the  enemy. 

It  was  not  until  November  2/th  that  Preble 
on  his  arrival  at  Malta  received  news  con 
firming  rumors  of  the  Philadelphia  s  loss  in 
letters  from  Bainbridge.  In  one  of  December 
5,  1803,  Bainbridge  had  suggested  the  de 
struction  of  the  Philadelphia,  an  idea  which 
naturally  had  already  occurred  to  Preble.  On 
December  iyth  the  latter  sailed  for  Tripoli, 
taking  with  him  the  Enterprise,  commanded 
by  Decatur,  who  captured  on  the  way  a  ketch  (or 
topsail  schooner)  named  the  Mastico,  with  a 
crew  of  seventy.  It  was  this  captured  vessel, 
renamed  the  Intrepid,  which  was  finally  used 
in  the  coming  adventure  and  has  thus  come 
down  through  more  than  a  century  in  the  list 
of  famous  ships. 

There  was  no  trouble  in  finding  officers  or 
men  for  the  duty,  but  the  whole  was  finally 
turned  over  to  the  commander  of  the  Enterprise 
to  arrange,  and  her  crew  only  was  to  be  em 
ployed  except  that  five  midshipmen  of  the 
Constitution  were  detailed  to  assist.  Sixty-two 
men  of  the  Enterprise  were  taken.  The  offi 
cers  were  Decatur,  commanding;  Lieutenants 


136  The  American  Navy 

Lawrence,  Bainbridge,  and  Thorn,  and  Mid 
shipman  Macdonough,  all  of  the  Enterprise; 
Midshipmen  Izard,  Morris,  Laws,  Davis,  and 
Rowe  of  the  Constitution,  and  Salvador  Catalano 
as  pilot.  Nearly  two  months  from  the  incep 
tion  had  been  spent  in  maturing  the  plans,  and 
on  the  evening  of  February  3d  the  Intrepid 
and  Siren  sailed  together  from  Syracuse  and 
were  off  Tripoli  on  the  yth.  A  gale  of  wind 
drove  them  to  sea,  and  it  was  not  until  the  i6th 
that  they  were  again  off  Tripoli.  At  dark  the 
Intrepid  was  two  miles  from  the  entrance,  and 
here  Midshipman  T.  O.  Anderson,  with  a  boat 
and  nine  men  from  the  Siren  (which  was  dis 
guised  as  a  merchantman),  was  taken  on  board. 
This  made  a  total  of  eighty-four  in  the  Intrepid. 
A  careful  division  of  duties  had  been  made. 
Decatur,  two  midshipmen,  and  fifteen  men  wrere 
to  hold  the  spar  (or  upper)  deck;  the  others 
were  to  look  after  the  lower  decks  except  a  mid 
shipman  and  his  boat's  crew  who  were  to  secure 
the  Philadelphia  s  boats  and  prevent  the  escape 
ashore  of  the  Tripolitan  crew.  The  watchword 
was  "Philadelphia." 

The  captured  ship  had  her  main  and  mizzen 
topmasts  housed  (partially -lowered),  the  fore 
mast  which  had  been  cut  away  was  not  yet 


The  American  Navy  137 

replaced;  the  sails  were  unbent  and  her  lower 
yards  lying  across  the  bulwarks.  Her  forty 
guns  were  all  loaded.  She  was  lying  in  front  of 
the  castle  well  inshore. 

The  night  was  almost  calm  with  a  smooth 
sea  and  a  young  moon,  and  the  Intrepid  crept 
slowly  in,  apparently  exciting  no  distrust.  The 
main  part  of  her  crew  was  kept  concealed,  only 
some  ten  or  twelve  being  visible.  She  was 
steered  straight  for  the  Philadelphia  s  bow. 

When  still  some  distance  off,  a  hail  from  the 
Philadelphia  was  answered  by  the  pilot,  who 
stated  the  vessel  to  be  from  Malta,  and  that  her 
anchors  having  been  lost  in  a  gale,  permission 
was  asked  to  make  fast  to  the  ship.  A  sudden 
shift  of  wind  brought  the  Intrepid  under  the 
frigate's  broadside  and  she  drifted  slowly 
astern,  exposed  to  the  Philadelphia's  port 
broadside  at  a  distance  of  about  forty  yards. 
So  completely  were  the  Tripolitans  deceived 
that  they  lowered  a  boat  and  sent  a  line.  Some 
of  the  Intrepid' s  men  had  meanwhile  got  into 
her  boat  and  taken  one  to  the  frigate's  fore 
chains  (supports  to  the  shrouds).  They  then 
took  the  line  from  the  frigate's  boat  which  had 
been  run  from  the  after  part  of  the  ship  and 
made  it  fast  aboard  the  Intrepid.  Both  lines 


138  The  American  Navy 

were  hauled  upon  by  the  men  lying  down  con 
cealed  on  her  deck.  On  getting  near  the 
Philadelphia  the  Intrepid's  anchors  were  dis 
covered.  On  this,  the  Tripolitans  prepared  to 
cut  the  fasts,  passing  the  cry  of  "Americanos." 
A  strong  pull  brought  the  Intrepid  alongside, 
"where  she  was  secured  quick  as  thought." 

The  ship  was  immediately  boarded.  The 
Tripolitans  crowded  over  to  the  starboard  side 
and  forward,  offering  practically  no  resistance, 
and  large  numbers  jumped  overboard.  There 
was  some  struggle  below,  "but  in  less  than  ten 
minutes  Decatur  was  on  the  quarter-deck  in 
undisturbed  possession  of  his  prize." 

The  orders  to  destroy  the  ship  and  not  at 
tempt  to  get  her  away,  which  in  the  circum 
stances  of  not  a  sail  bent  or  a  yard  aloft  would 
have  been  almost  impossible,  were  imperative. 
The  arrangements  for  firing  her  were  so  com 
plete  that  the  combustibles  prepared  were 
alight  in  a  few  minutes,  and  in  some  twenty- 
five  minutes  from  boarding  the  Americans  were 
hastening  out  of  the  ship  to  escape  the  flames. 
Their  movements  were  none  too  quick  to  escape; 
the  fasts  were  cut  and  the  Intrepid  shoved  clear 
only  just  in  time  herself  to  escape  burning. 
The  sixteen  sweeps  were  manned,  and,  aided 


The  American  Navy  139 

by  a  light  breeze,  the  little  vessel  with  her  brave 
crew  intact  swept  out  of  the  harbor  under  the 
fire  of  the  batteries  and  the  thunder  of  the 
Philadelphia  s  own  guns  as  they  heated  and 
discharged  themselves,  one  broadside  toward 
the  town,  the  other  toward  the  English  fort. 
The  only  shot  striking  the  Intrepid  was  one 
passing  through  her  topgallantsail.  She  was 
met  outside  the  harbor  by  the  Siren  s  boats. 
The  Siren  s  commander  had  seen  the  rocket- 
signal,  agreed  upon,  from  the  Philadelphia, 
and  in  the  calm  had  used  his  sweeps  to  close  in 
and  protect  the  Intrepid  should  she  be  attacked. 
Before  the  signal  could  be  answered  the  flames 
were  running  aloft  in  the  Philadelphia.  "Pres 
ently  a  boat  was  seen  coming  alongside  and  a 
man  in  a  sailor's  jacket  sprang  over  the  gangway 
of  the  brig.  It  was  Decatur  to  announce  his 
victory !  "*  On  the  I9th  both  vessels  were  again 
at  Syracuse.  This  brilliant  exploit  made  De 
catur  a  captain  at  the  age  of  twenty-five  and 
promoted  most  of  those  who  accompanied  him. 
It  remains  as  one  of  the  most  gallant  and  suc 
cessful  adventures  of  the  sea,  remarkable  par 
ticularly  for  the  coolness  of  its  procedure  and 
calm  courage  of  execution.  It  was  worthy  of 

*Condensed  from  Cooper  chiefly  and  from  Allen. 


140  The  American  Navy 

all  the  praise  given  it  at  the  time  and  which  has 
continued  undimmed. 


The  loss  of  the  Philadelphia  and  Decatur's 
exploit  gave  an  impetus  to  naval  affairs,  which 
struggled  then,  as  ever  since,  under  conditions 
of  want  of  knowledge  in  our  legislators  and  a 
poor  system  of  administration.  There  was, 
for  example,  not  a  drydock  in  the  whole  coun 
try.  "Facts,"  as  Fenimore  Cooper  expresses 
it,  "were  still  leading  opinion,  and  the  gallant 
men  who  were  slowly  fighting  themselves  into 
favor  were  merely  performing  an  office  that 
would  seem  inseparable  from  the  advancement 
of  every  free  people  in  civilization." 

Treble's  whole  force  before  Tripoli  in  July, 
1804,  was  the  frigate  Constitution,  six  small 
vessels  of  from  12  to  16  guns  each,  six  gunboats, 
and  two  bomb-vessels;  an  excellent  force  for 
blockading  and  for  attacking  the  Tripolitan 
gunboats,  which  hugged  the  shores,  but  not 
for  bombarding  the  batteries  in  which  were 
115  guns. 

From  now  on  many  brilliant  actions  between 
the  smaller  craft  took  place,  in  one  of  which  was 
a  famous  incident  of  the  general  attack  of 
August  4,  1804,  when  Decatur,  having  already 


The  American  Navy  141 

boarded  and  taken  one  gunboat,  boarded 
another.  The  captain  of  the  second  was  a 
large  and  powerful  Turk  who  seized  the  pike 
with  which  Decatur  attacked  him  and  used  it 
against  the  latter,  who  parried  with  his  sword 
which  broke  at  the  hilt.  The  pike  entered  the 
fleshy  part  of  Decatur's  breast.  Decatur  suc 
ceeded  in  tearing  it  out  and  grappled  with  the 
Turk.  Both  fell,  the  Turk  uppermost.  He 
felt  for  his  poinard,  but  Decatur,  grasping  his 
arm  with  one  hand,  was  able  to  take  a  small 
pistol  from  his  waistcoat  pocket  and  passing 
his  arm  around  the  Turk  fired  it  into  his  back. 
The  ball  passed  entirely  through  his  foe  and 
lodged  in  Decatur's  clothes.  While  this  was 
going  on,  another  raised  a  sabre  to  cleave 
Decatur,  but  a  young  seaman,  named  Daniel 
Fraisher,*  interposed  his  arm,  which  was  nearly 
severed  at  the  wrist.  Lieutenant  Trippe  of 
Gunboat  No.  6  had  an  equally  desperate  en 
counter.  His  own  and  the  enemy's  gunboat 
separated  with  the  shock,  leaving  only  nine 
Americans  aboard  the  Tripolitan.  Trippe  was 
attacked  by  a  powerful  young  Turk,  who  in 
flicted  eight  sabre  wounds  in  the  head  and  two 
in  the  breast.  Trippe  was  brought  to  his  knees, 

*See  Allen,  "  Barbary  Corsairs,"  192. 


142  The  American  Navy 

but  he  was  able  to  give  his  adversary  a  final 
thrust  with  his  short  pike,  which  ended  the 
struggle.  When  the  captain  thus  fell,  the 
others  surrendered.  The  desperate  nature  of 
the  struggle  undertaken  by  the  six  gunboats 
in  the  action  may  be  understood  when  it  is 
known  that  the  two  boats  captured  by  Decatur 
carried  about  eighty  men;  of  these  fifty-two  were 
known  to  be  killed  and  wounded,  many  jumped 
overboard,  and  only  eight  unwounded  prisoners 
were  taken.  Stephen  Decatur's  brother  James 
had  command  of  Gunboat  No.  2.  In  boarding, 
he  was  shot  through  the  forehead  and  died  that 
evening. 

The  details  of  the  many  sanguinary  ac 
tions  during  Treble's  blockade  cannot  be  given. 
Three  captured  gunboats,  numbered  7,  8,  and  9, 
were  changed  in  rig  and  added  to  the  fleet.  On 
August  yth  No.  7  blew  up  in  action  and  of  her 
crew  of  twenty-eight,  ten,  including  Lieutenant 
Caldwell,  her  commander,  and  Midshipman 
Dorsey,  were  killed,  and  six  wounded. 

The  arrival  of  the  John  Adams  on  August  8th 
brought  the  unwelcome  word  to  Preble  of  the 
coming  of  a  new  and  more  powerful  force  under 
Commodore  Samuel  Barron,  his  senior.  This,  as  it 
was  arranged,  was  an  unfortunate  necessity,  as  a 


The  American  Navy  143 

new  squadron  could  not  be  organized  without 
putting  in  command  some  of  Treble's  seniors, 
and  it  was  deplored  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
in  a  letter  to  Preble.  It  is  not,  however,  readily 
seen  why  the  crews  with  Preble,  the  times  of 
which  had  expired,  could  not  have  been  replaced 
by  new  crews,  and  only  the  two  captains  junior 
to  him  sent.  It  was  an  act  which  showed  feeble 
unaccustomedness  to  administration.  Preble 
wrote  in  his  private  journal:  "How  much  my 
feelings  are  lacerated  by  this  supersedure  at  the 
moment  of  victory  cannot  be  described  and  can 
be  felt  only  by  an  officer  placed  in  my  mortify 
ing  situation."  He  kept  up  his  attacks,  how 
ever,  while  awaiting  his  relief,  and  on  the  night 
of  August  24th,  after  being  much  delayed  by 
heavy  weather,  a  night  attack  was  made  by 
bombardment  with  little  reply.  This  was  re 
newed  on  the  28th;  one  Tripolitan  gunboat  was 
sunk,  two  ran  ashore,  and  the  rest  retreated. 
The  town  was  subjected  to  a  heavy  bombard 
ment  during  which  a  24-pound  shot  entered  the 
quarters  of  the  captive  Americans,  covering 
Bainbridge  in  the  debris. 

On  September  3d  came  Preble's  fifth  and  last 
attack  by  bombardment.  The  next  evening 
the  Intrepid  was  sent  in  with  the  intent  of  blow- 


144  The  American  Navy 

ing  her  up  in  the  midst  of  the  Tripolitan  fleet. 
A  compartment  was  built  in  which  was  placed 
15,000  pounds  of  powder  connected  with  a  slow 
match  expected  to  take  fifteen  minutes  in  burn 
ing.  Over  the  powder  was  placed  one  hundred 
13-inch  and  fifty  9-inch  shells,  with  a  quantity 
of  solid  shot  and  pig-iron  ballast.  She  was  com 
manded  by  Commander  Richard  Somers,  w^ho 
volunteered  for  the  work  and  took  with  him,  as 
the  only  other  officer,  Lieutenant  Wadsworth 
of  the  Constitution.  Ten  men  were  taken.  At 
the  last  moment,  before  parting  company  with 
the  three  vessels  which  accompanied  the  Intrepid 
to  a  point  near  the  entrance  and  stood  by  to  re 
ceive  the  boats  when  they  should  return,  Lieu 
tenant  Joseph  Israel  of  the  Constitution  went 
aboard  the  Intrepid  to  carry  a  message  from  the 
commodore  and  begged  so  to  stay  that  Somers 
allowed  him  to  do  so. 

The  night  was  dark  and  the  Intrepid  was  soon 
lost  in  the  gloom,  when  at  9:47,  as  marked  in 
the  log  of  the  Constitution,  there  was  a  terrific 
explosion,  followed  by  cries  of  terror  and  beating 
of  drums  in  the  town  and  then  silence.  The 
boats  which  were  to  return  never  came.  The 
bodies  of  the  three  officers  and  ten  men  were 
from  time  to  time  recovered  by  the  Tripolitans, 


The  American  Navy  145 

but  the  explosion,  which  evidently  occurred  be 
fore  intended,  has  ever  remained  a  mystery. 

Among  the  six  names  which  appear  on  the 
monument  now  at  the  Naval  Academy,  erected 
by  their  brother  officers  to  those  killed  at  Trip 
oli,  are  those  of  the  three  then  lost,  the  three 
other  names  being  Caldwell,  James  Decatur, 
and  Dorsey.  The  total  loss  in  Treble's  squadron 
in  these  eleven  months  at  Tripoli  was  thirty-two 
killed  and  twenty-two  wounded. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

PREBLE  left  for  home  without  having  come  to 
terms  with  the  Pacha  of  Tripoli.  He  was  not 
willing  to  rise  above  $500  for  each  of  the  cap 
tives,  and  would  offer  nothing  for  peace  or  for 
tribute.  Had  he  remained,  it  is  very  possible 
that  he  would  have  forced  a  peace  without  a 
ransom.  Peace,  however,  was  to  come  under 
his  successor  largely  through  one  of  the  extraor 
dinary  adventures  of  our  history. 

Yusuf  Karamanli,  the  Pacha  of  Tripoli,  was 
the  youngest  of  three  brothers.  In  1790  at  the 
age  of  twenty  he  murdered  the  eldest,  and  when 
his  father  died  in  1796,  and  the  second  brother, 
Hamet,  was  absent,  he  proclaimed  himself  Pa 
cha.  Hamet,  rather  a  weakling,  took  refuge  in 
Tunis,  leaving  his  family  at  Tripoli.  He  had 
taken  up  arms  against  his  brother,  using  Derne, 
some  500  miles  east  of  Tripoli,  as  a  base,  but  he 
was  unsuccessful,  and  in  1804  fled  to  Egypt. 
The  government  in  Washington,  influenced 
largely  by  ex-Consul  Eaton,  had  decided  to  use 

146 


The  American  Navy  147 

Hamet  as  an  asset  in  the  war  against  Yusuf,  and 
thus  placed  at  the  disposition  of  the  commodore 
a  moderate  amount  of  money  and  military  sup 
plies.  Eaton  was  appointed  a  navy  agent  under 
Commodore  Barren,  with  a  recommendation 
from  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  use  him  in 
connection  with  an  effort  to  establish  Hamet  at 
Tripoli  in  place  of  his  brother  Yusuf.  It  was  a 
scheme  in  full  accord  with  Eaton's  adventurous 
spirit  and  worthy  his  real  ability. 

The  Argus,  Captain  Hull,  thus  left  Malta  in 
September,  1804,  for  Alexandria,  nominally  to 
convoy  thence  any  vessels  desiring  protection, 
but  really  to  carry  Eaton  to  find  Hamet  and 
convey  him  to  whatever  should  be  decided  as 
the  most  convenient  point  from  which  to  act 
against  Tripoli.  Hamet  was  up  the  Nile.  Ea 
ton  explained  frankly  his  intentions  to  the  Vice 
roy  and  passports  were  obtained  for  himself  and 
Hamet  out  of  Egypt.  Hamet  was  finally  reached, 
but  such  obstacles  to  leaving  by  sea  were  raised 
through  the  influence  of  the  French  consul  that 
it  was  decided  to  go  by  land,  it  being  feared  that 
the  few  Arabs  whom  Hamet  had  raised  might 
otherwise  disappear.  The  Argus  sailed  for  Malta 
with  a  letter  from  Eaton  to  the  commodore  re 
questing  "that  the  expedition  be  met  at  Bomba 


148  The  American  Navy 

Bay  sixty  miles  east  of  Derne,  with  two  more 
small  vessels,  a  bomb-ketch,  two  field  pieces,  a 
hundred  muskets,  a  hundred  marines,  and  ten 
thousand  dollars.  A  convention  was  made  with 
Hamet,  the  United  States  promising  to  do  all 
that  was  proper  and  right  to  reinstate  him,  re 
imbursement  of  expenses  to  come  from  tribute 
paid  by  other  nations.  Eaton  was  to  be  recog 
nized  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  land  forces 
operating  against  the  usurping  brother. 

The  army  was  a  motley  array  of  some  four 
hundred,  though  Eaton  says  many  thousands 
could  have  been  had  had  there  been  money  and 
subsistence.  There  were  besides  Eaton  nine 
Americans:  Lieutenant  O'Bannon,  Midshipman 
Peck,  and  seven  marines;  an  English  volunteer; 
forty  Greeks;  some  Arab  horsemen,  etc.,  and  a 
caravan  of  107  camels  and  a  few  asses.  These 
began  on  March  8th  a  march  across  500  and 
more  miles  to  Derne.  Bomba  was  reached  after 
immense  difficulties  on  April  I5th.  Signal-fires 
were  built  on  a  high  hill  which  were  sighted  by 
the  Argus.  She  brought  a  cheering  letter  from 
the  commodore  announcing  aid.  Two  days  later 
the  Hornet  arrived  with  an  abundance  of  provi 
sions,  and  on  the  23d,  after  a  rest  of  a  week,  the 
march  of  sixty  miles  to  Derne  was  resumed. 


The  American  Navy  149 

This  was  made  in  two  days.  Derne  was  at 
tacked  on  the  ayth  from  land  and  from  sea  by 
the  Hornet  and  Nautilus  (which  had  also  ar 
rived).  The  town  was  occupied  after  a  strong 
resistance  and  some  loss.  A  Tripolitan  force 
now  appeared,  and  there  were  unsuccessful  ef 
forts  to  dislodge  Eaton's  forces.  After  May 
1 8th  the  attacks  ceased.  Dispatches  were  sent 
to  the  commodore,  and  only  the  Argus  remained 
at  Derne.  On  May  I9th  there  came  dispatches 
from  the  commodore  announcing  peace  negotia 
tions,  and  on  June  nth  came  the  Constellation 
announcing  peace  and  with  orders  to  evacuate 
Derne.  There  was  nothing  for  the  Ameri 
cans  to  do  but  to  embark,  taking  with  them 
Hamet  and  his  suite,  twenty-five  foreign  can- 
noniers  with  their  artillery,  and  the  small  party 
of  Greeks.  It  was  a  pitiful  abandonment  of 
men  who  were  our  allies,  brought  about  through 
the  influence  of  Consul-General  Lear,  who,  as 
previously  mentioned,  had  been  invested  with 
full  authority  to  negotiate  a  peace. 

Lear  had  spent  the  winter  of  1804-1805  with 
Commodore  Barren  at  Malta,  over  whom  he  ac 
quired,  in  Barren's  weakened  condition  of  mind 
and  health,  a  great  influence.  He  was  strongly 
opposed  to  Eaton's  expedition,  and  was  the  main 


150  The  American  Navy 

factor  in  causing  it  to  collapse;  the  aim  of  the 
expedition,  which  was  the  capture  of  Tripoli  and 
dethronement  of  the  Pacha,  was  not  in  accord 
with  his  views.  On  May  26th  Lear  arrived  off 
Tripoli  from  Malta  in  the  Essex,  which  delivered 
to  Captain  Rodgers  of  the  Constitution  a  letter 
from  Barron  announcing  the  necessity  of  the 
relinquishment  by  the  latter  of  the  command. 
Lear  had  already  been  informed  by  a  letter 
written  by  the  Danish  consul  at  Tripoli  of  the 
probability  of  the  Pacha's  willingness  to  treat, 
and  at  once  on  his  arrival  began  negotiations. 
The  preliminaries,  after  parleys  of  more  than  a 
week,  were  signed  on  June  3d.  Prisoners  were  to 
be  exchanged,  the  United  States  paying  a  bal 
ance  of  $60,000.  A  year  was  allowed  to  settle 
disputes  before  action;  prisoners  were  no  longer 
to  be  enslaved,  and  were  at  the  conclusion  of 
peace  to  be  restored  without  ransom.  No  trib 
ute  was  to  be  paid  in  future.  Hamet  was  to  be 
"persuaded"  to  withdraw  from  Derne,  and  his 
family  was  to  be  restored  to  him.  There  was, 
however,  a  secret  article  which  allowed  the  Pa 
cha  four  years  in  which  to  make  this  restoration. 
The  unwisdom  of  placing  the  negotiations 
wholly  in  the  hands  of  Lear  had  resulted  in  an 
unsatisfactory  peace,  and  attacks  ensued  which 


The  American  Navy  151 

must  have  caused  him  much  bitterness;  for 
General  Eaton,  as  he  was  now  called,  pursued 
him  violently  in  the  press  and  before  Congress 
to  the  end,  in  1811,  of  Eaton's  life.  Lear  was 
strongly  criticised  in  Congress  itself,  Senator 
Timothy  Pickering  declaring  his  conduct  inex 
cusable.  Madison's  instructions  as  Secretary  of 
State  anticipated  that  peace  would  be  made 
"without  any  price  or  pecuniary  compensation 
whatever";  and  so  undoubtedly  it  would  have 
been  had  negotiations  been  put  in  the  hands  of 
the  commodore  of  the  now  powerful  force  before 
Tripoli.  Nor  would  Eaton's  wonderful  action 
have  gone  for  nought,  nor  would  Hamet,  whom 
we  had  made  our  ally,  been  thrown  overboard 
with  so  little  consideration.  Commodore  Rod- 
gers  allowed  him  two  hundred  dollars  monthly 
to  support  himself  and  some  fifteen  dependents 
at  Syracuse  (the  winter  headquarters  of  the 
fleet)  until  twenty-four  hundred  dollars  was 
voted  him  by  Congress  in  1806.  His  family, 
through  pressure  of  our  consul,  was  restored  to 
him  in  October,  1807,  and  though  his  brother 
gave  him  residence  in  Morocco  and  a  pension, 
and  later  the  governorship  of  Derne,  he  had,  two 
years  later,  to  flee  with  his  family  to  Egypt, 
where  he  died. 


152  The  American  Navy 

Eaton  was  received  on  his  return  with  honor. 
Massachusetts  granted  him  ten  thousand  acres 
in  Maine  (then  a  part  of  Massachusetts)  and 
Congress  met  his  disbursements.  The  expedi 
tion  to  Derne  had  cost  forty  thousand  dollars 
but  Eaton  declined  everything  for  himself  but 
his  personal  expenses.  He  died  in  1811  at  the 
age  of  fifty-seven,  ending,  too  early,  a  life  of  pic 
turesque  adventure,  patriotic  effort,  and  un 
daunted  courage.  He  is  worthy  of  memory. 

Commodore  Rodgers  now  turned  his  atten 
tion  to  Tunis,  where  threatening  conditions  had 
arisen  from  the  capture  of  two  Tunis  vessels 
which  had  attempted  to  run  the  blockade  of 
Tripoli.  He  appeared  on  August  ist  with  nearly 
his  whole  force.  A  fortnight  later,  on  an  appear 
ance  of  delay,  Rodgers  informed  Lear  officially 
that  the  Dey  "must  do  one  of  three  things  by 
simple  request  or  must  do  all  three  by  force.  He 
must  give  [a  guarantee  for  the  maintenance  of 
peace  to  be  witnessed  by  the  English  and  French 
consuls],  or  he  must  give  sufficient  security  for 
peace  and  send  a  minister  to  the  United  States, 
or  he  must  make  such  alterations  in  the  [exist 
ing]  treaty  as  you  may  require  and  as  may  satisfy 
you  that  there  is  confidence  to  be  placed  in  what 


The  American  Navy  153 

he  does.  I  have  only  to  repeat  that  if  he  does 
not  do  all  that  is  necessary  and  proper,  at  the 
risk  of  my  conduct  being  disapproved  by  my 
country,  he  shall  feel  the  vengeance  of  the 
squadron  now  in  this  bay." 

Rodgers  now  in  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy  of  August  21,  1805,  laid  down  the 
honorable  dictum  which  has  ever  been  a  rule  of 
conduct  with  the  navy  that:  "Peace  on  honor 
able  terms  is  always  preferable  to  war/'  If 
chastisement  were  to  be  inflicted  he  begged  the 
honor  of  being  the  instrument,  pledging  that  if 
he  should  be  instructed  by  March,  1806,  that 
he  would  obtain  an  honorable  peace  before  Sep 
tember,  making  the  Dey  to  pay  all  the  expenses 
of  the  war,  and  that,  too,  without  any  increase  of 
force.  The  Dey  had,  however,  already  ac 
cepted  the  proposal  of  sending  a  minister  to  the 
United  States,  and  had  agreed  to  keep  the 
peace  until  the  result  of  the  mission  should  be 
known. 

Our  Barbary  difficulties  were,  with  occasional 
troubles  of  a  moderate  nature,  ended  for  nearly 
ten  years.  We  continued,  under  the  treaty  with 
Algiers,  to  send  an  annual  tribute  of  marine 
stores  to  the  value  of  twenty-one  thousand  dol 
lars.  This,  however,  was  but  a  remnant  of  our 


154  The  American  Navy 

early  weakness  and  an  honorable  carrying  out 
of  a  treaty.  The  spectacle  of  the  treatment  of 
our  commerce  by  France  and  England  roused 
the  envy  of  the  Dey  of  Algiers,  and  finally  the 
War  of  1812  overcame  any  good  resolutions  the 
then  Dey  had,  and  spoliation  began  anew.  Thus, 
immediately  after  the  peace,  a  powerful  fleet 
was  sent  into  the  Mediterranean  under  Decatur, 
followed  by  another  under  Bainbridge,  whose 
flagship,  the  Independence,  74,  was  the  first 
American  ship-of-the-line  in  foreign  waters. 
Farragut,  who  had  already  seen  three  years  of 
most  stirring  service  and  was  then  but  fourteen, 
was  a  midshipman  aboard.  But  before  Bain- 
bridge  had  arrived  Decatur  had  appeared  before 
Algiers  and  "at  the  mouths  of  our  cannon,"  as 
Decatur  expressed  in  his  dispatch  to  the  Navy 
Department,  dictated  a  peace  which  abolished 
tribute  in  any  form  forever,  released  all  Ameri 
cans,  and  forced  compensation  for,  and  restora 
tion  of,  all  American  property  seized  or  in  the 
Dey's  hands.  This  was  within  six  weeks  of  the 
sailing  of  the  fleet  from  home.  Decatur  then 
visited  Tunis  and  Tripoli,  and  forced  the  instant 
payment  at  each  place  of  indemnities  for  British 
prizes  which,  taken  into  port  by  an  American 
privateer,  had  been  seized  later  by  the  British. 


The  American  Navy  155 

Of  course  the  British  consul  protested,  but  with 
out  avail.  He  also  caused  the  release  of  two 
Danes  in  remembrance  of  the  unceasing  kind 
ness  to  Americans,  through  many  years,  of  the 
Danish  consul,  Nissen,  and  of  a  Sicilian  family 
of  eight,  in  consideration  of  aid  given  to  Preble 
by  the  king  of  the  two  Sicilies.  It  was  a  fine 
instance  of  gratitude  acknowledged. 

Thus,  practically,  ended  our  troubles  with 
Barbary.  "It  was  not  to  be  endured,"  said  the 
English  naval  historian,  Brenton,  "that  England 
should  tolerate  what  America  had  resented  and 
punished,"  and  thus  after  one  abortive  threat, 
when  he  paid  heavy  ransom  for  1,200  Neapoli 
tans  and  Sicilians,  during  the  negotiations  for 
which  he  was  grossly  insulted,  and  the  British 
consul  and  his  family  treated  "in  a  manner  the 
most  scandalous  and  insulting,"*  Lord  Ex- 
mouth  was  sent  in  August,  1816,  with  a  powerful 
fleet,  which,  combined  with  a  Dutch  force,  bom 
barded  Algiers  to  subjection,  and  Christian 
slavery  was  at  an  end.  The  Dey  shortly  before 
this  having  shown  signs  of  regretting  having 
made  the  American  treaty,  another  powerful 
American  fleet  appeared  shortly  after  Lord  Ex- 


*William  Shaler  (many  years  consul  at  Algiers),  133. 


156  The  American  Navy 

mouth's  bombardment,  which  removed  the  in 
tention  of  renewal  of  hostile  acts. 

Thus  ended,  practically,  the  extraordinary 
career  of  piracy  and  slavery  which  through  so 
many  generations  had  been  submitted  to  by 
Europe.  It  was  not,  however,  until  1824,  when 
the  demand  for  continuance  of  tribute  from 
Holland  was  successfully  resisted,  that  Algiers 
finally  dismissed  the  idea  of  return  to  her  ancient 
ways. 

It  should  be  a  proud  memory  to  Americans 
that  it  was  the  American  navy  which  first  re 
sisted  and  brought  to  terms  the  barbarous  cor 
sairs,  so  long  the  scourge  of  commerce  and  en 
slavers  of  white  men.  The  Frenchman  Dupuy, 
at  the  end  of  his  admirable  history  of  our  Bar- 
bary  wars,  pays  us  a  fine  tribute,  saying:  "The 
statesmen  [of  America],  breaking  loose  from  the 
unworthy  yielding  of  Europe  to  the  Barbary 
States,  had  in  hardly  thirty  years  broken  the 
abominable  traditions  which  the  Christian 
powers  had  shamefully  respected  for  ages."* 

*E.  Dupuy,  "Americains  et  Barbaresques,"  Paris,  R.  Roger 
et  F  Cernoviz,  99  Boulevard  Raspail,  1910. 


CHAPTER   XIV 

WHILE  we  were  fighting  the  Algerines,  we  were 
suffering  from  depredations  on  our  commerce  by 
France  and  England  a  hundredfold  more  serious 
than  all  we  had  undergone  from  the  African  cor 
sairs.  The  story  is  as  shameful  to  the  states 
manship  of  the  period  as  our  stand  with  regard 
to  Barbary  was  honorable. 

Napoleon  dominated  Europe  by  land;  Eng 
land  by  sea.  The  former's  great  aim  after  sub 
jecting  the  Continental  states,  rotten  with  the 
decaying  feudalism  of  the  past  centuries,  was  to 
destroy  English  supremacy  by  closing  all  Eu 
rope  to  English  commerce,  an  effort  which  was 
to  fail  through  one  of  the  greatest  instincts  of 
man,  that  of  trade.  Almost  universal  war  thus 
made  neutral  America  the  great  carrier;  our 
shipping  increased  by  amazing  bounds  and  cov 
ered  every  sea.  But  between  the  two  great 
antagonists  it  was  to  be  heavily  ground.  Our 
losses  were  in  many  millions,  our  ships  for  a  con 
siderable  period  being  seized  at  an  average  of 


158  The  American  Navy 

three  a  day.  It  would  take  a  book  much  larger 
than  this  to  go  into  the-  details  of  this  question 
which  looms  so  large  even  to  this  day.  Added 
to  the  question  of  ships  was  that  of  impressment 
of  our  seamen  who  were  taken  out  of  our  mer 
chantmen,  and  in  two  cases  from  men-of-war, 
to  man  those  of  the  British  navy,  on  the  claim 
that  a  British  subject  was  always  a  subject.  In 
carrying  out  this  dictum,  a  vast  number  of 
Americans  were  claimed  as  such  from  mere  ap 
pearance  or  other  characteristic  or  for  no  reason 
whatever  except  that  he  was  a  likely  man.  Over 
11,000  were  to  be  so  taken  before,  in  1812,  we 
went  to  war. 

Jefferson  was  President  for  the  eight  years 
beginning  March  4,  1801.  His  residence  as  min 
ister  in  France  from  1785  to  1788  had  given 
him  as  mentioned  leanings  which  affected  all 
his  later  views,  despite  the  monstrous  excesses 
of  the  French  Revolution.  He  had  very  peculiar 
ideas  of  the  ocean-carrying  trade,  mentioning  it 
as:  "this  protuberant  navigation  which  has  kept 
us  in  hot  water  from  the  commencement  of  the 
government."  He  would  "an5  he  could,"  have 
made  of  America  a  rural  community,  apparently 
not  being  able  to  comprehend  that  man  is,  by 
nature,  a  trader;  that  trade  is  the  real  civilizer 


The  American  Navy  159 

and  missioner  beyond  all  other  endeavors  com 
bined.  Linked  with  this  was  a  willingness  to 
submit  the  country  to  unparalleled  insult  and 
injury  in  the  seizure  of  ships  and  impressment 
of  our  seamen  without  taking  any  efficient  or 
reasonable  steps  to  resist  such  outrages.  The 
extent  of  our  Government's  submission  is  well 
shown  by  Captain  Basil  Hall  in  his  most  inter 
esting  reminiscences  as  a  seaman.  Describing 
his  life  as  a  midshipman  in  the  Leander,  in  the 
middle  years  of  Jefferson's  administration,  he 
says:  "Every  morning  at  daybreak  during  our 
stay  off  New  York  we  set  about  arresting  the 
progress  of  all  vessels  we  saw,  firing  off  guns  to 
the  right  and  left,  to  make  every  ship  that  was 
running  in  heave  to,  or  wait  until  we  had  leisure 
to  send  a  boat  on  board  'to  see,'  in  our  lingo, 
'what  she  was  made  of.'  I  have  frequently 
known  a  dozen,  and  sometimes  a  couple  of  dozen 
ships,  lying  to,  a  league  or  two  off  the  port, 
losing  their  fair  wind,  their  tide  and,  worse 
than  all,  their  market,  for  many  hours,  some 
times  the  whole  day,  before  our  search  was  com- 
pleted." 

A  crowning  outrage  came  in  1807  when  the 
frigate  Chesapeake  flying  the  broad-pennant  of 
Commodore  Samuel  Barren  was  leaving  for  the 


160  The  American  Navy 

Mediterranean.  She  had  been  preparing  for 
some  time  for  sea,  but  finally  was  hurried  off  in 
a  state  wholly  unfit  to  go  suddenly  into  action 
with  any  vessel  of  moderate  force,  and  certainly 
not  with  the  much  more  powerful  ship  which 
was  about  to  attack  her.  This  ship,  the  Leopard, 
of  54  guns,  had  been  lying,  along  with  several 
other  British  men-of-war,  in  Lynnhaven  Bay, 
just  within  the  Capes  of  the  Chesapeake.  They 
were  watching  for  two  French  frigates  then  lying 
ofF  Annapolis.  This  occupancy,  for  such  a  pur 
pose,  of  our  waters,  was  in  itself  an  insulting 
abuse  of  our  neutrality,  though  Jefferson  could 
speak  of  it  as  "enjoying  our  hospitality." 

The  Chesapeake  passed  out  of  the  capes  about 
noon  on  June  22,  1807.  When  about  ten  miles 
outside  the  Leopard  hailed  saying  she  had  a  dis 
patch  for  Commodore  Barron.  This  " dispatch  " 
proved  to  be  a  copy  of  an  order  from  the  British 
admiral,  Berkeley,  to  search  the  Chesapeake  for 
deserters  from  certain  British  ships,  the  order  to 
be  first  shown  to  her  captain.  On  Barren's  re 
fusal  to  submit  to  such  outrage  the  Chesapeake 
was  fired  into  by  the  Leopard,  without,  in  the 
unprepared  state  of  the  ship,  being  able  to  re 
turn  a  gun.  Twenty-one  men  were  killed  and 
wounded,  the  ship  searched  and  four  of  the  crew, 


The  American  Navy  161 

claimed  as  British  deserters,  were  taken  away. 
"Of  these,  one  was  hanged,  one  died,  and  the 
other  two,  after  prolonged  disputation,  were  re 
turned  five  years  later  to  the  deck  of  the  Chesa 
peake  in  formal  reparation."  A  deeper  insult  to 
a  nation  could  scarcely  have  been  offered.  All 
the  same,  it  ended  only  on  the  part  of  the  admin 
istration  in  what  may  be  called  a  fit  of  sulks 
known  as  the  embargo,  which  from  December, 
1807,  to  March,  1809,  took  American  commerce 
by  the  throat  and  forbade  our  merchant  ships 
to  go  to  sea.  It  was  much  as  if  a  man  should  re 
duce  himself  to  bread  and  water  as  a  revenge 
against  an  enemy. 

Jefferson,  meanwhile,  with  the  British  prac 
tically  blockading  our  ports  and  taking  men  from 
vessels  entering  New  York  and  other  harbors, 
was  seized  with  a  passion  for  gunboats,  and 
shortly  after  the  Chesapeake  incident,  which 
cried  aloud  for  ships-of-the-line  instead  of  the 
two  hundred  petty  toys  he  devised  and  caused 
to  be  built,  and  which  could  not  go  to  sea  without 
striking  their  one  gun  into  the  hold,  we  find  him 
saying:  "Believing,  myself,  that  gunboats  are 
the  only  water  defence  which  can  be  useful  to  us, 
and  protect  us  from  the  ruinous  folly  of  a  navy, 
I  am  pleased  with  everything  which  promises  to 


162  The  American  Navy 

improve  them."*  It  was  a  mind  far  better 
fitted  to  deal  with  the  manipulations  of  a  polit 
ical  party  than  with  the  care  of  a  nation  which 
he  was  not  so  very  far  from  wrecking  by  an  in 
sensate  policy  of  peace  at  any  price.  Peace, 
however,  cannot  be  kept  by  one  only  of  the  in 
terested  parties  declaring  such  a  preference. 
One  must  be  in  a  position  to  command  peace, 
and  this  failure  was  Jefferson's  great  mistake,  a 
mistake  which  from  every  point  of  view  was  to 
cost  us  dear.  "Whether  with  or  without  a  war, 
a  navy  would  have  saved  us  the  six  years  of  hu 
miliation  which  were  to  intervene  between  1806 
and  1812;  it  would  have  saved  the  embargo 
which  was  to  tie  to  the  wharves  in  rotting  idle 
ness  more  than  a  million  tons  of  shipping  which 
had  been  engaged  in  foreign  trade;  to  bring 
grass-grown  streets  to  our  greatest  ports,  and 
strain  the  sentiment  of  the  several  sections  of 
the  Union  to  the  point  of  separation.  It  would 
have  saved  the  War  of  1812,  the  capture  and 
burning  of  Washington,  and  the  shameful  inep 
titude,  with  one  brilliant  exception,  of  our  army 
commanders  in  that  contest.  .  .  .  There 
would  have  been  a  cessation  of  British  impress- 


"Jefferson,"  Works,"  V,  189. 


The  American  Navy  163 

ment  and  there  would  have  been  no  such  orders 
in  council  as  those  directed  to  the  destruction  of 
American  commerce;  or  had  these  come  before 
America  was  ready  with  her  navy  there  would 
have  been  quick  renunciation."* 

Gallatin,  Jefferson's  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
pressed  to  apply  the  surplus  of  two  millions  a 
year  ("and,"  said  he,  "it  is  a  very  low  calcula 
tion"),  which  he  considered  would  be  lost  in  case 
of  war,  wholly  "to  the  building  of  ships  of  the 
line."f  Said  Gouverneur  Morris  in  the  Senate 
(and  it  was  the  expression  of  one  of  the  ablest 
minds  of  the  country):  "When  we  have  twenty 
ships-of-the-line  at  sea,  and  there  is  no  good 
reason  why  we  should  not  have  them,  we  shall  be 
respected  by  all  Europe.  .  .  .  The  expense 
compared  with  the  benefit  is  moderate,  nay,  tri 
fling.  Whatever  sums  are  necessary  to  secure 
the  national  independence  must  be  paid.  .  .  . 
If  we  will  not  pay  to  be  defended,  we  must  pay 
for  being  conquered. "J 

Instead  of  a  fleet  which  would  have  com 
manded  respect,  the  United  States  had  built  in 
the  years  1801-1811  "two  sloops  of  18  guns  and 

"Chadwick,  "  Relations  of  U.  S.  and  Spain,"  I  (Diplomacy),  106. 
fGallatin   to   Jefferson,    September    15,    1805,  "Writings,"  I, 
241-254. 

JAnnals  of  Congress,  1802,  1803,  255. 


164  The  American  Navy 

two  brigs  of  16,  and  out  of  twelve  frigates  had 
permitted  three  to  rot  at  their  moorings";  and 
this  while  917  American  ships  had  been  seized 
by  the  British,  many  more  than  this  number  by 
the  French,  and  our  men  taken  from  our  vessels 
by  the  thousand  and  impressed  into  the  British 
service.  There  is  an  official  record  of  6,257  of 
these,  but  it  is  known  that  the  number  ran  to 
over  11,000.  Such  things,  if  we  were  to  survive 
as  a  nation,  could  only  bring  war,  whether  Jef 
ferson  and  Madison  wished  war  or  not.  The  in 
stigators  of  such  conditions  had  not  long  to  wait 
to  repent  their  folly. 

The  affair  of  the  Chesapeake  had  stirred  the 
soul  of  the  little  navy,  at  least,  to  its  depth. 
There  were  now,  in  1810,  in  commission,  the 
President,  44;  Constitution,  44;  United  States,  44; 
Essex,  32;  John  Adams,  24;  Wasp,  18;  Hornet, 
1 8;  Argus,  1 6;  Siren,  16;  Nautilus,  12;  Enterprise, 
12,  Vixen,  12.  The  whole  list  is  given,  as  nearly 
all  these  were  to  make  names  for  themselves. 
Attention,  too,  began  to  be  turned  to  the  lakes, 
for  war  was  now  foreseen  by  all  naval  officers 
and  at  least  some  of  the  administration.  The 
British  had  a  considerable  force  upon  the  Ameri 
can  coast,  but  they  were  now  more  chary  of  giv 
ing  offence.  The  danger  was  emphasized  on  May 


The  American  Navy  165 

16,  1811,  when  the  President,  carrying  Commo 
dore  Rodgers's  broad-pennant,  and  at  sea  on  ac 
count  of  having  heard  of  the  impressment  of  a 
seaman  near  Sandy  Hook,  sighted  a  strange 
man-of-war  which  stood  away.  The  President 
gave  chase  but  did  not  come  near  until  about 
8:30  in  the  evening  when,  on  a  hail  from  the 
President,  the  stranger  fired  a  gun  which  struck 
the  President's  mainmast.  The  latter  at  once 
fired  a  broadside,  and  recognizing  shortly  that 
her  antagonist  was  disabled  ceased  fire.  The 
other  began  anew  but  was  soon  silenced.  At 
daylight  the  President  sent  a  boat  and  found  that 
the  ship  was  the  British  sloop-of-war,  Little  Belt, 
of  1 8  guns.  She  had  suffered  severely  and  thirty- 
one  of  her  people  had  been  killed  and  wounded. 
Offers  of  aid  were  given  but  declined,  and  the 
British  cruiser  stood  for  Halifax. 

Naturally  the  strong  tension  already  existing 
was  increased  and  matters  moved  rapidly.  On 
June  1 8,  1812,  the  United  States  declared  war. 

At  the  moment  of  America's  declaration  of  war 
against  England  Napoleon  was  on  his  way  to 
Russia  with  an  army  destined  never  to  return. 
Spain  was  being  desolated  by  the  struggle  of  the 
French  and  British  in  the  peninsula;  all  the 
Spanish  provinces  in  South  America  were  in  rev- 


1 66  The  American  Navy 

olution.  With  the  entry  of  the  United  States 
the  whole  western  world  was  at  war. 

Our  population  at  this  time,  excluding  negroes, 
was  about  7,500,000;  that  of  Great  Britain  was 
about  1 5,000,000.  We  had  a  navy  of  three  large 
and  one  small  frigate,  one  sloop-of-war,  and  seven 
smaller  vessels,  with  500  officers,  of  whom  twelve 
were  captains.  There  were  5,230  men  in  the  en 
listed  force,  of  whom  2,436  were  destined  for  the 
cruising  ships,  "the  remainder  being  for  service 
at  the  forts  and  navy  yards,  in  the  gunboats,  and 
on  the  lakes."  In  the  British  navy  were  over  a 
thousand  ships. 

There  can  of  course  be  no  comparison  between 
such  forces;  nor  could  there  in  the  long  run  be 
any  doubt  as  to  the  result,  but  the  American 
navy  was  to  achieve,  in  the  unequal  struggle,  a 
series  of  victories  which  brought  results  psychi 
cally  the  equal  of  victories  of  great  fleets.  It  is 
not  that  we  were  continuously  victorious,  but 
in  the  main  our  success  was  so  great  and  of  a 
character  to  which  the  British  navy  and  public 
were  so  unaccustomed  that  our  victories  were  a 
staggering  blow  to  Britain's  self-sufficiency.  It 
must  be  remembered  that  the  French  navy  of 
Louis  XVTs  time  had  been,  so  far  as  officers  and 
morale  were  concerned,  swept  out  of  existence 


The  American  Navy  167 

by  the  French  Revolution.  The  French  fleet  of 
the  Consular  and  Napoleonic  period  was  now  not 
only  ill-officered,  but  through  the  constant  block 
ades  of  the  British  had  but  little  of  the  sea  habit 
by  which  only  a  navy  can  be  efficient.  The 
Spanish  navy  had  no  real  organization  or  other 
qualities  of  success  under  circumstances  of  even 
much  worse  neglect.  The  British  ships,  well  offi 
cered,  well  manned,  and  with  constant  sea  prac 
tice,  had  no  real  antagonists,  for  it  is  absurd  to 
compare  in  efficiency  such  organizations  as  that 
which  fought  under  Nelson  at  Trafalgar  and 
those  under  Villeneuve  and  Gravina  in  the  same 
battle.  The  American  navy  was  to  show  a  dif 
ferent  standard. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THERE  were  three  important  and  epoch-making 
events  in  the  war:  the  victory  of  the  Constitution 
over  the  Guerriere,  the  battle  of  Lake  Erie,  and 
the  battle  of  Lake  Champlain.  Each  of  these 
was  of  such  immense  importance  that  they  over 
shadow  all  others,  picturesque  and  striking  as 
others  were. 

The  administration  had  at  first  only  consid 
ered  the  laying  up  of  our  ships,  but  the  indig 
nant  protests  of  our  naval  officers  caused 
another  course.  The  first  ships  to  get  to  sea 
were  those  at  New  York:  the  President,  44,  Com 
modore  Rodgers;  the  Essex,  32,  Captain  David 
Porter;  and  the  Hornet,  18,  Master  Commandant 
Lawrence.  These  were  joined  down  the  bay  on 
June  2  ist  by  the  United  States,  44,  Commodore 
Decatur;  and  the  Congress,  36,  Lieutenant  Com 
mandant  Sinclair  from  Norfolk.  All  except  the 
Essex,  which  was  overhauling  her  rigging,  got  to 
sea  on  the  2ist,  immediately  after  the  reception 
of  the  declaration  of  war,  and  stood  southeast  to 
168 


The  American  Navy  169 

intercept  a  reported  fleet  of  West  Indiamen.  On 
June  23d,  however,  a  frigate,  later  known  to  be 
the  Belvidera,  was  sighted  and  chased.  On 
nearing  her,  Rodgers  himself  went  forward  to 
direct  the  firing,  and  at  4:30  he  fired  the 
starboard  forecastle  gun,  the  first  shot  of  the 
war.  The  next  gun  was  fired  from  the  main 
deck  by  the  officer  of  the  division,  and  a  third 
was  fired  by  Rodgers.  The  three  shots  had  all 
struck  the  chase,  killing  and  wounding  seven 
men.  A  fourth  was  now  fired  from  the  main 
deck.  This  gun  burst,  lifting  the  forecastle 
deck,  killing  and  wounding  sixteen  men.  Among 
the  latter  was  Rodgers,  who  was  thrown  into  the 
air  and  in  falling  broke  his  leg.  The  forward 
guns  being  thrown  out  of  action,  the  President 
was  obliged  to  yaw  from  time  to  time  to  bring 
her  broadside  guns  to  bear.  This  gave  the  chase 
an  advantage  which  was  added  to  by  her  throw 
ing  overboard  boats  and  anchors  and  fourteen 
tons  of  water.  By  midnight  she  was  out  of  dan 
ger.  The  President  does  not  seem  to  have  been 
handled  as  well  as  she  might  have  been,  but  ac 
count  must  be  taken  of  the  very  serious  accident 
aboard  and  of  the  injury  to  the  commodore. 
The  Belvideras  fire  killed  and  wounded  six  of 
the  President's  crew.  She  was  well  handled  and 


170  The  American  Navy 

her  captain,  Richard  Byron,  deserves  marked 
credit  for  his  escape.  Rodgers  continued  his 
cruise  in  pursuit  of  the  West  Indiaman  as  far  as 
the  entrance  to  the  English  Channel,  but  by 
August  3  ist  was  in  Boston,  having  made  but 
seven  prizes  and  one  recapture. 

The  Essex  did  not  leave  New  York  until  June 
23d.  The  ship  carried,  mostly,  only  carronades 
which  were  totally  inefficient  except  at  close 
quarters.  This  fact  placed  her  at  a  great  dis 
advantage  when  in  meeting  a  convoy  of  troops 
she  was  unable  to  bring  to  action  the  convoying 
frigate.  She  cut  out,  however,  one  ship  with 
197  soldiers  aboard.  But  on  August  I3th  she 
captured  the  sloop-of-war,  Alert,  of  twenty  18- 
pounder  carronades,  the  first  man-of-war  prize 
of  the  war.  The  Essex  returned  to  New  York 
on  September  7th,  having  taken  ten  prizes  and 
423  prisoners. 

The  Constitution,  Captain  Hull,  had  returned, 
just  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  from  Europe 
where  she  had  been  sent  to  pay  the  interest  on 
our  Dutch  loan.  She  shipped  a  new  crew,  and 
on  July  1 2th  sailed  from  Annapolis.  On  the 
1 7th  when  off  the  Virginia  coast,  and  barely  out 
of  sight  of  land,  six  vessels  were  discovered,  one 
of  which,  as  it  turned  out,  and  much  the  near- 


The  American  Navy  171 

est,  being  the  Guerriere.  The  next  morning,  the 
weather  almost  calm,  there  were  four  frigates,  a 
ship-of-the-line,  and  a  brig  and  a  schooner  just 
out  of  gunshot;  the  two  last  were  prizes.  There 
then  ensued  a  chase  famous  in  American  naval 
annals  for  the  admirable  way  in  which  the  Con 
stitution  was  handled,  and  for  her  success.  She 
hoisted  out  her  boats  in  the  calm  and  towed; 
the  enemy  put  the  boats  of  two  ships  to  tow  the 
headmost.  Their  advantage  was  overcome  by 
Hull's  using  all  the  cordage  of  the  ship  available 
for  such  a  purpose  in  running  a  kedge  ahead 
nearly  half  a  mile  and  hauling  in  upon  the  haw 
ser.  The  kedges  thus  employed  caused  the 
Constitution  to  gain  largely  until  the  enemy  dis 
covered  the  method  and  himself  applied  it.  For 
two  days  this  most  exciting  and  exhausting  chase 
continued.  On  the  evening  of  the  2Oth  there  was 
a  heavy  squall,  which  was  utilized  by  Hull  with 
the  utmost  judgment  and  during  which  a  large 
gain  in  distance  was  made.  On  its  clearing  away 
all  apprehension  ended;  all  but  two  of  the  frig 
ates  were  far  distant  and  most  of  the  fleet  hull 
down.  At  8:15  next  morning  the  English  gave 
up  the  chase,  thus  ending  as  exciting  three 
days  and  nights  as  any  of  the  war.  The 
admirable  manner  in  which  the  Constitution 


172  The  American  Navy 

was   handled   has    ever    been    the    admiration 
of  seamen. 

The  Constitution  went  into  Boston,  but  Hull, 
fearing  orders  for  detachment,  which  in  fact  were 
on  the  way  from  Washington,  hurried  to  sea 
again  on  August  2d.  On  the  iQth,  at  a  point 
some  400  miles  southeast  of  Halifax,  he  met  the 
British  frigate,  Guerriere,  Captain  Dacres.  The 
latter  on  the  Constitution's  near  approach  lay-to 
with  her  maintopsail  to  the  mast,  showing  her 
willingness  to  engage.  The  battle  began  a  little 
after  6:00  P.  M.,  and  before  seven  the  Guerriere 
was  dismasted  and  in  a  sinking  condition.  Her 
crew  was  taken  off;  she  was  set  afire,  and  in  a 
quarter  of  an  hour  blew  up.  The  Constitution 
was  practically  uninjured  and  in  a  few  hours 
could  have  gone  into  action  again.  She  was,  it 
is  true,  the  heavier  ship,  with  thirty  24-pounders 
against  the  Guerriere  s  thirty  1 8's,  and  twenty-four 
32-pounder  carronades  against  the  Guerriere' s 
sixteen;  and  a  total  of  55  guns  and  468  men 
against  the  Guerriere's  49  guns  and  272  men, 
but  the  injury  was  entirely  disproportionate. 
The  Guerriere  had  seventy-nine  men  killed  and 
wounded.  The  Constitution  had  seven  killed 
and  seven  wounded.  The  Guerriere  lost  every 
mast  and  her  hull  was  so  riddled  that  she  could 


The  American  Navy  173 

not  be  carried  into  port.  So  little  was  the  Con 
stitution  injured  that  in  the  same  evening  all 
damage  was  repaired  and  another  ship,  sup 
posedly  an  enemy,  which  appeared  at  2:00  A.  M., 
sheered  off. 

The  ships  were  not  markedly  different  in  size, 
the  Constitution  being  1,576  tons  American  meas 
urement,  the  Guerriere  1,338  British.  But  by 
the  latter  the  Constitution  would  have  been  but 
1,426.  The  difference  in  size  and  force,  however, 
was  a  small  matter  considering  the  fact  that  be 
fore  the  outbreak  of  the  war  it  was  confidently 
affirmed  that  British  sloops-of-war  would  lie 
alongside  American  frigates  with  impunity. 

The  capture  of  the  Guerriere  by  the  Constitu 
tion  is  a  great  landmark  in  our  history — a  second 
"shot  heard  round  the  world."  It  was  not  sim 
ply  the  taking  of  a  British  frigate;  it  was  a  second 
declaration  of  American  independence.  We  had 
so  long  been  called  spaniels  and  curs  in  the  Brit 
ish  press;  we  had  so  long  submitted  basely  (the 
word  is  none  too  strong  to  describe  our  adminis 
tration  of  the  Jeffersonian  period);  there  had 
become  so  strongly  entrenched  in  the  British 
and  French  mind  that  we  would  submit  to  any 
insult  so  long  as  our  ships  might  sail,  even  at  the 
cost  of  the  immense  toll  they  took  of  them,  that 


174  The  American  Navy 

our  going  to  war  was  considered  impossible. 
New  England,  the  chief  sufferer,  was  in  a  danger 
ous  spirit  which  threatened  secession.  All  this 
changed  instantly  when  the  news  spread  from 
town  to  town,  from  farm  to  farm.  The  Ameri 
cans  became  another  people.  It  revived  the  dor 
mant  spirit  of  nationality  and  gave  a  deathblow 
to  the  disunionist  spirit  of  the  period.  How 
it  permeated  the  soul  of  the  country  was  shown 
in  a  remarkable  way  at  the  death  of  a  lady 
of  the  Adams  family  in  1903.  Born  in  1808, 
she  was  but  four  years  old  at  the  time  of 
the  battle,  but  so  vividly  had  the  exultation 
of  her  elders  been  impressed  upon  the  child's 
mind,  that  on  the  day  of  her  death,  more 
than  ninety  years  after,  her  mind  reverted  to 
but  one  thought,  the  most  deeply  impressed 
of  her  childhood.  In  tremulous  tones,  though 
otherwise  apparently  unconscious,  she  kept  re 
peating  through  this  last  day  of  her  life  the  ex 
pression  of  her  elders  in  1812:  "Thank  God  for 
Hull's  victory."*  Nothing  could  show  more 
strongly  the  immensity  of  exultation  and  relief. 
The  Constitution  was  to  have  other  victories, 
was  to  come  unscathed  through  the  war,  and 

*Told  the  author  by  General  C.  F.  Adams.     See  also  "American 
Histor.  Rev.,"  April,  1913,  p.  521. 


The  American  Navy  175 

was  for  many  years  to  carry  our  flag  in  honor  in 
many  seas;  but  this  victory  alone  should  en 
shrine  the  ship  in  the  hearts  of  all  true  Americans 
as  an  instrument  which  went  far  to  preserve 
this  Union  and  its  government.  Fortunately, 
through  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes's  noble  poem,  she 
still  remains,  honored  in  her  old  age,  a  glorious 
memory  of  victory  in  a  noble  cause. 

On  October  i8th  the  sloop-of-war  Wasp^  of  18 
guns  and  135  men,  commanded  by  Captain 
Jacob  Jones,  captured  the  British  brig  Frolic,  of 
19  guns  and  no  men.  The  first  lieutenant,  Bid- 
die,  who  had  gallantly  led  the  boarders,  hauled 
down  the  Frolic's  flag  at  12:15,  forty-three 
minutes  after  the  beginning  of  the  action.  Al 
most  at  once  afterward  both  of  the  Frolic  s  masts 
went  by  the  board.  Not  twenty  of  her  men  had 
escaped  unhurt.  Every  officer  was  wounded, 
and  the  first  lieutenant  and  master  died  soon 
after.  Her  total  loss  was  thus  ninety  killed  and 
wounded.  Says  the  distinguished  French  Ad 
miral  Jurien  de  la  Graviere,  commenting  on  this 
action:  "On  occasions  when  the  roughness  of 
the  sea  would  seem  to  render  all  aim  excessively 
uncertain  the  effects  of  [the  American]  artillery 
were  not  less  murderous  than  under  more  ad- 


176  The  American  Navy 

vantageous  conditions."  Unfortunately,  a  little 
later,  the  British  Poictiers,  74,  came  in  sight,  and 
the  Wasp  not  only  had  to  yield  her  capture  but 
was  herself  carried  a  prize  into  Bermuda,  where 
Jones  and  his  men  were  later  exchanged.  Cap 
tain  Jones  was  promoted  to  the  command  of  the 
Macedonian,  which  had  been  captured  by  the 
United  States  only  a  week  after  the  Wasp's  own 
brilliant  action. 

The  United  States  and  Argus,  under  Commo 
dore  Decatur,  had  left  Boston  on  October  8th 
in  company  with  Commodore  Rodgers,  com 
manding  the  President  and  the  Congress,  The 
latter  was  successful  in  making  one  valuable 
prize  and  eight  others  of  but  small  value,  and  re- 
entered  Boston  on  December  jist.  Decatur 
had  separated  from  Rodgers's  command  on  Oc 
tober  1 2th,  and  on  the  i8th,  about  500  miles 
south  by  west  of  the  Azores,  he  met  the  frigate 
Macedonian,  of  49  guns  and  301  men,  com 
manded  by  Captain  Richard  Garden.  There 
was  about  the  same  difference  in  force  as  between 
the  Constitution  and  Guerriere  and  about  the 
same  in  destruction.  The  Macedonian  had  forty- 
three  killed  and  mortally  wounded,  and  sixty- 
one  wounded;  the  United  States  had  a  lieutenant 
and  six  seamen  killed  or  mortally  wounded,  and 


The  American  Navy  177 

five  wounded.  The  action  lasted  an  hour  and  a 
half.  The  Macedonian  had  received  over  a  hun 
dred  shot  in  the  hull,  her  mizzenmast  had  gone 
by  the  board,  and  her  fore  and  maintopmasts 
at  the  cap.  Her  rigging  was  badly  cut  and  many 
of  her  guns  had  been  dismounted.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  United  States  had  suffered  no  injuries 
which  could  not  at  once  be  repaired.  It  was 
clear  that  the  American  gunnery  was  immensely 
superior,  though  the  Macedonian  had  been  re 
garded  a  crack  ship.  The  British  ship  had  on 
board  eight  impressed  Americans.  These,  though 
objecting  to  fighting  their  countrymen,  were 
obliged  to  stay  at  the  guns,  and  three  were  killed. 

Fortunately  the  damages  to  the  Macedonian 
were  not  so  severe  that  she  had  to  be  destroyed; 
convoyed  by  the  United  States,  she  was  carried 
into  New  London,  reaching  there  on  December 
4th. 

On  October  26,  1812,  Commodore  Bainbridge 
sailed  from  Boston  with  the  Constitution,  which 
he  personally  commanded,  and  the  Hornet,  18, 
Captain  Lawrence.  The  Essex,  under  Captain 
David  Porter,  was  also  to  be  part  of  Bain- 
bridge's  squadron,  but  she  was  in  the  Delaware 
and  did  not  get  to  sea  until  two  days  after  Bain- 
bridge  left  Boston.  In  anticipation  of  a  long 


178  The  American  Navy 

cruise,  the  ship  carried  an  unusual  number  of 
both  officers  and  men.  Very  unfortunately,  she 
had  to  retain,  against  Porter's  protest,  a  bat 
tery  of  short-range  carronades  with  but  six  long 
12-pounders.  She  was  given  the  island  of  Fer 
nando  de  Noronha,  off  Brazil,  as  a  rendezvous. 
She  was  not  to  meet  her  consorts,  but  to  have 
adventures  of  her  own  of  a  very  remarkable 
character. 

Bainbridge, touching  at  Fernando  de  Noronha, 
went  into  Bahia,  Brazil,  and  found  there  a  Brit 
ish  sloop-of-war  of  the  same  force  as  the  Hornet. 
Lawrence  challenged  her  captain  to  a  fight, 
pledging  that  the  Constitution  would  not  inter 
fere.  The  challenge,  however,  was  not  accepted, 
among  the  reasons  being  that  the  Bonne  Citoy- 
enne  had  on  board  £500,000  in  species.  Bain- 
bridge,  leaving  the  Hornet  to  watch  the  British 
ship,  went  to  sea.  December  29th,  being  still 
near  Bahia,  he  sighted  two  ships :  one  turned  out 
to  be  the  frigate  Java;  the  other  a  captured  ship? 
the  William,  in  company.  The  latter  was  di 
rected  to  go  into  Bahia  and  the  Java  stood  to 
ward  the  Constitution.  The  latter  stood  off  to 
get  clear  of  the  land,  in  plain  view,  and  thus  get 
out  of  neutral  waters.  There  was  a  mutual  read 
iness  to  engage.  The  Java  came  down  with  a 


The  American  Navy  179 

light  free  wind,  furling  her  mainsail  and  royals. 
The  Constitution)  with  royal  yards  aloft,  and 
which  she  carried  throughout  the  battle,  was  un 
der  about  the  same  canvas.  The  firing  began  at 
2:00  P.  M.,  with  a  shot  at  long  range  from  the 
Constitution,  but  the  two  ships  quickly  neared 
to  pistol  range.  They  approached  so  near  that 
they  were  less  than  600  feet  apart.  The  Java  was 
being  so  much  cut  up  aloft  that  an  attempt  was 
made  to  board,  but  during  this  the  Constitution 
poured  in  a  most  destructive  raking  fire  (i.  e., 
lengthwise  of  the  enemy),  bringing  down  the 
Java 's  maintopmast  and  cutting  away  the  fore 
mast  just  under  the  foretop.  The  attempt  to 
board  failed,  the  ships  fell  apart  and  began  anew 
as  furiously  as  ever.  Captain  Lambert  of  the 
Java  was  killed  and  the  ship  continued  to  be 
fought  gallantly  by  her  first  lieutenant,  Chads, 
who  was  already  wounded.  But  the  British, 
with  the  wreck  of  the  maintopmast  with  its 
hamper  over  the  side,  the  foretopmast  gone,  and 
a  little  later  the  mizzenmast  and  what  remained 
of  the  foremast,  could  do  no  more;  the  Javas 
guns  were  completely  silenced.  At  4:05,  the 
Javas  flag  being  shot  away,  Bainbridge  thought 
she  had  struck.  He  then  hauled  by  the  wind 
and  crossed  the  Javas  bows.  The  latter's  main- 


180  The  American  Navy 

mast  fell,  leaving  her  a  complete  wreck.  The 
Constitution  went  to  windward,  spent  an  hour  in 
repairing  the  very  moderate  damages  to  her  rig 
ging,  and  then  again  stood  down  for  her  enemy, 
whose  flag  had  again  been  shown.  This,  of 
course,  meant  nothing  in  such  circumstances, 
and  as  soon  as  the  Constitution  stood  across  her 
bows  it  was  struck. 

The  Constitution)  after  her  repairs  of  an  hour, 
was  now  again,  in  naval  language,  all  ataunto. 
Her  loss  had  been  eight  seamen  and  one  marine 
killed;  the  fifth  lieutenant,  John  C.  Aylwin,  and 
two  seamen  mortally  wounded;  Commodore 
Bainbridge  and  twelve  seamen  severely  wounded; 
seven  seamen  and  two  marines  slightly  wounded; 
a  total  killed  and  wounded  of  thirty-four. 

The  Java  had  been  cut  to  pieces;  "she  was  a 
riddled  and  entirely  dismasted  hulk."  She  lost 
her  captain  and  five  midshipmen  killed  or  mor 
tally  wounded,  and  six  officers  and  four  mid 
shipmen  wounded.  Her  total  loss  was  forty- 
eight  killed  and  one  hundred  and  two  wounded.* 

The  two  ships  were  not  very  unequal  in  force, 


*The  British  accounts  were  often  so  inaccurate  and  garbled,  and 
in  James's  "Naval  History"  so  frequently  glaringly  untrue  that 
only  little  dependence,  in  some  instances,  can  be  placed  upon  them. 
For  a  discussion  of  this  phase,  see  Roosevelt's  "Naval  War  of 
1812"  passim.  Part  of  this  account  is  condensed  from  this  latter. 


The  American  Navy  181 

the  Constitution  being  about  10  per  cent,  stronger 
in  weight  of  gunfire  and  with  about  10  per  cent, 
more  men.  The  larger  number  of  men  aboard 
the  Java  than  she  usually  carried  was  due  to  her 
having  on  board  men  for  some  other  ships.  Both 
ships  were  handled  with  remarkable  skill  and 
coolness,  but  the  American  gunnery  had  shown 
itself  enormously  superior.  It  had  so  wrecked 
the  Java  that  Bainbridge,  now  5,000  miles  from 
home  and  on  an  unfriendly  coast,  gave  up  the 
idea  of  attempting  to  save  the  ship.  He  lay  by 
for  several  days  removing  the  wounded  and 
saving  the  effects  of  the  crew.  The  Java  was 
then  blown  up,  and  the  Constitution  went  into 
Bahia  and  paroled  the  Java's  officers  and  crew. 

"Our  gallant  enemy,"  reported  Lieutenant 
Chads,  "has  treated  us  most  generously,"  and 
Lieutenant-General  Hislop  who  with  his  staff 
were  passengers  in  the  Java  for  the  East,  pre 
sented  Commodore  Bainbridge  with  a  very  hand 
some  sword  as  a  token  of  gratitude  for  the  kind 
ness  with  which  he  had  treated  the  prisoners.* 

Bainbridge,  his  ship  needing  repairs  after  a 
long  period  of  service  which  had  begun  before 
the  war,  sailed  from  Bahia  on  January  6,  1813, 


*Roosevelt,  129. 


1 82  The  American  Navy 

and  reached  Boston  February  2yth,  having  been 
absent  119  days.  The  Hornet  had  been  left  at 
Bahia  observing  the  Bonne  Citoyenne,  but  the 
arrival  of  the  Montagu,  74,  relieved  the  captain 
of  the  British  sloop-of-war  from  risking  his  ship 
and  treasure.  The  Hornet,  on  the  Montagu  s  ar 
rival,  put  to  sea  late  in  the  evening  unmolested. 
The  war  had  now  lasted  six  months,  and  in 
stead  of  the  little  American  navy  being  swept 
from  the  sea,  it  had  been  a  David  to  smite  a 
Goliath.  The  capture  of  three  British  frigates 
in  the  three  successive  combats  stirred  Britain 
to  the  quick.  Said  the  Pilot  of  London:  "Five 
hundred  merchantmen  [taken]  and  three  frig 
ates!  Can  this  be  true?  Will  the  English  people 
read  this  unmoved?  Any  man  who  foretold 
such  disasters  this  day  last  year  would  have  been 
treated  as  a  madman  or  a  traitor.  He  would 
have  been  told  that  ere  seven  months  had  gone 
the  American  flag  would  have  been  swept  from 
the  ocean,  the  American  navy  destroyed,  and 
the  maritime  arsenals  of  the  United  States  re 
duced  to  ashes.  Yet  not  one  of  the  American 
frigates  has  struck.  They  leave  their  ports  when 
they  choose,  and  return  when  it  suits  their  con 
venience.  They  cross  the  Atlantic,  they  visit 
the  West  Indies,  they  come  to  the  chops  of  the 


The  American  Navy  183 

Channel,  they  parade  along  the  coast  of  South 
America.  Nothing  chases  them;  nothing  inter 
cepts  them — nay,  nothing  engages  them  but  to 
yield  in  triumph."^ 

*Cited  by  McMasters,  "  History  of  the  United  States,"  IV,  901. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

THE  British  force  on  our  own  coast  was  now,  in 
1813,  much  increased.  Particular  attention  was 
paid  to  the  approaches  of  New  York  and  to  the 
Chesapeake,  which  latter  region  was  devastated. 
Destruction  was  carried  on  under  the  general  or 
ders  of  the  British  Admiralty  to  "destroy  and 
lay  waste  all  towns  and  districts  of  the  United 
States  found  accessive  to  the  attacks  of  the  Brit 
ish  armaments."  Hampton,  in  Virginia,  was 
thus  sacked  with  a  brutality  which  even  the 
very  prejudiced  British  historian,  James,  called 
"revolting  to  human  nature." 

On  February  24th  the  Hornet,  which  we  left 
taking  leave  of  the  Montagu,  74,  at  Bahia,  was  on 
January  24th  off  Demarara.  A  brig,  the  Es- 
piegle,  was  inside  the  bar;  another,  standing  in 
for  the  port,  was  the  Peacock.  She  was  ready  to 
engage,  and  at  5:25  p.  M.  action  opened;  four 
teen  minutes  later  the  Peacock  was  a  prize  and 
sinking.  The  two  vessels  were  equal  in  size  and 
nearly  equal  in  men,  the  Hornet  having  aboard 

184 


The  American  Navy  185 

135  to  the  Peacock's  122.  The  Hornet  was  su 
perior  in  so  far  as  carrying  32-pound  carronades 
to  the  Peacock's  24/5;  but  weight  of  shot  made  no 
difference  for  the  Peacock's  guns  did  scarcely  any 
damage.  Lawrence,  overcrowded  with  prisoners, 
returned  to  the  United  States,  anchoring  at 
Holmes  Hole  on  March  I9th.  Less  than  three 
months  later  he  was  to  die  a  defeated  man, 
aboard  the  Chesapeake,  the  victim  of  rashness 
and  over-confidence. 

The  Chesapeake,  throughout  her  career  an  ill- 
omened  ship,  had  made  a  cruise  under  Captain 
Evans,  leaving  Boston  December  13,  1812,  and 
returning  there  April  9,  1813,  having  captured 
five  merchantmen.  The  term  of  enlistment  of 
the  crew  was  up,  and  there  being  a  difficulty  over 
prize  money,  most  of  the  men  refused  to  enlist. 
Captain  Evans  on  account  of  ill-health  gave  up 
the  command,  and  Lawrence  was  appointed  in 
his  stead.  He  joined  about  the  middle  of  May; 
he  left  Boston  Harbor  to  fight  the  Shannon  a 
fortnight  later.  Thus  in  two  weeks  he  had  to  get 
new  officers  and  a  new  crew  together  and  prepare 
for  sea.  As  for  target  practice,  or  for  even  the  or 
dinary  "shaking  down,"  there  was  no  oppor 
tunity  whatever.  So  new  were  some  of  the  men 
to  their  ship  "that  the  last  draft  that  arrived 


1 86  The  American  Navy 

still  had  their  hammocks  and  bags  lying  in  the 
boats  stowed  over  the  booms  when  the  ship  was 
captured."*  Privateering  had  now  risen  to  such 
prominence  that  the  same  difficulties  were  ex 
perienced  as  to  men  as  in  the  times  of  the  Revo 
lution,  when  it  was  often  impossible  to  man  the 
ships  of  the  navy  on  account  of  the  attractions 
which  the  other  and  freer  service  offered.  As  a 
consequence  a  large  number  of  foreigners  had 
to  be  taken,  including  some  forty  British  and  a 
number  of  Portuguese,  these  latter  in  the  best 
circumstances  being  what  one  would  not  select 
from  choice.  In  this  case  they  were  particularly 
troublesome,  a  Portuguese  boatswain's  mate 
being  the  ringleader  in  what  became  almost  a 
mutiny  on  account  of  a  question  of  prize  money. 
The  first  lieutenant,  Page,  was  ill  ashore;  he  was 
replaced  by  a  young  lieutenant,  Ludlow,  who 
had  been  third  on  the  Chesapeake' s  last  cruise;  the 
third  and  fourth  were  only  midshipmen  with  act 
ing  appointments.  To  go  to  sea  thus  and  fight  a 
battle  with  a  ship  which  had  been  in  commission 
six  and  a  half  years,  under  a  particularly  able 
captain,  was  simple  madness.  But  this,  driven 
by  over-confidence  and  perhaps  an  over-desire  for 
distinction,  is  what  Lawrence  did. 

*Roosevelt,   178. 


The  American  Navy  187 

Captain  Philip  Bowes  Vere  Broke,  to  give  him 
his  full  name,  had  commissioned  the  Shannon, 
a  new  ship,  on  September  14,  1806.  He  was  sui 
generis  in  his  own  service,  for  he  carried  on  tar 
get  practice  twice  a  week,  whereas  the  usual 
custom  in  the  British  navy  of  the  time  was  once 
a  year;  his  guns  were  furnished  with  sights, 
which  was  also  unusual,  and  he  was  a  kindly 
captain  with  the  good-will  of  his  crew,  like 
wise  unusual  in  those  days  of  free  use  of  the 
cat. 

The  two  ships,  without  going  into  detail,  were 
practically  of  equal  force,  each  carrying  52  guns. 
The  Chesapeake  had  379  men;  the  Shannon  330, 
30  of  whom  were  new  hands.  The  Shannon  had 
been  off  Boston  for  some  time,  when  on  June  1st 
Broke  sent  a  letter  to  Lawrence  challenging  him 
to  meet  the  Shannon  later  at  a  given  point.  It 
is  a  great  pity  that  this  failed  to  reach  Lawrence 
in  time. 

On  May  3ist  the  Chesapeake  dropped  down  to 
the  lower  bay;  the  men  were  stationed  at  the 
guns  and  were  exercised  at  the  battery.  On 
June  ist,  a  little  after  midday,  she  stood  to  sea 
under  all  sails,  even  to  studding  sails.  The 
Shannon  stood  off  shore  under  easy  sail  until 
about  eighteen  miles  from  Boston  Light,  where 


1 88  The  American  Navy 

she  awaited  her  foe,  which  had  now  also  reduced 
her  canvas. 

There  is  no  need  to  go  into  the  manoeuvres, 
which  can  be  found  in  many  books.  Lawrence 
brought  his  ship  so  close  that  both  vessels  suf 
fered  severely.  He  was  soon  mortally  wounded 
and  the  sailing  master  (who  looked  after  the 
handling  of  the  ship  under  the  captain's  orders) 
was  killed.  The  two  most  important  officers 
were  thus  removed  early  in  the  action.  A  heavy 
explosion  occurred  in  the  Chesapeake,  probably 
by  the  ignition  of  cartridges  lying  on  the  deck. 
At  six  o'clock  the  two  ships  came  together,  the 
Shannon  s  anchor  catching  in  one  of  the  after 
ports  of  the  Chesapeake.  Broke  now  ordered 
"away  boarders."  The  Chesapeake* s  first  lieu 
tenant,  Ludlow,  received  a  wound  of  which  later 
he  died.  Cox,  the  third  lieutenant,  coming  up 
from  the  main  deck,  was  so  unmanned  by  the 
conditions  of  things  that  he  turned  and  ran  be 
low,  an  act  for  which  he  was  later  court- 
martialled  and  dismissed  from  the  service.  As 
Broke  came  aboard  heading  some  twenty  men, 
the  only  opposition  that  could  be  offered  at  the 
moment  came  from  the  nine  marines,  all  that 
were  left  unhurt  of  forty-four.  Their  com 
mander,  Broom,  and  a  corporal,  were  dead, 


The  American  Navy  189 

and  both  sergeants  were  wounded.  The  only 
officer  there  at  the  moment  was  the  chaplain, 
Livermore,  who  fired  his  pistol  at  Broke,  and 
himself  was  severely  wounded,  in  return,  by  a 
sword  cut  from  Broke.  The  large  number  of 
mercenaries  aboard  had  run  below.  Lieutenant 
George  Budd,  stationed  on  the  main  deck,  now 
ran  up,  followed  by  some  dozen  men,  and  at 
tacked  the  boarders,  killing  the  purser,  Aldham, 
and  the  captain's  clerk,  Drum,  but  Budd  was 
soon  wounded  and  knocked  down  the  main 
hatchway.  The  wounded  Ludlow  struggled  to 
the  spar  deck,  and  received  another  wound. 
Broke  himself  showed  brilliant  courage  in  lead 
ing  his  men  and  was  severely  wounded.  Just 
fifteen  minutes  after  the  action  began,  the 
Chesapeake' 's  colors  were  hauled  down.  "Of  her 
379  men,  61  were  killed  or  mortally  wounded, 
including  her  captain,  first  and  fourth  lieuten 
ants,  the  lieutenant  commanding  the  marines, 
the  master,  boatswain,  and  three  midshipmen; 
85  were  wounded  more  or  less  severely,  includ 
ing  both  her  other  lieutenants,  five  midship 
men,  and  the  chaplain;  total,  148;  the  loss  falling 
entirely  upon  the  American  portion  of  the 
crew.  Of  the  Shannons  men,  33  were  killed 
outright  or  died  of  their  wounds,  including  her 


190  The  American  Navy 

first  lieutenant,  purser,  captain's  clerk,  and  one 
midshipman,  and  50  were  wounded,  including 
the  captain  and  boatswain;  total,  83."* 

The  Chesapeake  was  taken  to  Halifax.  Law 
rence  and  Ludlow  were  buried  there  with  every 
honor.  The  remains  of  the  former  were  later 
taken  to  New  York,  where  in  the  churchyard  of 
old  Trinity  they  now  lie.  Lawrence's  dying 
words:  "Don't  give  up  the  ship,"  were  later 
blazoned  on  a  flag  flown  by  Perry  on  Lake  Erie, 
where  the  dead  hero  was  to  have  his  revenge, 
for  hero  he  was,  however  mistaken  in  judgment. 
His  fatal  action  was  the  ignoring  of  the  value 
of  preparation  in  war.  Discipline  and  train 
ing  are  as  necessary  as  valor,  an  axiom  which  our 
people  are  only  too  slow  to  learn. 

The  result  caused  immense  rejoicing  in  Eng 
land.  It  is  the  only  naval  action  of  the  war 
which  to-day  receives  recognition  there,  and 
I  doubt  if  the  British  people  in  general,  of  the 
present,  know  of  any  other.  And  while  treating 
of  it,  there  is  a  persistent  unfairness  in  ignoring 
conditions  of  the  Chesapeake;  even  in  articles 
which  were  written  in  1913,  the  hundredth  year 
later,  by  historians  from  whom  fairness  might 
be  expected,  no  mention  was  made  of  them.  It 

*Roosevelt,  187. 


The  American  Navy  191 

is  left  to  another  and  fairer  foreigner,  a  French 
man,  Admiral  Jurien  de  la  Graviere,  the 
most  distinguished  writer  on  naval  affairs  of 
his  nation,  to  tell  the  truth,  when  he  said: 
"Fortune  was  not  fickle,  she  was  merely  logi 
cal." 

A  little  later  there  was  an  action  which  was 
really  discreditable  to  us:  that  of  the  Argus,  a 
brig  of  298  tons  and  10  guns,  against  the  British 
Pelican,  of  467  tons  and  1 1  guns.  The  Argus 
had  been  cruising  in  the  English  Channel  "cap 
turing  and  burning  ship  after  ship  and  creating 
the  greatest  consternation  among  the  London 
merchants."  On  August  I3th  she  had  captured 
a  brig  laden  with  wine  from  Oporto,  a  success 
which  was  to  be  apparently  her  undoing.  Next 
day  she  met  the  Pelican.  The  Argus' s  captain, 
Allen,  was  killed  early  in  the  action,  as  were 
also  two  midshipmen;  her  first  lieutenant  was 
wounded.  The  odds  were  against  her,  but  not 
to  such  degree  as  to  account  for  the  too  slight 
resistance  later  in  the  action.  It  is  not  unlikely, 
as  has  been  said  by  competent  historians,  that 
the  captured  port  had  much  to  do  with  this. 
The  results  of  such  actions  had  previously  been 
so  markedly  different  that  there  is  reason  to 
suspect  this.  The  capture  of  the  Argus  was 


192  The  American  Navy 

soon  offset  by  that  of  the  British  brig  Boxer,  of 
66  men  and  14  guns,  by  the  Enterprise,  of  104 
men  and  16  guns.  Captain  Blyth  of  the 
Boxer  was  killed  early  in  the  action,  as  was 
also  Lieutenant  Burrows  of  the  Enterprise. 
The  few  remaining  American  brigs  disappeared 
by  capture  by  much  superior  forces,  most  of 
them  by  squadrons  from  which  there  was  no 
escape. 

There  had  undoubtedly  by  this  time  been  a 
falling  off  in  the  character  of  the  American 
crews.  The  Atlantic  now  swarmed  with  pri 
vateers  which,  as  in  our  Revolution,  attracted 
the  best  men;  the  navy  thus  labored  under  a 
severe  handicap.  The  privateers  did  immense 
damage  to  British  commerce  and  caused  the 
British  merchant  to  long  for  peace,  but  they 
damaged  our  real  naval  interests.  This  damage 
would  have  been  more  real  had  not  the  British 
naval  power  now  begun  to  tell  in  blockade, 
which  became  one  of  absolute  strictness.  The 
United  States  and  the  captured  Macedonian, 
which  had  been  repaired  and  commissioned  at 
New  York,  got  to  New  London  by  way  of  Hell 
Gate,  but  were  so  strictly  watched  that  they 
remained  there  for  the  rest  of  the  war.  Naval 
action  was  now,  perforce,  to  be  confined  almost 


The  American  Navy  193 

entirely  to  the  lakes,  where  it  was  momentous 
in  character.  The  fights  on  the  ocean  were 
but  exhibitions  of  ability  and  prowess;  those 
on  the  lakes  were  vital  to  the  outcome  of  the 
war. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

OUR  army  efforts  on  the  frontier  of  Canada  had 
been  great  failures.  In  the  very  beginning  of 
the  war  General  William  Hull,  Governor  of 
Michigan,  had  been  obliged  to  surrender  his 
small  army  at  Detroit  for  the  simple  reason 
that  he  was  faced  by  starvation.  He  was  tried 
and  sentenced  to  death,  but  was  reprieved  by 
President  Madison.  But  the  fault  was  not 
wholly  Hull's.  It  was,  along  with  Hull's  age 
and  inefficiency,  the  ineptitude  of  our  own  ad 
ministrative  and  legislative  authorities  in  Wash 
ington.  Our  northern  defence  was  thus  to  fall 
upon  the  navy. 

There  was  in  1813  no  vessel  of  war  on  Lake 
Erie,  and  but  one,  the  Oneida,  of  116  tons,  built 
four  years  before  the  war,  on  Ontario.  The 
British  had  long  had  a  force  on  this  lake,  and 
in  1812  there  were  six  vessels,  carrying  in  all 
about  80  guns;  the  largest  was  the  Royal  George, 
of  22.  Had  the  British  commander  been  com 
petent  he  could  easily  have  controlled  the  lake. 

194 


The  American  Navy  195 

He  attacked  Sackett's  Harbor  in  July,  but  Lieu 
tenant  Woolsey,  commanding  the  Oneida,  landed 
his  guns,  and  with  the  batteries  thus  formed  beat 
him  off.  Commodore  Isaac  Chauncey  was 
now,  in  August,  1812,  sent  to  command  both 
lakes.  Guns,  officers,  shipwrights,  and  stores 
were  transported  from  New  York,  and  by  No 
vember  a  small  fleet  was  ready.  Before  this, 
however,  Lieutenant  L.  D.  Elliot,  who  had  been 
sent  to  Buffalo  to  look  after  Lake  Erie,  had  made 
a  brilliant  expedition  against  the  Detroit,  which 
had  been  surrendered  at  the  time  of  Hull's  dis 
aster,  and  another  vessel,  the  Caledonia.  Both 
were  captured  on  the  Canada  side  of  the  lake 
at  Fort  Erie  by  boarding,  a  small  army  detach 
ment  assisting.  The  Detroit  was  burned. 

On  November  8th  Chauncey  made  a  spirited 
attack  on  the  harbor  of  Kingston,  and  kept  up 
his  activities  until  navigation  was  closed  by  ice 
early  in  December.  The  winter  was  spent  in 
building.  A  new  ship,  however,  named  the 
Madison,  had  already  (November  24th)  been 
launched  at  Sackett's  Harbor.  Nine  weeks 
before  her  timber  had  stood  in  the  forest. 

By  the  opening  of  navigation  in  1813  each 
combatant  had  a  considerable  fleet  on  Lake 
Ontario,  though  nearly  all  were  but  mere  gun- 


196       ,  The  American  Navy 

boats.  The  British,  recognizing  the  immense 
importance  of  control  of  the  lakes,  had  selected 
an  able  officer,  Sir  James  L.  Yeo,  to  command. 
The  outcome  of  the  season's  operations,  how 
ever,  for  the  detail  of  which  one  should  look  to 
larger  books,  was  that  the  Americans  were  left 
in  naval  control.  In  the  course  of  the  summer 
the  hostile  squadrons  were  three  times  engaged. 
Chauncey's  courage  and  spirit  have  received, 
and  deserved,  high  praise  for  "the  rapidity  and 
decision  with  which  he  created  a  force,  as  it 
might  be  in  a  wilderness,  the  professional  re 
sources  which  he  discovered  in  attaining  this 
great  end,  and  the  combined  gallantry  and 
prudence  with  which  he  manoeuvred  before  the 
enemy  .  .  .  while  the  intrepidity  with 
which  he  carried  his  own  ship  into  action  off 
York  has  always  been  a  subject  of  honest  exul 
tation  in  the  service  to  which  he  belongs."  This 
high  praise  from  one  so  able  to  judge  as  Feni- 
more  Cooper,  himself  in  early  life  a  naval  officer, 
holds  to  this  day. 

What  Chauncey  did  on  Lake  Ontario,  Perry 
was  to  do,  and  much  more,  on  Erie.  He  had 
been  reared  in  Treble's  school  at  Tripoli,  but 
by  1806  he  was  at  Newport  superintending  the 
building  of  some  of  Jefferson's  absurd  gunboats, 


The  American  Navy  197 

and  to  duty  such  as  this  he  was  kept  for  six 
years,  an  inglorious  inaction  for  such  a  spirit. 
No  attention  was  paid  by  a  nerveless  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  for  his  application  for  the  lakes 
until  it  was  pressed  by  Chauncey,  on  which  he 
was  ordered  to  report  at  Sackett's  Harbor  with 
his  best  men.  Receiving  his  orders  on  Febru 
ary  lyth,  fifty  men  were  on  their  way  before 
sunset;  a  hundred  more  followed,  and  Perry 
himself  on  the  22d.  He  reached  Sackett's 
Harbor  on  March  3d,  and,  after  two  weeks,  was 
ordered  to  Erie.  Sailing-master  Dobbins  and 
Noah  Brown,  master  shipwright,  already  had 
three  gunboats  well  under  way  and  keels  laid 
for  two  brigs.  The  timber  for  their  construc 
tion  had  been  but  a  few  days  before  trees  in  the 
forest.*  But  nothing  had  been  provided  in  the 
way  of  armament,  cordage,  stores,  men,  or 
officers.  These  dribbled  in  through  the  appeals 
and  constant  personal  work  of  Perry.  In  five 
months  he  had  his  little  fleet  fairly  ready.  On 
August  loth  he  went  in  search  of  the  British. 
He  had  the  brigs  Lawrence  and  Niagara,  of  20 
guns  each,  and  eight  schooners  carrying,  one 
three,  the  others  two  and  one  guns  each.  The 
British  commodore,  Barclay,  had  the  ship 

"Condensed  from  McMaster,  IV,  33. 


198  The  American  Navy 

Detroit,  of  19  guns;  the  Queen  Charlotte,  of  17;  the 
Lady  Prevost,  a  schooner  of  13,  and  three  small 
craft  of  10,  3,  and  i .  Perry  had  in  all  416  men  fit 
for  duty;  Barclay  440.  On  September  loth  they 
met. 

The  action  began  at  11:45.  How  Perry 
fought  his  ship  unsupported  by  the  Niagara 
until  the  Lawrence  was  a  wreck  and  but  20  of 
his  100  men  were  left  unhurt;  how  he  fired  him 
self  the  last  heavy  gun  from  his  ship  with  the 
help  of  the  purser  and  chaplain,  and  then  jumped 
into  a  small  boat,  pulled  by  his  brother  and  four 
seamen,  boarded  the  Niagara,  took  personal 
command,  and  carried  her  to  victory,  make  a 
story  of  courage  and  resource  unsurpassed  in 
any  of  the  sea  fights  of  history.  Never  did  one 
man  more  personify  a  victory. 

The  British  flag  was  struck  at  3  :oo  P.M.,  after 
a  most  gallant  struggle.  Twenty-nine  Ameri 
cans  were  killed  or  mortally  wounded  and  94 
wounded.  The  British  lost  41  killed  and  94 
wounded.  The  moral  effect  throughout  the 
country,  which  covered  itself  with  bonfires  and 
rejoicings,  was  almost  equal  to  that  of  the  vic 
tory  of  the  Constitution.  But  besides  this  there 
was  the  great  concrete  result  of  the  evacuation 
of  Detroit  and  Michigan  by  the  British  and 


The  American  Navy  199 

their  occupancy  by  the  Americans.  To  Perry's 
victory  and  Chauncey's  success  on  Lake  On 
tario  is  due  that  we  preserved  our  northwestern 
frontier  in  the  coming  peace. 

The  winter  of  1813-1814  was  passed  on  Lake 
Ontario  by  both  antagonists  in  building  ships 
for  the  next  campaign.  The  largest  put  afloat 
at  Sackett's  Harbor  by  the  Americans,  the 
arming  and  equipping  of  which  was  under  enor 
mous  difficulties  of  transportation  through  the 
then  almost  roadless  forest,  was  the  Superior, 
of  62  guns;  but  the  British  built  a  much  larger, 
the  St.  Lawrence,  of  112  guns.  But  it  was  not 
until  October  I5th  that  she  was  in  service,  too 
late  in  the  season  to  affect  the  situation.  Had 
the  war  continued,  the  lakes  would  have  been 
the  scene  of  naval  operations  greater  than  any 
carried  on  by  us  upon  the  sea,  aided  curiously 
enough  by  the  British  blockade  of  our  coast, 
which  caused  the  transfer  to  the  lakes  of  the 
crews  of  the  blockaded  frigates.  We  shall  hear 
a  little  later  of  still  another  momentous  battle 
on  our  inland  waters.  For  the  moment  we 
turn  again  to  the  ocean. 

It  may  be  remembered  that  the  Essex,  under 
Captain  David  Porter,  was  to  form  part  of 


2OO  The  American  Navy 

Bainbridge's  command  when  the  latter  left 
Boston  October  26,  1812,  with  the  Hornet. 
Porter  was  then  in  Delaware  River.  He  left 
on  October  28th,  but  when  he  reached  the  ren 
dezvous  appointed  his  consorts  had  gone.  On 
his  way  thither  a  British  brig  transport,  the 
Norton,  was  captured,  with  $55,000  in  specie, 
which  in  the  circumstances  to  come  was  to  be  a 
most  valuable  aid.  The  prize  was  sent  with  a 
crew  of  seventeen  men  to  the  United  States, 
but  was  overhauled  by  a  frigate  and  captured 
after  passing  Bermuda.  Porter  continued  on 
to  the  second  rendezvous  off  Cape  Frio,  where 
he  arrived  December  25th,  four  days  before  the 
capture  of  the  Java.  Porter  remained  on  the 
Brazilian  coast  until  near  the  end  of  January, 
1813,  when,  hearing  no  news  of  his  consorts,  he 
started  for  the  Pacific,  where  for  a  full  year  he 
was  to  cruise  at  will,  capturing  nearly  every 
British  whaler  in  that  ocean,  arming  some,  de 
stroying  others,  and  recapturing  and  protecting 
our  own.  British  commerce  was  swept  from 
what  was  then  called  the  South  Sea.  The  story 
of  this  cruise  in  which  the  captain  of  the  Essex 
showed  a  surpassing  boldness,  energy,  and  re 
source  is  one  of  the  most  romantic  in  history. 
After  nearly  a  year  of  continuous  success  in 


The  American  Navy  201 

crippling  the  enemy's  commerce,  during  which 
the  Essex  supported  herself  and  armed  her  con 
sorts  entirely  from  her  prizes,  Porter  was  desir 
ous  of  meeting  a  British  man-of-war,  and  hear 
ing  of  the  dispatch  of  the  frigate  Phoebe,  of  36 
guns,  to  the  Pacific,  he  went  to  Valparaiso  to 
await  her  coming.  But  instead  of  one  ship 
came  two,  the  Cherub  accompanying  the  former. 
This  cruising  in  couples  was  the  outcome  of  one 
of  the  most  remarkable  orders  ever  issued  by 
the  British  Admiralty;  its  issuance  was  the 
highest  compliment  ever  paid  any  navy.  The 
order  in  full  cannot  be  omitted,  it  read: 

"My  Lords  Commissioners  of  the  Admiralty 
having  received  intelligence  that  several  Ameri 
can  ships-of-war  are  now  at  sea,  I  have  their 
lordships'  commands  to  acquaint  you  therewith, 
and  that  they  do  not  conceive  that  any  of  his 
Majesty's  frigates  should  attempt  to  engage, 
single-handed,  the  larger  class  of  American 
ships,  which,  though  maybe  called  frigates,  are 
of  a  size,  complement,  and  weight  of  metal  much 
beyond  that  class  and  more  resembling  line- 
of-battle  ships. 

"In  the  event  of  one  of  his  Majesty's  frigates 
under  your  orders  falling  in  with  one  of  these 
ships,  his  captain  should  endeavor  in  the  first 
instance  to  secure  the  retreat  of  his  Majesty's 


2O2  The  American  Navy 

ship;  but  if  he  finds  that  he  has  an  advantage 
in  sailing,  he  should  endeavor  to  manoeuvre,  and 
keeping  company  with  her,  without  coming  to 
action,  in  the  hope  of  falling  in  with  some  other 
of  his  Majesty's  ships,  with  whose  assistance 
the  enemy  might  be  attacked  with  a  reasonable 
hope  of  success. 

"It  is  their  lordships'  further  directions  that 
you  make  this  known  as  soon  as  possible  to  the 
several  captains  commanding  his  Majesty's 
ships."* 


There  is  a  delightfully  ingenuous  recognition 
of  the  alarm  that  had  been  inspired  by  our  vic 
tories  in  the  hope  that  we  might  be  attacked  by 
two  together,  "with  a  reasonable  hope  of  suc 
cess."  It  was  absurd  to  compare  our  frigates 
with  line-of-battle  ships.  They  were  undoubt 
edly  heavier  than  the  usual  frigate,  though  some 
then  in  the  British  navy  were  quite  as  powerful. 
But  the  fact  that  our  ships  were  as  good  as  any 
of  their  class  and  better  than  most  was  all  the 
more  to  the  credit  of  their  designers.  But  the 
Constitution,  one  of  our  best,  was  "but  ver}r 
little  more  than  one  half  the  force  of  one  of  the 
smallest  true  liners  England  possessed!"! 

*"The  Croker  Papers,"  I,  44. 

fRposevelt,  71,  where  a  careful  analysis  of  several  pages  is  given 
to  this  subject. 


The  American  Navy  203 

The  Essex  thus  anchored  at  Valparaiso  on 
January  12,  1814.  She  had  in  company  one 
of  her  captured  merchantmen,  renamed  the 
Essex  Junior  with  60  men,  ten  long  6's,  and  ten 
1 8-pound  carronades.  She  was  of  course  wholly 
unfit  to  meet  a  regular  cruiser.  On  February 
8th  the  Phoebe,  36,  Captain  Hillyar,  and  the 
Cherub,  18,  Captain  Tucker,  appeared.  There 
was  an  evident  design  on  the  part  of  Hillyar 
to  run  aboard  the  Essex,  but  a  very  near  ap 
proach  revealed  the  latter's  crew  at  her  guns, 
and  he  backed  his  yards,  inquiring,  meanwhile, 
of  Captain  Porter's  health.  Porter  politely 
replied,  but  warned  Hillyar  not  to  fall  foul, 
adding  later,  "You  have  no  business  where  you 
are;  if  you  touch  a  rope-yarn  of  this  ship  I  shall 
board  instantly."  It  had  been  well  had  the 
two  ships  fought  then  and  there,  for  later  the 
Essex  was  to  be  taken  at  a  much  greater  dis 
advantage.  The  two  British  ships  established 
a  blockade,  and  on  Porter's  endeavor  to  fight 
the  Phoebe  singly  on  February  2/th  she  ran 
down  and  joined  her  consort.  On  March 
28th,  however,  Porter,  who  had  already  decided 
to  go  to  sea,  parted  his  port  cable  in  a  gale  of 
wind  and  dragged  his  other  anchor  in  the  deep 
roadstead  and  very  difficult  anchorage,  under 


204  The  American  Navy 

the  best  of  circumstances,  at  Valparaiso.  He 
had,  by  several  trials,  assured  himself  of  the 
superior  speed  of  the  Essex,  and  now,  under  way, 
was  sure  of  getting  clear  of  his  enemies.  In 
rounding  the  outermost  headland  of  the  bay,  his 
ship  was  struck  by  a  heavy  squall,  which  careened 
her  to  the  gunwale  and  carried  away  the  main- 
topmast.  The  Essex  attempted  to  regain  the 
harbor,  but  an  adverse  wind  and  her  crippled 
condition  prevented  this.  She  thus  stood  north 
ward  and  anchored  three  miles  north  of  the 
town  and  half  a  mile  from  a  small  Chilean  bat 
tery.  She  was  within  pistol  shot  of  the  shore 
and  far  within  neutral  waters.  But  our  Brit 
ish  kindred  have  never  recked  of  such  small 
matters  as  neutrality  unless  such  stickling 
served  their  purpose.  Both  British  ships  thus 
stood  in  with  flags  and  mottoes  at  every  mast 
head,  deliberately  took  position  out  of  range  of 
the  short-range  carronades  of  the  Essex  (which 
carried  but  about  300  yards),  and  opened  fire. 
The  time  was  4:00  P.M.  Now  was  made  appar 
ent  the  justice  of  Porter's  demand  for  a  battery 
of  long-range  guns  which  he  had  made  before 
leaving  the  United  States,  but  which  was  re 
fused  him.  He  thus  had  to  fight  the  action 
with  but  his  six  long  12-pounders.  The  result 


The  American  Navy  205 

was  the  loss  of  the  ship,  but  never  was  ship  more 
gallantly  fought.  Near  the  end  she  caught  fire 
and  a  quantity  of  powder  exploded  below. 
Many  men  were  knocked  overboard  and  some, 
jumping  into  the  water  to  swim  ashore  when 
the  ship  had  become  a  total  wreck,  succeeded. 
At  6:20  the  ship  was  surrendered.  Of  the  255 
of  the  crew  58  had  been  killed,  66  wounded, 
and  31  drowned;  24  reached  the  shore.  The 
Phoebe  had  lost  4  killed,  including  her  first 
lieutenant,  and  7  wounded;  the  Cherub  i  killed 
and  3  wounded.  Such  were  the  benefits  of 
being  able  to  fight  at  long  taw.  Captain 
Hillyar  is  not  to  be  blamed  for  so  doing;  his 
business  was  to  capture  the  Essex,  and  he  did 
this  with  as  little  loss  to  himself  and  consort  as 
might  be.  But  all  the  honors  were  with  the 
American.  Hillyar's  flagrant  violation  of  the 
neutrality  of  Chile  was  in  British  eyes  but  an 
easily  condoned  incident,  and  he  received  all 
the  praise  and  regard  which  would  have  been 
due  for  taking  the  Essex  in  fairest  fight.  He 
gave  at  least  every  credit  to  the  brave  defenders 
of  our  ship.  As  usual  in  modern  British  ac 
counts  of  this  notable  battle,  no  reference  is 
made  to  the  crippled  state  of  the  Essex,  nor  to 
her  being  in  neutral  waters,  nor  to  the  fact  that 


206  The  American  Navy 

she  had  a  battery  incomparably  inferior  in 
range,  nor  that  two  ships  were  employed  against 
one  to  do  the  work.  The  "American  frigate 
Essex  was  captured  by  the  British  frigate 
Phoebe"  and  British  self-respect  thereby  saved. 

One  officer  who  did  his  duty  bravely  and  well 
in  the  Essex,  as  did  all,  was  later  to  achieve  fame 
as  the  most  brilliant  naval  officer  of  his  time: 
David  Glasgow  Farragut,  then  aged  twelve 
years  and  eight  months.  Farragut  continued 
his  battle  even  after  the  surrender  in  a  stand-up 
fight  aboard  the  Phoebe  for  the  preservation  of 
his  pet  young  pig,  Murphy,  an  animal  always  a 
favorite  of  sailors.  He  won. 

The  Constellation,  of  noble  record,  was  a  vic 
tim  of  the  blockade,  and,  beyond  aiding  in  the 
defence  of  Norfolk,  had  to  remain  passive.  The 
Adams,  after  a  successful  cruise  so  far  as  affect 
ing  the  enemy's  trade  very  seriously,  had  to  be 
burned  while  careened  in  the  Penobscot  to  es 
cape  capture  by  an  overwhelming  force.  The 
Peacock,  of  ii  guns,  captured  the  British  brig 
Epervier,  of  9,  with  $118,000  in  specie  aboard, 
on  April  29, 1814.  The  Wasp,  22,  in  a  daring  and 
successful  cruise  of  destruction  in  the  English 
Channel,  met  and  captured  on  June  28th  the 
British  Reindeer,  18,  of  considerably  less  force, 


The  American  Navy  207 

in  an  action  which  was  honorable  to  the  cap 
tains  and  crews  of  both  ships.  On  September 
ist,  after  a  brilliant  night  action,  she  captured 
the  Avon,  of  18  guns.  The  Wasp  was  driven 
off  by  the  approach  of  three  new  antagonists, 
who  had  to  go  to  the  assistance  of  the  Avon, 
which  sank  after  the  removal  of  several  of  her 
crew.  The  Wasp,  after  taking  a  number  of 
prizes,  spoke  on  October  4th  a  Swedish  brig  and 
received  from  her  Lieutenant  McKnight  and 
Master's  Mate  Lyman,  both  on  their  way  home 
from  the  Essex.  This  was  the  last  ever  heard 
of  her  and  her  brilliant  and  lamented  captain. 
The  last  memento  of  her,  besides  that  of  Octo 
ber  9th  in  the  journal  of  the  Swedish  brig,  the 
Adonis,  was  a  prize,  the  Atlanta,  which  reached 
Savannah  November  4th  under  Midshipman 
Geisinger. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

THERE  was  to  be  one  other  battle  on  the  lakes, 
that  of  Lake  Champlain,  which  was  to  have 
momentous  consequences  quite  equal  to  that  of 
Lake  Erie,  and  place  the  name  of  young  Thomas 
MacDonough  high  on  the  list  of  benefactors  of 
his  country.  MacDonough,  on  September  28, 
1812,  had  been  directed  to  proceed  immediately 
and  take  command  on  the  lake,  the  control 
having  previously  been  under  a  young  lieuten 
ant,  Sydney  Smith.  There  was,  however,  little 
to  command.  The  Americans  had  three  armed 
sloops  and  a  few  small  gunboats  and  galleys  (the 
latter  propelled  only  by  oars).  But  this  was 
larger  than  that  of  the  British,  until  on  June 
3,  1813,  two  of  the  sloops,  the  Growler  and  the 
Eagle,  in  pursuit  of  some  of  the  British  flotilla 
which  had  ventured  into  the  American  part  of 
the  lake,  found  themselves  in  the  narrow  reaches 
of  the  north  end  with  a  south  wind  against 
which  it  was  impossible  to  work  back.  Here 
they  were  attacked  both  by  gunboats  and  by 

208 


The  American  Navy  209 

troops  on  both  shores  of  the  narrow  waters,  and 
had  to  surrender.  Thenceforward,  until  May, 
1814,  the  British  by  the  addition  of  the  captured 
American  sloops  were  in  control.  Manned 
temporarily  by  seamen  from  the  sloop-of-war 
Wasp  at  Quebec,  the  British  flotilla  raided 
Plattsburgh  on  June  30,  1813,  destroyed  the 
public  buildings  there  and  at  Swanton  in  Ver 
mont,  and  threatened  the  destruction  of  the 
new  vessels  building  by  MacDonough.  On 
April  n,  1814,  he  launched  the  ship  Saratoga. 
By  the  end  of  May  he  was  afloat  with  the  Sara 
toga,  of  26  guns,  8  of  which  were  long  24-pound- 
ers,  the  remainder  being  32  and  42  pounder 
carronades;  the  schooner  Ticonderoga,  the  sloop 
Preble,  and  ten  galleys.  Once  more  the  Ameri 
cans  were  in  control.  The  British,  however, 
were  urging  forward  with  all  haste,  to  assist 
in  the  coming  invasion,  a  ship  much  more  than 
the  Saratoga's  equal.  This  was  the  Confiance, 
of  37  guns,  27  of  which  were  long  24-pounders 
and  the  others  carronades  of  24  and  32  pounds. 
On  August  25th  she  was  launched.  With  her 
tonnage  of  over  1,200  against  the  734  of 
the  Saratoga  and  with  her  great  superiority  in 
long  guns,  she  was  an  enemy  to  be  reckoned 
with. 


2io  The  American  Navy 

The  European  wars  had  now  closed.  Four 
brigades  of  Wellington's  army  had  been  sent  to 
Canada  from  Bordeaux.  They  came  with 
orders  to  "give  immediate  protection  to  his 
Majesty's  possessions  in  America,"  by  the  entire 
destruction  of  Sackett's  Harbor  and  of  the 
naval  establishments  on  Lake  Erie  and  Lake 
Champlain.* 

The  governor-general  of  Canada,  Sir  George 
Prevost,  who  also  was  in  command  of  the  army, 
now  had,  exclusive  of  officers,  29,437  men, 
nearly  all  of  whom  were  regulars  seasoned  by 
years  of  service  under  Wellington.  He  decided 
to  advance  by  the  west  side  of  the  lake  reporting 
that  as  "Vermont  has  shown  a  disinclination  to 
the  war,  and,  as  it  is  sending  in  specie  and  pro 
visions,  I  will  confine  offensive  operations  to  the 
west  side  of  Lake  Champlain. "f 

On  August  3  ist  Prevost  moved  south  with  an 
army  variously  estimated  at  from  11,000  to 
14,000  men.  The  American  army  under  General 
Alexander  Macomb  was  less  than  2,000,  but  by 
September  4th  came  in  700  militia  from  the 
neighborhood,  and  by  the  nth  "other  militia 

*"The  Public  Life  of  Sir  George  Prevost,"  136,  quoted  by 
Mahan,  362. 

fReport  in  Canadian  Archives,  1896,  Lower  Canada,  p.  31. 
For  some  mortifying  details  in  this  subject  see  Mahan,  "The  War 
of  1812,"  363-365- 


The  American  Navy  211 

from  New  York  and  volunteers  from  Vermont 
.  .  .  in  encouraging  contrast  to  their  fellow- 
citizens  who  were  making  money  by  abetting 
the  enemy."  The  British  entered  Plattsburg 
on  the  6th.  Macomb  retreated  across  the 
Saranac,  a  small,  fordable  river  on  which  the 
town  stands,  and  entrenched.  Had  Prevost 
had  the  courage  to  attack  Macomb  with  his 
large  and  seasoned  army,  Macdonough  would 
have  had  either  to  withdraw  up  the  lake  or  risk  a 
battle  in  the  open  lake,  where  the  Confiance  would 
have  been  more  than  a  match  for  his  whole 
squadron.  He  had  anchored  under  Cumberland 
Head,  somewhat  over  a  mile  from  the  west 
shore  with  the  Eagle,  Saratoga,  Ticonderoga, 
and  Preble  in  a  line  from  north  to  south  in  the 
order  named.  West  of  this  line  were  his  ten 
gunboats.  His  fourteen  vessels  totalled  but 
2,244  tons,  with  86  guns  and  882  men.  The 
British  commodore,  Downie,  had  sixteen  vessels, 
amounting  in  all  to  2,402  tons,  with  92  guns  and 
937  men,  but  his  flagship,  as  mentioned,  was 
nearly  twice  the  size  and  force  of  the  Saratoga. 

But  now  came  to  the  aid  of  the  Americans  the 
nervousness  of  the  incapable  British  general  who 
insisted  upon  immediate  action  by  the  British 
squadron  in  his  support.  The  Confiance  had 


212  The  American  Navy 

only  been  launched  on  August  25th;  to  make 
her  ready  for  action  in  seventeen  days  was  a  task 
of  Hercules,  and  that  she  was,  in  a  way,  made 
ready,  reflects  the  highest  credit  upon  the  energy 
and  ability  of  those  in  charge.  Commodore 
Downie  had  joined  only  on  September  2d;  the 
crew  had  been  hastily  gathered  from  ships  at 
Quebec,  the  last  detachment  coming  aboard  only 
the  night  but  one  before  the  battle.  The  men 
were  thus  largely  unknown  to  the  officers  and  to 
one  another.  The  ship  hauled  into  the  stream  on 
September  7th  with  the  artificers  still  hard  at 
work  on  the  hundreds  of  fittings  so  necessary  in 
the  equipment  of  a  man-of-war.  They  did  not 
leave  her  until  two  hours  before  the  beginning 
of  battle.  The  situation  of  unpreparedness  was 
very  comparable  to  that  of  the  Chesapeake  in  like 
circumstances,  except  that  Macdonough's  own 
ship  had  been  launched  but  four  months  earlier. 
Prevost,  by  the  fact  of  his  position  as  gover 
nor-general,  was  in  a  position  to  command 
obedience,  and  his  peremptory  insistence  caused 
Downie  to  move  earlier  than  he  should,  un 
doubtedly  against  the  latter's  better  judgment. 
He  thus  on  the  morning  of  September  n,  1814, 
stood  up  the  narrow  reaches  of  the  northern 
part  of  the  lake,  with  a  fair  wind  from  the  north- 


The  American  Navy  213 

east.  He  had  every  reason  to  expect  a  simul 
taneous  attack  by  Prevost  on  the  American 
troops,  but  none  came.  Having  passed  Cumber 
land  Head,  it  was  too  late  to  await  any  action  by 
Prevost. 

Macdonough  had  so  admirably  chosen  his 
position  that  the  British  in  rounding  Cumber 
land  Head  were  forced  to  stand  nearly  north 
west  and  almost  head  on  to  the  American  line. 
They  were  thus  subjected  to  a  raking  fire 
(lengthwise  of  the  ship).  The  Confiance,  being 
in  the  lead  and  having  thus  a  concentration 
upon  her  of  the  American  fire,  suffered  severely 
before  anchoring  within  five  hundred  yards 
of  the  line.  Within  fifteen  minutes  her  cap 
tain  was  dead.  The  day  was  finally  won  by 
"winding"  the  Saratoga  (turning  her  end  for 
end),  for  which  excellent  previous  arrangements 
had  been  made.  A  new  and,  in  great  degree,  un 
injured  broadside  was  thus  brought  into  use, 
and  shortly  after,  about  n,  the  Confiance  hauled 
down  her  colors.  The  whole  action  lasted,  by 
Macdonough's  report,  two  hours  and  twenty 
minutes.* 


*The  most  complete  account  of  this  battle  and  events  con 
nected  with  it  is  in  Mahan,  377-381,  largely  drawn  on  in  this 
account. 


214  The  American  Navy 

The  immediate  effect  of  the  victory  was 
Prevost's  retreat  without  delay  into  Canada. 
The  general  result  was  the  end  of  the  war,  of 
which  it  was  really  the  "decisive"  battle.  No 
longer  could  Castlereagh,  the  British  foreign 
minister,  hold  Great  Britian  "entitled  to  claim 
the  use  of  the  lakes  as  a  military  barrier."* 

To  Macdonough  and  Perry,  the  former  under 
thirty-one,  the  latter  but  twenty-eight  years  old 
at  the  time  of  their  victories,  our  country  owes 
the  preservation  of  its  northern  boundaries  at 
the  coming  peace.  It  is  a  great  debt. 

instructions  to  Peace  Commissioners,  August  14,  1814. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE  WAR  had  no  more  than  begun  when  the 
question  of  peace  was  being  considered.  The 
United  States  had  gone  to  war  for  two  causes: 
the  "Orders  in  Council"  which  bore  so  heavily 
upon  our  shipping;  and  the  impressment  of  our 
seamen.  The  former  were  revoked  on  June 
23d,  five  days  after  the  declaration  of  war  by 
Congress;  peace  was  to  be  made  without  even  a 
mention  of  the  latter. 

Actual  steps  toward  peace  were  taken  through 
Russia  even  as  early  as  September,  1812.  The 
whole  is  a  long  story,  but  on  November  4th 
a  direct  negotiation  was  offered  by  England 
which  was  accepted  by  the  United  States  on 
January  5,  1814,  and  commissioners  were  ap 
pointed,  with  Ghent  as  the  place  of  meeting.  It 
is  well  that  action  was  thus  early,  for  by  April 
Great  Britain's  hands  were  largely  free  in 
Europe,  and  she  could  turn  her  efforts  more 
freely  upon  America,  and  this  she  did  in  the  ex 
pedition  against  Louisiana  (which  was  to  end  in 

215 


216  The  American  Navy 

almost  unequalled  disaster),  and  in  the  abortive 
invasion  turned  back  by  Macdonough's  victory. 
The  British  state  of  mind  was  expressed  in  a 
letter  from  Gallatin,  then  in  London,  to  Monroe, 
the  Secretary  of  State:  "You  may  rest  assured/' 
he  said,  "of  the  general  hostile  spirit  of  this 
nation,  and  of  its  wish  to  inflict  serious  injury 
upon  the  United  States;  that  no  resistance  can 
be  expected  from  Europe;  and  that  no  better 
terms  will  be  obtained  than  the  status  ante 
bellum"  And  so  it  turned  out.  On  Christmas 
Eve,  1814,  peace  was  signed,  and  though  im 
pressment  was  ignored,  it  was  never  again  to  be 
attempted.  Nor  was  there  cause,  for  there  was 
not  to  be  a  naval  war  upon  the  ocean  in  which 
Britain  was  to  be  engaged  for  a  hundred  years. 
Before  hostilities  on  the  water  came  to  an  end 
there  were,  however,  to  be  several  notable  naval 
events,  one  of  the  most  remarkable  being  the 
defence  on  September  26,  1814,  of  the  privateer 
General  Armstrong,  Captain  Reid,  at  Fayal, 
Azores,  against  a  boat  attack  from  three  Brit 
ish  ships,  the  Plantagenet,  74;  Rota,  38;  and 
Carnation,  18.  The  British  were  repulsed  with 
the  loss  of  34  killed  and  86  wounded.  The  next 
day  the  Carnation  stood  in  to  attack  alone,  and 
was  driven  off;  but  with  a  74  present  besides  two 


The  American  Navy  217 

other  ships,  the  question  of  saving  the  little 
vessel  was  hopeless,  and  she  was  scuttled,  the 
crew  escaping  ashore. 

In  those  days  news  travelled  slowly,  and  thus 
it  was  that  after  the  peace  the  President,  one  of  a 
squadron  under  Commodore  Decatur,  separated 
from  her  consorts,  was  captured,  after  she  had 
driven  off  the  Endymion  frigate,  by  the  squad 
ron  accompanying  the  latter.  On  February  20, 
1815,  the  Cyane  and  Levant,  sloops-of-war,  were 
captured  in  a  night  action,  300  miles  from 
Madeira,  by  the  Constitution,  Captain  Stewart, 
who  was  to  be  the  instrument  of  trouble  many 
years  after  to  Britain,  through  his  grandfather- 
hood  of  Charles  Stewart  Parnell. 

This  action  was  remarkable  for  the  brilliant 
handling  of  Stewart's  ship.  The  Levant  was  re 
captured  by  a  British  squadron  at  Porto  Praya, 
in  the  Cape  Verdes,  where  she  had  taken  refuge 
against  the  British  squadron,  which  had  vainly 
chased  the  Constitution.  It  was  another  instance, 
added  to  those  of  the  Essex  and  the  General 
Armstrong,  of  the  disregard  of  the  English  of  a 
neutrality  so  highly  esteemed  in  these  latter 
days. 

The  capture,  on  March  23d,  of  the  British 
Penguin  by  the  Hornet,  Captain  Biddle,  of 


21 8  The  American  Navy 

equal  force,  was  the  last  real  action  of  the  war, 
that  of  the  Peacock  and  British  Nautilus  in  the 
Indian  Ocean  on  June  3Oth,  on  account  of  the 
former's  superiority  in  force,  not  calling  for  any 
but  mere  mention. 

But  the  history  of  the  War  of  1812  cannot 
close  without  mention  of  the  crowning  victory  on 
land,  New  Orleans,  on  January  8,  1815.  In 
this,  perhaps  the  severest  and  completest  repulse 
ever  suffered  by  a  British  army,  the  navy  bore 
a  most  important  part,  for  by  its  efforts  was 
prevented  the  flanking  of  General  Jackson's 
force  from  the  river.  The  naval  vessels,  the 
Louisiana,  with  Commodore  Patterson,  and  the 
Caroline,  Lieutenant  J.  D.  Henley,  controlled 
the  river  situation  on  the  British  left  flank  un 
til  the  latter  was  burned  by  hot  shot  from  the 
British  trenches.  The  Louisiana  then  shifted  to 
cover  Jackson's  right.  The  situation  forced 
the  British  to  transport  siege  pieces  from  the 
fleet,  seventy  miles  away;  this  gave  time  for 
Jackson  to  strengthen  his  position  and  time  for 
reinforcements  to  join  him.  The  Louisiana's 
guns  were  now  landed  and  a  battery  established 
which  would  flank  the  newly  established  British 
battery  as  well  as  their  attacking  columns;  the 
result  was  the  destruction  of  the  British  battery 


The  American  Navy  219 

soon  after  it  had  opened  fire.  The  British 
move,  on  the  day  of  the  main  attack,  to  capture 
the  Louisiana  s  battery  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
river,  was  finally  successful  through  the  flight  of 
the  supporting  militia,  but  it  was  too  late;  the 
naval  battery  had  already  assisted  in  the  bloody 
repulse  of  the  main  body,  and  there  was  nothing 
left  to  the  capturing  party  but  withdrawal.* 

The  war  was  now  ended.  It  had  been  a 
second  War  of  Independence,  which  had  re 
leased  America  from  the  strong  British  influence 
which  had  still  obtained  and  had  established  a 
real  national  spirit.  The  world  recognized  the 
birth  of  a  new  power  upon  the  ocean,  which  the 
future  was  to  reckon  with,  though  America  her 
self  was  slow  to  accept  her  new  situation.  We 
had,  however,  afloat  in  1815,  three  line-of-battle 
ships,  the  Washington,  Independence,  and  Frank- 
tin,  and  in  this  year  we  were  to  end,  as  has  already 
been  mentioned,  our  Barbary  troubles  forever  by 
the  action  of  Decatur  in  command  of  the  largest 
fleet  we  were  to  have  at  sea  for  many  years.  We 
began  a  new  life  with  a  self-respect  which  had 
needed  a  war  for  its  revival. 

There  was  one  note  at  least  of  dissatisfaction 
over  the  peace.  The  London  Times,  comment- 

*For  a  complete  account  see  Mahan,  "War  of  1812,"  II,  391,  396. 


22O  The  American  Navy 

ing  in  its  issue  of  December  30,  1814,  said:  "We 
have  retired  from  the  combat  with  the  stripes 
yet  bleeding  on  our  backs.  Even  yet,  however, 
if  we  could  but  close  the  war  with  some  great 
naval  triumph,  the  reputation  of  our  maritime 
greatness  might  be  partially  restored.  But  to 
say  that  it  has  not  hitherto  suffered  in  the 
estimation  of  all  Europe,  and,  what  is  worse,  of 
America  herself,  is  to  belie  common  sense  and 
universal  experience.  '  Two  or  three  of  our  ships 
have  struck  to  a  force  vastly  inferior!'  No; 
not  two  or  three,  but  many  on  the  ocean  and 
whole  squadrons  on  the  lakes;  and  the  numbers 
are  to  be  viewed  with  relation  to  the  comparative 
magnitude  of  the  two  navies.  Scarcely  is  there 
an  American  ship-of-war  which  has  not  to  boast 
a  victory  over  the  British  flag;  scarcely  one 
British  ship  in  thirty  or  forty  that  has  beaten 
an  American.  With  the  bravest  seamen  and 
the  most  powerful  navy  in  the  world,  we  retire 
from  the  contest  when  the  balance  of  defeat  is  so 
heavily  against  us."*  And  more  defeats  were 
yet  to  come.  Perhaps  yet  more  would  have 
come,  for  just  as  the  war  closed,  the  first  war- 
steamer  to  be  built  for  over  ten  years,  the 
Fulton,  was  ready  for  sea.  With  a  double  hull 

*Quoted  by  Maclay,  "History  of  the  Navy,"  II,  82. 


The  American  Navy  221 

of  such  thickness  as  to  be  impervious  to  harm 
from  any  but  the  heaviest  guns,  moved  by  a 
wheel  in  the  middle  which  was  protected  from 
shot,  it  seems  almost  a  pity  that  she  should  not 
have  been  tried  with  her  two  loo-pound  guns 
upon  the  ships  blockading  New  York.  But 
even  as  it  was  America  had  good  reason  to  be 
well  satisfied  with  the  work  of  her  navy. 


CHAPTER  XX 

THOUGH  thirty-one  years  was  to  pass  before  the 
United  States  was  again  to  be  at  war  with  a 
foreign  power,  and  then  with  Mexico — which 
had  no  navy — they  were  far  from  being  years 
of  idleness  or  want  of  deeds  accomplished. 

Our  flag  was  now  shown  in  every  sea  and  with 
the  weight  and  authority  which  success  always 
carries.  Thus  N.  P.  Willis,  who  in  the  early 
thirties  was  the  guest  of  wardroom  officers  of 
the  flagship  in  the  Mediterranean,  says  in  his 
"Pencilings  by  the  Way": 

"From  the  comparisons  I  have  made  between 
our  own  ships  and  the  ships-of-war  of  other 
nations,  I  think  we  may  well  be  proud  of  our 
navy.  I  had  learned  in  Europe  long  before 
joining  the  United  States  that  the  respect  we 
exact  from  foreigners  is  paid  more  to  America 
afloat  than  to  a  continent  they  think  as  far  off  at 
least  as  the  moon.  They  see  our  men-of-war 
and  they  know  very  well  what  they  have  done 
and,  from  the  appearance  and  character  of  our 
officers,  what  they  might  do  again — and  there  is 

222 


The  American  Navy  223 

a  tangibility  in  the  deductions  from  knowledge 
and  eyesight  which  beats  books  and  statistics. 
I  have  heard  Englishmen  deny  one  by  one  every 
claim  we  have  to  political  and  moral  superiority, 
but  I  have  found  none  illiberal  enough  to  refuse 
a  compliment — and  a  handsome  one — to  Yankee 
ships.'** 

The  world  was  yet  a  world  of  piracy,  and  the 
extirpation  of  these  wolves  of  the  sea  was  a  work 
which,  when  finished  in  the  Mediterranean  and 
in  the  West  Indies,  was  to  continue  in  the  Far 
East  to  our  own  day.  The  situation,  however, 
in  the  Caribbean  Sea  and  its  adjacent  waters  was 
particularly  serious  from  the  anarchic  conditions 
arising  through  the  revolt  of  Spain's  American 
dominions,  with  the  exception  of  Cuba,  Puerto 
Rico,  and  Mexico,  and  this  last  was  to  join  in 
the  upheaval  in  1821.  But  all  became  nests  of 
piracy.  The  fault  in  the  beginning  was  with 
our  own  Government,  which  had  allowed  too 
freely  the  fitting  out  of  vessels,  usually  schooners, 
in  our  ports  which  sailed  away  for  Venezuela  or 
Argentina  and  there  took  out  letters  of  marque 
and  flew  the  insurgent  flags.  They  captured  not 
only  Spanish  vessels,  but  whatever  seemed  likely 

*Quoted  by  Soley,  "Admiral  Porter/'  41. 


224  The  American  Navy 

prize,  and  our  own  ships  suffered  as  well  as 
others.  Galveston  and  Matagorda  had  also  for 
years  after  the  peace  of  1815  been  bases  of  piracy 
under  the  claim  of  patriotism.  Our  war  with 
England  had  in  fact  so  developed  the  greed  in 
privateering  that  the  more  adventurous  kept  it 
up  in  the  new  form.  Florida,  Louisiana,  Texas, 
and  Mexico  at  the  time  thus  bred  pirates  much 
as  ill-conditioned  ponds  breed  mosquitoes. 
When  Mexico  declared  independence  in  1821 
and  there  was  nothing  left  to  Spain  but  Cuba  and 
Puerto  Rico,  numerous  privateers  were  fitted 
out  from  there  against  the  privateers  of  the 
patriots,  and  the  former  became  in  turn  as  bad 
as  the  latter.  Havana  itself  was  one  of  the 
strongholds  of  these  villains,  the  captain-general 
sharing  in  the  profits,  and  each  of  the  many 
curiously  formed,  deep,  bottlelike  harbors  of 
Cuba  was  a  pirate  refuge.  For  nine  years,  from 
1817  to  1826,  the  navy  was  busily  engaged  in 
suppressing  these  marauders,  and  it  was  on  such 
duty,  in  1819,  that  Commodore  Oliver  Hazard 
Perry,  in  command  of  a  squadron  in  the  Carib 
bean,  lost  his  life  through  yellow  fever  caught  in 
the  Orinoco.  He  was  but  thirty-four  years  old. 
But  while  this  work  had  its  losses,  it  had  also 
great  uses,  besides  protecting  the  commercial 


The  American  Navy  225 

world,  in  serving  as  a  school  for  the  greatest 
admiral  of  his  or  any  time  in  fact,  and  for 
another  great  officer  who  was  bound  to  him  by 
peculiarly  romantic  ties.  These  were  Farragut 
and  Porter,  who  forty  or  more  years  later  were 
to  come  to  such  distinguished  fame.  The  story 
needs  a  telling. 

The  first  Porter,  a  merchant  captain,  born  in 
Massachusetts  in  1727,  had  two  sons,  of  whom 
David  was  the  later  admiral's  grandfather. 
This  grandfather  served  as  a  privateersman, 
was  a  captain  in  the  Massachusetts  state  navy 
in  the  Revolution,  was  captured  and  confined  in 
the  Jersey  prison  ship,  escaped,  and  served  at 
sea  for  the  rest  of  the  war.  Becoming  again  a 
merchant  captain,  his  bold  and  successful  re 
sistance  to  the  impressment  of  his  men  by  a 
British  man-of-war  in  Santo  Domingo  led,  when 
the  navy  came  to  life  in  1794,  to  his  appointment 
as  a  sailing  master.  He  was  in  command  of  the 
naval  station  at  New  Orleans  when  in  1808, 
having  had  a  sunstroke  while  fishing  on  Lake 
Ponchartrian,  he  was  found  and  cared  for  by 
George  Farragut,  a  sailing  master  in  the  navy  who 
lived  on  the  borders  of  the  lake.  Porter  died,  and 
Mrs.  Farragut  dying  of  yellow  fever,  both  were 
buried  on  the  same  day,  June  22,  1808. 


226  The  American  Navy 

Some  time  after,  the  late  Porter's  son  David, 
whom  we  have  met  herein  as  the  captain  of  the 
famous  Essex,  took  charge  of  the  New  Orleans 
station,  and  in  recognition  of  the  great  kindness 
of  the  Farragut  family  offered  to  adopt  one  of 
the  motherless  boys  and  train  him  for  the  navy. 
It  was  thus  that  the  future  victor  at  New 
Orleans  and  at  Mobile  Bay  had  his  start  in  life. 
Farragut,  born  July  5,  1801,  was  taken  into 
Porter's  family,  and  on  December  17,  1810, 
received  his  appointment  as  midshipman.  He 
was  then  just  nine  years  five  months  and  twelve 
days  old.*  In  1811  he  was  at  sea  with  Porter 
in  the  Essex  and  took  a  very  active  and  valorous 
part  in  the  famous  battle  in  1814  in  which  she 
was  overcome  by  great  odds.  It  was  in  the 
year  before  this  (1813)  that  the  youngest  David 
Porter  was  born.  The  careers  of  the  two  men 
were  to  be  curiously  linked  through  life,  and  the 
period  of  piracy  mentioned  was  one  which  was 
to  be  largely  formative  of  their  characters. 
Both  were  to  rise  to  the  highest  honors  in  their 
profession  and  leave  great  and  worthy  names. 


*Not  so  young,  however,  as  was,  when  appointed  midshipman, 
an  admiral  under  whom  the  author  served  in  1865,  S.  W.  Godon. 
He  told  me  that  he  was  appointed  at  so  early  an  age  that  for 
some  years  he  was  taken  by  a  servant  on  quarter  day  to  the  navy 
yard  to  draw  his  pay. 


The  American  Navy  227 

Their  stories  make  books  which  all  boys,  young 
or  old,  should  read  and  thereby  stir  their  blood. 
By  1822  it  had  become  necessary  to  employ  a 
large  force  on  the  Caribbean,  and  Commodore 
Porter  (he  of  the  Essex)  was  selected  for  the 
command.  By  1826  piracy  in  those  waters  was 
at  an  end,  but  the  righteous  punishment  given 
some  of  the  depredators  at  Cape  Fajardo  at  the 
eastern  end  of  Puerto  Rico,  though  not  at  all 
excessive,  was,  as  an  invasion  of  Spanish  terri 
tory,  made  a  cause  of  investigation,  and  Porter's 
conduct  was  found  "censurable"  by  the  court- 
martial  before  which  the  matter  was  brought. 
This  was  too  much  for  Porter's  high  spirit,  and 
he  at  once  resigned  from  the  navy  and  never 
thereafter  would  speak  to  a  member  of  the  court. 
In  1826  he  became  commander-in-chief  of  the 
then  somewhat  considerable  Mexican  navy, 
Mexico  now  being  at  war  with  Spain,  and  it  was 
as  a  midshipman  in  this  service  that  the  younger 
Porter,  now  thirteen,  began  his  sea-going  life. 
He  was,  in  1828,  in  one  of  the  severest  and 
bloodiest  battles  of  his  career,  that  of  the  brig 
Guerrero,  in  which  he  was  serving,  with  the 
Spanish  frigate  Lealtad,  west  of  Havana.  His 
career  as  a  Mexican  midshipman  ended  in  im 
prisonment,  a  quick  release,  and  an  appointment 


228  The  American  Navy 

as  midshipman  in  our  own  navy,  his  father,  the 
commodore,  having  thrown  up  his  Mexican 
appointment.  The  latter  was  to  end  his  career 
as  our  first  minister  to  Turkey,  to  which  post 
he  was  appointed  by  President  Jackson,  to  whom 
Porter  was  a  man  after  his  own  heart.  He  ended 
his  life,  than  which  there  have  been  few  of  such 
romantic  and  gallant  exploit,  at  Constantinople 
on  March  28,  1843,  at  the  age  of  sixty-three,  and 
after  fourteen  years'  service  as  minister. 

The  following  years  of  the  navy  until  the 
Mexican  War  were  thus  years  of  commerce- 
protecting  and  of  the  usual  routine  of  naval  duty 
varied  by  punitive  expeditions  in  the  East  and 
in  the  Pacific.  There  was  the  well-known  ex 
ploring  expedition  of  Lieutenant  Wilkes  in  the 
years  1838-1842,  the  discoveries  of  which  were 
for  years  to  be  minimized  by  British  jealousy, 
but  which  are  now  recognized  at  their  full  value; 
the  establishment  of  the  Naval  Observatory, 
1842;  of  the  Naval  Academy  in  1845;  and  the 
introduction  of  steam  vessels,  the  first  to  see 
actual  service  in  our  navy  being  a  small  pur 
chased  vessel,  the  Sea  Gull,  used  against  the 
pirates  of  Cuba  in  1823.*  Throughout  the 

*Spears,  112. 


The  American  Navy  229 

period,  too,  of  the  Seminole  War  in  Florida  the 
navy  did  its  share  in  a  not  overglorious  but  most 
trying  duty. 

War  was  declared  with  Mexico  on  May  12, 
1846.  The  share  of  the  navy  in  the  occupancy 
of  the  east  coast  of  the  country,  apart  from  its 
landing  a  very  efficient  battery  of  heavy  guns  at 
Vera  Cruz,  which  assisted  materially  in  a  quick 
surrender  of  the  place,  was  not  of  very  great 
importance  beyond  occupying  all  the  other 
towns  of  the  coast,  a  duty  in  every  case  gallantly 
performed.  The  importance  of  naval  action  in 
the  Pacific  was  far  different,  for  it  secured  to  us 
California,  then  a  part  of  Mexico.  Whatever  the 
laterofficialstatements  as  to  British  intent,ornon- 
intent,it  was  well  that  our  ships  wereon  theground 
first  and  in  possession;  in  any  case  our  action  on 
the  California  coast  forestalled  any  question. 

There  was  from  the  treaty  of  peace  with 
Mexico,  February  2, 1848,  to  our  next  and  great 
est  war,  an  interval  of  but  thirteen  years.  This 
was  one  of  the  periods  of  greatest  transition  in 
which  the  ships  and  guns  which  had  existed  for 
over  two  hundred  years  with  but  moderate  change 
were  to  take  a  long  step  to  complete  transfor 
mation,  from  sail  to  steam,  and  from  the  smooth 
bore  to  the  rifle.  In  the  matter  of  guns,  though, 


230  The  American  Navy 

we  were  much  slower  to  change  than  was  Europe. 
We  were  to  carry  aboard  our  ships,  during  the 
Civil  War  and  for  long  after,  the  smooth-bore 
Dahlgren  gun,  so  called  from  the  bottlelike  form 
given  it  by  the  inventor,  Commander  (later 
Rear-Admiral)  J.  A.  Dahlgren. 

One  by  one,  or  at  most  by  occasional  twos,  the 
new-fangled  idea — the  steamship  — had  made  its 
way.  In  1837  had  been  built  the  Fulton,  of  4 
guns;  in  1841,  the  Missouri,  which  was  to  perish 
by  fire  at  Gibraltar  but  two  years  later,  1843; 
and  the  Mississippi,  a  sister  ship,  which  after 
many  years  of  honorable  service  was  to  find  her 
grave  in  the  river  of  her  name  at  Port  Hudson  on 
March  14,  1863;  in  1843  was  built  our  first  screw 
steamer,  the  Princeton;  in  1844  at  Erie  our  first 
iron  steamer,  the  Michigan,  for  service  on  the 
lakes,  where  she  cruised  for  many  years  and 
became  in  lapse  of  time  a  curiosity;  in  1848,  the 
Saranac;  and  in  1850  the  two  fine  old  side-wheel 
frigates,  the  Susquehanna  and  the  Powhatan.  By 
1855  we  were  building  the  five  frigates,  W abash, 
Roanoke,  Colorado,  Merrimac,  and  Minnesota,  the 
finest  of  their  time,  but  which  except  the  Merri- 
mac,  transformed  into  an  ironclad,  were  to  cut  no 
figure  in  the  coming  Civil  War  on  account  of  their 
deep  draft.  Their  time  had  passed  even  by  1861. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

THOUGH  there  were  many  mutterings  of  the  com 
ing  tempest  in  the  decade  1850-1860,  the  navy, 
whose  duty,  unaffected  by  internal  politics,  lay 
abroad,  went  its  even  tenor.  We  had  come  to 
the  verge  of  war  with  Spain  in  1852  over  the 
case  of  the  Black  Warrior.  There  had  been 
filibustering  expeditions  and  the  slave  trade  to 
look  after;  threatenings  of  difficulties  with 
England;  a  successful  expedition  to  Paraguay  in 
1858  and  1859  to  demand  reparation  for  the 
firing  upon  the  United  States  steamer  Water 
Witch;  and  most  notable  and  most  momentous 
of  all,  the  expedition,  1852-1854,  resulting  in  the 
opening  of  Japan. 

Meanwhile  was  swiftly  gathering  the  storm  of 
secession.  Despite  the  Kansas  war,  the  John 
Brown  raid,  and  fierce  political  antagonisms,  the 
illimitable  optimism  of  the  American  people 
would  not  admit  the  idea  of  danger  until  the 
convulsion  was  upon  them.  So  little  could  our 
people  in  1860  recognize  that  they  were  rapidly 

231 


232  The  American  Navy 

being  carried  into  the  abyss  of  war,  that  in  the 
last  days  of  the  Congress  which  closed  on  June 
25th  of  that  year,  "at  the  instance  of  Sherman, 
of  Ohio,  the  estimate  for  repairs  and  equipment 
of  the  navy  was  cut  down  a  million. 
Senator  Pugh,  of  the  same  state,  could  say:  'I 
think  we  have  spent  enough  money  on  the  navy, 
certainly  for  the  service  it  has  rendered,  and  for 
one  I  shall  vote  against  building  a  single  ship 
under  any  pretence  at  all.'  The  blatant  Love- 
joy,  in  the  face  of  the  rising  storm,  said:  'I  am 
tired  of  appropriating  money  for  the  army  and 
navy  when  absolutely  they  are  of  no  use  what 
ever  ...  I  want  to  strike  a  blow  at  this 
whole  navy  expenditure  and  let  the  navy  go  out 
of  existence.  .  .  .  Let  us  blow  the  whole 
thing  up!  Let  these  vessels  rot,  and  when  we 
want  vessels  to  fight,  we  can  get  mercantile 
vessels  and  arm  them  with  our  citizens/  .  .  . 
The  whole  existing  steam  navy  consisted  of  but 
twenty-three  vessels  which  could  be  called 
efficient  and  thirteen  which  were  worthless,  and 
while  there  was  a  willingness  and  effort  on  the 
part  of  the  Northern  senators  and  representa 
tives  to  add  to  the  force,  it  was  put  wholly  upon 
the  ground  of  the  suppression  of  the  slave  trade. 
Morse,  of  Maine,  the  chairman  of  the  Naval 


The  American  Navy  233 

Committee  in  the  House,  urged  that  the  increase 
should  take  the  form  of  a  purchase  of  small 
steamers  of  six  to  nine  feet  draught  for  African 
service.  There  appears  no  glimmering  in  the 
mind  of  any  one  of  the  speakers  of  the  coming  of 
a  great  war,  then  but  nine  months  distant,  and 
in  which  the  North  could  not  have  been  success 
ful  had  it  not  been  for  the  throttling  of  the 
blockade  and  the  occupancy  of  the  Mississippi/'* 
Besides  the  legislative  incapacity  just  men 
tioned,  and  the  equally  inept  legislation  which 
for  ten  years  or  more  had  quarrelled  over  carry 
ing  slavery  into  impossible  regions,  our  admin 
istrative  departments  were  absurdly  inefficient 
and,  in  the  case  of  the  War  Department,  cor 
rupt,  in  that  the  Secretary  of  War  had  steadily 
been  distributing  arms,  such  as  they  were,  in 
the  South.  Never  did  the  government  of  a 
great  country  go  to  war  under  such  conditions 
of  ineptitude  as  did  ours.  Buchanan's  effort 
to  reinforce  Fort  Sumter  had  come  to  grief 
through  the  folly  of  General  Scott,  who  had 
caused  the  change  from  the  heavily  armed  war- 
steamer,  Brooklyn,  lying  at  Fort  Monroe,  to  the 
merchant  steamer,  Star  of  the  West.  Had  the 

*Chadwick,  "The  Causes  of  the  Civil  War,"   American  Nation 
Series,  Vol.  XIX,  124, 125. 


234  The  American  Navy 

Brooklyn  gone,  as  was  intended,  the  Confederates 
would  not  have  dared  to  fire  upon  her.  Had 
they  done  so,  the  raw  militia  which  had  never 
before  fired  a  cannon  would  have  been  driven 
from  their  improvised  battery,  and  Charleston 
harbor  would  have  been  ours  permanently.  It 
was  the  same  when  Mr.  Lincoln  made  the  second 
effort  and  the  Powhatan  was  diverted  to  Pensa- 
cola  through  the  officiousness  of  the  Secretary 
of  State,  who  meddled  with  affairs  with  which 
he  had  nothing  to  do  and  caused  orders  to  be 
sent  to  the  Powhatan  without  the  knowledge  of 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

Our  officers  from  the  South  resigned  by  scores, 
and  our  Southern  navy  yards,  Norfolk  and 
Pensacola,  left  under  the  command  of  aged 
officers,  were  surrendered  with  enormous  loss, 
particularly  in  cannon,  many  hundreds  of  which 
thus  went  to  arm  the  Southern  batteries  on  the 
coast  and  more  particularly  on  the  Mississippi. 
The  following  ships  were  burned  and  scuttled 
at  Norfolk  on  April  20,  1861 :  the  Pennsylvania, 
120;  Columbus,  74;  Delaware,  74;  Raritan,  44; 
Columbia,  44;  Merrimac,  40;  Germantown,  20; 
Plymouth,  20,  and  Dolphin,  10.  All  but  the 
Merrimac  were  sailing  ships  and  thus,  with  this 
exception,  no  great  loss.  General  Scott,  weak- 


The  American  Navy  235 

ened  by  age,  was  still  commander-in-chief,  and 
failed  to  man  the  Southern  forts,  which,  prop 
erly,  should  have  been  done  in  the  first  days 
of  secession,  and  every  port  of  the  South  thus 
held  by  the  Federal  Government.  In  such  case 
there  could  have  been  no  war.  As  it  was,  a  few 
militia  marched  in  and  took  possession  against 
what  was  only,  in  most  cases,  a  sergeant-in 
ch  arge.  Never  was  any  government  so  thor 
oughly  inefficient,  and  it  was  the  inefficiency  of 
years  of  ineptitude,  not  of  a  day. 

But  the  South  occupied  every  fort  and  began 
war.  To  the  trained  strategist  the  action  to  be 
taken  so  far  as  the  navy  was  concerned  was 
simple:  to  blockade  every  port  and  to  occupy 
the  Mississippi.  The  former  would  cut  off  the 
importation  of  military  supplies,  in  which  the 
South  was  terribly  deficient;  the  latter  would  cut 
the  Confederacy  in  twain  and  isolate  the  great 
food  supply  of  her  armies.  The  former  of 
course  to  be  effective  was  a  matter  of  ships,  and 
it  took  time  to  supply  these;  the  latter  could 
and  should  have  been  done  at  once,  before  the 
defences  of  the  Mississippi  were  thoroughly  es 
tablished  and  organized  as  they  were  to  be. 

The  magnitude  of  the  work  of  blockade  is 
evident  in  the  fact  "that  there  were  185  harbor 


236  The  American  Navy 

and  river  openings  in  the  Confederate  coast 
line.  .  .  .  This  coastline  extended  from 
Alexandria,  Virginia,  to  the  Mexican  port  of 
Matamoros,  which  lies  forty  miles  up  the  Rio 
Grande.  The  Continental  line  so  measured  was 
3,549  miles  long/'*  Our  few  ships  were  scat 
tered  over  the  world.  There  were  but  three 
instantly  available.  During  the  war  these  were 
increased  to  600  by  building  and  by  purchasing 
everything  which  could  steam  and  carry  a  gun, 
down  to  ferry-boats.  We  improvised  a  great 
navy — of  a  kind.  It  could  not,  however,  until 
our  ironclad  fleet  of  turreted  vessels  were  built, 
have  stood  for  a  moment  before  a  great  regular 
force.  Fortunately,  foreign  complications  were 
avoided  and  we  had  to  do  with  a  government 
which  itself  had  to  improvise  such  vessels  as  it 
could  or  get  them  from  England  and  France, 
and  the  former  was  full  willing  until  she  came 
herself  to  the  verge  of  war  on  that  account. 
She  launched  the  Alabama  and  Shenandoah 
which,  though  officered  by  Southerners,  were 
manned  by  Englishmen,  and  built  blockade 
runners  by  the  hundreds,  which  kept  the  Con 
federacy  alive. 

By  great  good  fortune  the  Secretary  of  the 

*Spears,  "Farragut,"  159,  160. 


The  American  Navy  237 

Navy,  Gideon  Welles,  himself  a  civilian  of 
fine  mind  and  good  hard  sense,  though  with  no 
initiative  and  with  no  knowledge  of  war,  was 
supplemented  by  an  Assistant-Secretary,  Gus- 
tavus  V.  Fox,  a  former  officer  of  the  navy,  of 
strong  character  and  great  energy.  He  was  to 
become  practically  a  chief-of-staff.  There  had 
been  no  plan  of  operations,  no  laying  down  of  a 
broad  scheme  such  as,  had  there  been  any  real 
organization  of  the  services,  there  would  have 
been  by  a  general  staff.  Congress  has  resisted 
such  an  organization  in  the  navy  to  this  day. 
Even  the  Civil  War  has  not  been  able  to  teach 
it  the  wisdom  of  this.  Thus,  admits  Mr.  Welles 
himself,  "but  for  some  redeeming  successes  at 
Hatteras  and  Port  Royal  the  whole  belligerent 
operations  of  1861  would  have  been  pronounced 
weak  and  imbecile  failures." 

The  work  of  strengthening  the  blockade  was 
carried  on  with  great  energy.  By  building  and 
purchasing  every  available  steam  vessel  in  the 
country  which  could  carry  a  gun,  there  were 
by  December,  1864,  559  steam  vessels  in  the 
service,  carrying  3,760  guns  and  about  51,000 
men.  Fortunately  there  had  been  enough 
freedom  from  prejudice  to  accept  the  plans  of 
Ericsson  for  building  the  Monitor,  which  ap- 


238  The  American  Navy 

peared  in  the  very  nick  of  time,  to  save  our 
wooden  fleet  from  total  destruction  in  Hampton 
Roads  by  the  Virginia,  so  much  better  known 
under  her  original  name  of  the  Merrimac,  which 
had  been  one  of  the  frigates  so  ignominiously 
sunk  at  Norfolk  on  the  surrender  of  that  yard, 
raised,  and  with  immense  energy  converted  by 
the  Confederates  into  a  formidable  ironclad. 
The  story  of  the  Monitor's  battle,  on  March 
9,  1862,  under  Worden;  his  almost  fatal  wound 
ing;  and  the  continuance  of  the  fight  to  victory 
by  Dana  Greene,  her  young  first  lieutenant,  a 
mere  boy,  is  among  the  stories  which  will  last 
forever.* 

Hatteras  inlet  had  been  taken  and  occupied 
on  August  28,  1861;  Port  Royal  on  Novem 
ber  7th. 

There  was  one  man  at  least,  David  D.  Porter, 
yet  only  a  lieutenant  at  the  age  of  forty-nine, 
who,  when  blockading,  July,  1861,  the  passes  of 
the  river  in  the  Powhatan,  saw  the  importance 
and  feasibility  of  occupying  the  Mississippi. 
Porter,  north  again  in  November,  brought  the 
subject  before  the  Navy  Department,  and  urged 


*The  inventor  of  the  revolving  turret  was  Mr.  T.  R.  Timby, 
who  took  out  a  patent  in  1841  and  received  a  royalty  of  $5,000  for 
each  turret  built  by  Ericsson. 


The  American  Navy  239 

as  commander  of  the  expedition  his  adopted 
brother,  Farragut,  senior  to  Porter  in  age  by 
thirteen  years,  and  far  his  superior  in  rank. 

Farragut  had  left  Norfolk  declaring,  it  is 
reported,  at  a  meeting  of  Southern  naval  officers, 
some  of  whom  were  bound  to  him  by  his  mar 
riage  to  a  Norfolk  wife:  "Gentlemen,  I  would 
see  every  man  of  you  damned  before  I  would 
raise  my  arm  against  the  flag."*  The  expres 
sion  is  not  exactly  in  consonance  with  Farragut's 
calm  and  restrained  nature,  but  it  fits  so  well 
with  his  later  one  from  the  shrouds  of  the  Hart 
ford  in  Mobile  Bay,  that  it  may  be  taken  as 
true.  In  any  case,  Farragut  left  Norfolk  on 
April  1 8th,  with  his  wife  and  son,  Loyall.  He 
found  Baltimore,  on  his  arrival  there  in  the  Bay 
Line  steamer,  in  possession  of  the  mob  which  had 
attacked  the  Sixth  Massachusetts  Regiment 
passing  through  that  morning,  April  I9th.  He 
went  to  Hastings-on-the-Hudson  and  awaited 
orders. 

Every  Southern  officer  was  then  suspected, 
and  it  required  Porter's  utmost  powers  to  con 
vince  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  that  Farragut 
was  the  man  for  the  great  effort  which  was  to 
be  made.  On  Porter's  going  to  Hastings,  he 

*Spears,  152. 


240  The  American  Navy 

found  Farragut  thoroughly  in  accord  with  the 
plan  and  eager  for  the  work.  He  reached 
Washington  on  December  12,  1861,  and  on 
January  9,  1862,  was  appointed  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  West  Gulf  Blockading  Squadron, 
with  his  flag  in  the  Hartford,  a  sister  ship  to  the 
Brooklyn,  each  carrying  twenty-two  9-inch 
smooth-bore  guns  and  two  2O-pounder  rifles. 
It  is  far  from  the  least  of  Porter's  services  to 
his  country  that  he  should  have  been  the  in 
strument  of  this  selection. 

We  all  know  the  story  of  the  passage  of  the 
forts  by  the  fleet  (numbering  seventeen  ships, 
with  179  guns)  with  the  rising  of  the  moon,  early 
in  the  morning  of  April  24,  1862;  of  the  fire  rafts 
(one  of  which  set  the  Hartford  afire);  of  the  fight 
with  the  eleven  Confederate  steamers  (one  an 
ironclad  ram)  above  the  forts;  the  arrival  off 
New  Orleans.  Says  George  W.  Cable:  "I  went 
to  the  riverside;  there  far  into  the  night  I  saw 
hundreds  of  drays  carrying  cotton  out  of  the 
presses  and  yards  to  the  wharves,  where  it  was 
fired.  The  glare  of  these  sinuous  miles  of  flame 
set  men  and  women  weeping  and  wailing  thirty 
miles  away  on  the  farther  shore  of  Lake  Pont- 
chartrain.  But  the  next  day  was  a  day  of  terrors. 
.  .  .  The  firemen  were  out,  but  they  cast 


The  American  Navy  241 

fire  upon  the  waters,  putting  the  torch  to  the 
empty  ships  and  cutting  them  loose  to  float 
down  the  river.  Whoever  could  go  was  go 
ing.  .  .  .  My  employer  left  the  city.  I 
closed  the  doors  and  ran  to  the  river  to  see  the 
sights.  .  .  .  'Are  the  Yankee  ships  in 
sight?'  I  asked  an  idler.  He  pointed  to  the 
tops  of  their  naked  masts  as  they  showed  up 
across  the  huge  bend  of  the  river.  They  were 
engaging  the  batteries  at  Camp  Chalmette — 
the  old  field  of  Jackson's  renown.  Presently 
that  was  over.  Ah  me!  I  see  them  now  as 
they  came  slowly  round  Slaughter  House  Point 
into  full  view,  silent,  so  grim  and  terrible,  black 
with  men,  heavy  with  deadly  portent,  the  long- 
banished  Stars  and  Stripes  flying  against  the 
frowning  sky.  Oh,  for  the  Mississippi,  the  Mis 
sissippi  I  Just  then  she  came  down  upon  them. 
But  now  drifting  helplessly — a  mass  of  flames. 

"The  crowds  on  the  levee  howled  and 
screamed  with  rage.  The  swarming  decks  an 
swered  never  a  word;  but  one  old  tar  on  the  Hart- 
fordy  standing  with  a  lanyard  in  his  hand  beside 
a  great  pivot  gun,  so  plain  in  view  you  could  see 
him  smile,  silently  patted  its  big  black  breech 
and  blandly  grinned."* 

*Cable,  Century  Magazine,  April,  1885,  p.  922. 


242  The  American  Navy 

The  ships  anchored,  and  now  came  as  bold  an 
act  as  any  of  these  stirring  hours.  Captain 
Theodorus  Bailey,  Farragut's  flag  captain,  and 
Lieutenant  George  Perkins,  of  beloved  memory 
in  the  navy,  landed  and  calmly  walked  through 
a  howling  mob  crying  "  Hang  them !  hang  them !" 
to  the  city  hall  and  demanded  the  hauling  down 
of  the  state  flag  and  surrender  of  the  city. 

It  was  not  until  the  28th  that  everything  was 
settled  by  the  surrender  of  the  forts  to  Com 
mander  Porter,  who  had  remained  below  with 
his  mortar  flotilla,  which  had  done  such  good 
service.  Mention  should  be  made  of  the  very 
improper  action  of  the  British  ship  Mersey, 
which,  following  Farragut's  fleet  up  the  river, 
anchored  near  the  Hartford,  where  the  men 
aboard  sang  Confederate  songs  and  acted 
otherwise  in  a  way  so  offensive  that  Farragut 
was  obliged  to  call  the  English  captain's  at 
tention  to  their  conduct.  Farragut  should,  in 
fact,  have  ordered  the  ship  out  of  the  river. 

The  first  step  only  had  been  taken.  There 
were  yet  to  come  great  and  ever-memorable 
battles  before  Port  Hudson  and  Vicksburg; 
fights  with  ironclads,  and  expeditions  up  the 
rivers  by  squadrons  of  improvised  men-of-war 
under  Flag  Officers  Davis  and  Foote,  both  of 


The  American  Navy  243 

gallant  memory.  Finally  the  command  of  the 
navy,  extending  over  the  whole  of  the  vast  river 
system  of  which  the  Mississippi  was  the  main 
artery,  fell  gradually  to  Porter,  who  on  the  fall  of 
Vicksburg,  in  which  his  fleet  played  so  great  a 
part,  was  made  a  rear-admiral.  His  command 
was  now  extended  down  to  New  Orleans.  He 
had  over  150  vessels  under  his  flag,  and  on 
August  7,  1863,  he  was  able  to  write  from  New 
Orleans  that  the  "river  is  entirely  free  from 
guerrillas,  and  merchant  vessels  can  travel  it 
without  danger."  But  there  was  plenty  of 
fighting  yet  for  the  navy  in  the  affluents  of  the 
Mississippi,  and  the  Red  River  expedition  of 
March  12  to  May  16,  1864,  in  aid  of  General 
Banks's  ill-advised  campaign,  came  near  to 
causing  the  destruction  of  the  most  important 
part  of  Porter's  fleet  through  the  falling  of  the 
water.  The  building  of  the  famous  dam  by 
Colonel  Bailey  of  the  volunteers,  and  the  suc 
cessful  passage  thereby  of  the  fleet  into  deeper 
water,  is  one  of  the  great  dramatic  events  of  the 
war. 

While  such  things  were  happening  on  the 
western  rivers,  scores  of  actions  were  taking 
place  in  Atlantic  waters.  The  siege  of  Charles 
ton  was  a  continuous  operation  and  was  to 


244  The  American  Navy 

remain  such  to  the  end  of  the  war;  the  ironclad 
had  come  into  extended  use;  the  Confederate 
ironclad  Atlanta  had  been  captured  in  Wassaw 
Sound  in  Georgia  by  the  monitor  Weehawken, 
under  Captain  John  Rodgers.  There  were  in  all, 
during  the  year  1863)  145  engagements  by  the 
navy,  great  and  small. 

The  year  1864  was  to  bring  the  Civil  War 
well  toward  a  close.  The  blockade  had  become 
one  of  extreme  rigor;  the  region  west  of  the  Mis 
sissippi  had  been  entirely  cut  off,  and  the  whole 
South  was  now  reduced  to  a  poverty  of  arms, 
equipment,  food,  clothing,  and  medical  supplies, 
the  want  of  all  of  which  was  gradually  reducing 
its  armies  to  a  state  of  inanition.  Before  the 
end  of  the  war  every  port  had  been  closed, 
Wilmington,  in  North  Carolina,  being  the  last. 
Between  November,  1861,  and  March,  1864, 
eighty-four  different  steamers  were  running 
between  Nassau  and  Confederate  ports,  of 
which  thirty-seven  were  captured  and  twenty- 
four  wrecked  or  otherwise  destroyed.*  These 
vessels  were  built  in  Great  Britain  especially  for 
the  service,  were  laden  with  British  cargoes,  and 
used  the  British  Bahamas  and  Bermudas  as 

*Spears,  166. 


The  American  Navy  245 

ports  of  call  and  supply.  Nassau  bloomed  into 
one  of  the  greatest  and  most  active  ports  of  the 
world. 

In  addition  to  the  remarkable  episode  of  Red 
River  already  mentioned,  which  resulted  in 
saving  Porter's  fleet,  the  last  year  of  the  war  was 
to  include  some  of  its  most  important  and 
striking  events:  the  appearance  in  April  of  the 
powerful  ironclad  Albemarle;  her  career,  and  her 
final  destruction  by  a  torpedo  through  the  heroic 
bravery  of  Lieutenant  Gushing  on  the  night  of 
October  27-28;  the  fight  of  the  Kearsarge  and 
Alabama  on  June  I9th;  the  battle  of  Mobile  Bay 
on  August  5th;  the  appearance  of  the  ironclad 
Stonewall  and  the  bombardments  of  Fort  Fisher 
at  the  end  of  December  and  in  the  beginning  of 
the  new  year. 

The  destruction  of  the  Alabama  on  a  Sunday 
morning  off*  Cherbourg  brought  to  an  end  the 
career  of  a  ship  built  in  England  and  manned 
by  an  English  crew,  which  for  more  than  two 
years  had  sunk  or  burned  our  merchantmen. 
Her  captain  escaped  being  taken,  as  the  English 
yacht  Deerhound,  which  had  accompanied  the 
Alabama  out  of  the  harbor  to  the  point  seven 
miles  out  where  the  Kearsarge  awaited  her,  took 
him  aboard  before  he  could  be  reached  by  the 


246  The  American  Navy 

boats  from  the  Kearsarge.  That  this  aid,  if  it 
should  be  necessary,  was  prearranged,  is  shown 
by  the  statement  of  Winslow  of  the  Kearsarge, 
that  the  Deerhound  had  received  aboard  Captain 
Semmes's  valuables  the  night  before.  It  was  a 
notable  victory  and  went  far  to  set  aright  the 
British  mind,  so  susceptible  to  "success," 

Mobile,  which  so  soon  followed,  was  the 
crown  of  Farragut's  career,  and  fixes  his  place 
as  the  greatest  of  naval  commanders.  His  dar 
ing,  his  consummate  decision,  his  perfect  self- 
reliance  in  situations  such  as  never  before  fell  to 
an  admiral  to  face,  and  his  thorough  command  of 
such,  justify  every  praise.  And  in  character — 
simplicity,  kindliness,  and  uprightness,  and  in 
every  quality  which  we  are  apt  to  assign  to  the 
best  breeding  of  the  sea — he  was  among  the  very 
first.  Of  but  one  other,  so  far  as  I  have  known 
men,  can  so  much  be  said — Sampson  his  suc 
cessor  of  thirty-three  years  after. 

Farragut's  climbing  aloft  in  the  main  shrouds,, 
where  his  flag-lieutenant,  John  Crittenden 
Watson  (who  still  survives  him,  an  honored 
admiral),  lashed  him  to  prevent  his  falling;  his 
anger  with  the  slowing  of  the  Brooklyn  when  her 
captain  saw  the  monitor  Tecumseh  go  down 
before  him  from  the  explosion  of  a  mine;  Far- 


The  American  Navy  247 

ragut's  order,  shouted  from  aloft:  "Damn  the 
torpedoes.  Full  speed  ahead!";  the  more  than 
Sydney  an  courtesy  of  Tunis  Craven,  the  captain 
of  the  unfortunate  Tecumseh,  in  stepping  aside 
from  the  port  of  the  turret  and  saying  to  the 
pilot:  "After  you,  sir,"  and  going  down  with  his 
ship;  the  final  magnificent  grappling  of  the 
Hartford,  Monongahela,  and  Lackawanna  with 
the  ironclad  Tennessee,  make  a  story  which  it 
needs  a  poet  to  tell  and  which  should  be  en 
shrined  in  the  heart  of  every  lover  of  complete 
courage  and  genius  in  action,  and  in  no  man 
were  these  more  personified  than  in  Farragut. 
America  would  seem  to  have  lost  that  genius  for 
praise  in  poetry  of  her  heroes  and  heroic  actions 
which  has  remained  in  full  vigor  in  England, 
whose  poets  seem  to  rise  ever  to  the  occasion, 
even  if  at  times  soaring  somewhat  above  it. 
But  better  the  latter  than  none  at  all.  Still, 
whether  sung  or  not  (for  Brownell's  fine  poem 
was  but  a  taste  of  what  should  be),  Mobile  Bay 
remains  one  of  the  finest  dramas  ever  enacted 
upon  the  salt  flood  of  ocean. 

The  great  bombardments  of  Fort  Fisher  on 
December  24th,  25th,  and  27th,  and  again  on 
January  nth-i5th  by  the  fleet  of  fifty-eight  ships 
under  Admiral  Porter,  during  which  the  fort 


248  The  American  Navy 

was  assaulted  by  2,000  seamen  and  marines 
which,  though  unsuccessful  in  itself,  greatly 
assisted  that  of  the  army,  were  the  last  naval 
events  of  high  importance  of  the  war.  During 
this  bombardment,  in  which  the  most  powerful 
ships  of  the  navy  assisted,  16,682  projectiles 
were  fired,  weighing  1,652,638  pounds.  All  of 
the  nineteen  guns  on  the  sea  face  of  the  fort 
were  dismounted. 

On  April  9th  came  the  surrender  of  Lee  at 
Appomattox,  and  peace. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

THE  end  of  the  "Brothers'  War"  had  made  of 
the  United  States  a  nation.  Our  country  took 
its  place  in  the  world,  and  its  fleets  again  reached 
into  every  sea.  But  the  lessons  of  the  navy  had 
not  touched  the  dull  minds  which  in  June,  1860, 
had  voted  down  the  supplies  of  the  little  navy 
which  was  to  expand  so  greatly  in  the  four  suc 
ceeding  years.  To  such,  the  whole  work  of  de 
feating  the  Confederacy  appeared  to  be  the  more 
spectacular  work  of  the  army.  The  constric 
tion  of  the  blockade  was  not  of  the  dramatic 
character  of  Gettysburg  or  the  battles  of  the 
Wilderness.  Its  meaning  was  to  filter  but  slowly 
into  even  the  more  thoughtful.  Thus  for  years, 
while  immense  changes  were  going  on  else 
where,  we  were  at  a  standstill  in  naval  matters, 
or  rather  slowly  sinking  to  absolute  nonentity. 
By  1882  the  shameful  condition  of  neglect  began 
to  be  remedied.  That  year  may  be  taken  as 
the  birth-year  of  our  navy  of  to-day.  For  seven 
years  we  had  to  go  abroad  for  such  material— 
249 


250  The  American  Navy 

gun-forgings,  shafting,  and  armor — as  we  wanted, 
until  our  naval  demands  forced  upon  our  steel 
establishments  the  work  of  putting  themselves 
in  order.  The  story  of  this  work  has  never  been 
told,  but  the  country  can  be  assured  that  it  was 
to  the  navy  that  the  initial  great  development 
of  steel  manufacture  in  this  country  was  due. 
In  1882  we  could  make  only  a  forged  iron  shaft 
for  the  little  Dolphin,  which  promptly  broke  on 
her  trial  trip.  It  was  through  arrangements 
made  by  the  Navy  Department  that  our  steel 
works,  beginning  with  Bethlehem,  established 
modern  conditions. 

The  story  of  the  building  of  the  new  navy  is 
outside  the  scope  of  this  book.  It  suffices  to 
say  that  by  1898  we  had  in  service  four  battle 
ships,  the  Iowa,  Indiana,  Oregon,  and  Massachu 
setts,  of  the  first  class;  the  Texas,  of  the  second; 
two  armored  cruisers,  the  New  York  and  Brook 
lyn;  eleven  protected  cruisers  of  from  3,000  to 
7,735  tons,  and  twenty  unprotected  cruisers 
of  from  839  to  2,089  tons.  We  also  had  eight 
torpedo  boats,  a  dynamite  vessel,  the  Vesuvius, 
and  six  ships  of  the  monitor  type,  from  4,000 
to  6,060  tons.  It  was  with  this  fleet  we  fought 
the  war  with  Spain. 

The  causes  of  this  war  stretch  back  through 


The  American  Navy  251 

generations.  Their  foundation  was,  essentially, 
a  difference  in  race.  The  American  is  mainly 
an  Anglo-Saxon,  direct  and  practical  in  his 
way;  the  Spaniard  an  oriental,  courteous,  kindly 
in  the  relations  of  friendship  and  family,  with 
much  that  is  lovable,  but  impracticable,  tribal 
in  his  tendencies,  knowing  little  of  the  modern 
phases  of  government  by  a  constitution,  and 
bloodthirsty  and  devastating  in  putting  down 
revolt  or  in  settling  political  differences.  An 
anarchic  century  in  Spain  produced  like  con 
ditions  in  Cuba.  Our  proximity  to  Cuba  and 
our  many  commercial  interests  there  were  very 
strong  elements  in  the  situation. 

A  great  impetus  was  given  to  feeling  for  Cuba 
and'  against  Spain  by  the  explosion  of  the 
Maine  in  Havana  Harbor  about  9:30  p.  M., 
February  I5th.  Two  months,  however,  were 
yet  to  pass  before  war  was  declared,  though 
at  the  last  moment  Spain  had  acceded  to  all  our 
demands.  While  our  diplomacy  may  thus  be  said 
to  have  been  not  entirely  "correct,"  President 
McKinley  may  be  ruled  to  have  been  wise  in 
cutting  the  Gordian  knot  by  war,  which  his  mes 
sage  of  April  n,  1898,  practically  did  in  refer 
ring  the  whole  subject  to  Congress.  The  joint 
resolution  passed  and  signed  on  April  2Oth, 


252  The  American  Navy 

demanding  that  Spain  should  relinquish  her 
authority  in  Cuba,  was  of  course  taken  as  a 
declaration  of  war  by  Spain,  and  April  21  st  was 
declared  by  Congress  a  few  days  later  as  the 
official  date  of  its  beginning. 

On  the  afternoon  of  May  2 1st  Captain  Wil 
liam  T.  Sampson,  who  was  now  in  command  of 
the  North  Atlantic  station,  and  was  with  the 
flagship  New  York  off  the  reef  at  Key  West 
where  well-nigh  all  the  available  ships  in  the 
Atlantic  were  collected,  received  a  telegram 
announcing  his  assignment  to  the  command, 
with  the  rank  of  rear-admiral,  an  advancement 
only  possible  by  selection  by  the  President  in 
time  of  war.  This  was  the  first  indication  of 
actual  hostilities,  but  it  was  soon  followed  by 
another  ordering  to  blockade  immediately  the 
coast  of  Cuba  from  Cardenas  to  Bahia  Honda 
(a  little  west  of  Havana).  Gathering  during 
the  night  outside  the  reef  (distant  six  miles  from 
Key  West)  all  the  ships  ready  to  move,  the  fleet 
early  next  morning  was  on  its  way,  and  by  even 
ing  was  off  Havana,  the  searchlights  of  which 
were  sweeping  the  sea  in  expectancy  of  the 
American  fleet.  Powerfully  armed  as  were  its 
batteries,  they  were,  curiously  enough,  so  dis 
posed  that  they  were  open  to  attack  from  the 


The  American  Navy  253 

southwest,  with  little  possibility  of  return.  It 
was  Sampson's  eager  wish  to  make  this  attack 
at  once,  and  a  battle-order  had  been  drawn  in 
anticipation  of  war,  early  in  April,  but  the  Navy 
Department  in  a  letter  of  April  6th  set  its  face 
so  decidedly  against  the  attempt,  that  Sampson 
had  to  yield.  The  department  from  the  view 
of  the  necessity  of  preserving  the  fleet  to  meet 
Cervera  was  justified,  but  Sampson's  view,  as 
later  analysis  of  the  situation  showed,  was  cor 
rect.  Had  action  been  allowed,  Havana  would 
have  been  ours,  without  loss,  on  April  23  d. 

In  addition  to  Sampson's  command,  a  squad 
ron  made  up  of  the  Brooklyn,  Massachusetts,  and 
Texas  was  stationed  at  Hampton  Roads  under 
Commodore  Schley;  and  several  others,  among 
them  the  fast  Columbia  and  Minneapolis  and 
the  cruiser  San  Francisco,  were  kept  north  to 
meet  the  clamor  of  the  seacoast  in  general  for 
protection.  The  public  could  not  understand 
that  the  only  real  protection  was  concentration 
against,  and  the  destruction  of,  the  enemy's 
fleet. 

As  the  joint  resolution  of  Congress  of  April 
2Oth  declared  the  aim  of  the  United  States  to  be 
relinquishment  of  Spanish  authority  in  the  is 
land  of  Cuba,  our  main  sphere  of  action  was 


254  The  American  Navy 

naturally  the  Caribbean.  As  soon  as  Spain 
should  have  yielded  the  island,  the  war  would 
naturally  end  unless  Spain  should  choose  to  con 
tinue  it.  There  were  in  the  island,  by  official 
statement,  159,297  regular  troops  and  119,160 
volunteers.  The  American  regular  army,  dis 
tributed  from  Maine  to  Alaska,  was  but  28,183. 
Of  course  it  was  necessary  to  call  for  a  large 
number  of  volunteers. 

To  preserve  Cuba  it  was  necessary  for  Spain 
to  preserve  communication  with  the  island. 
This  could  be  done  only  by  obtaining  and  keep 
ing  command  of  the  Atlantic.  To  do  this  she 
had  an  effective  force  of  only  four  armored 
cruisers:  the  Infanta  Maria  Teresa,  Almirante 
Oquendo,  Fizcaya  (Biscay),  and  Cristobal  Colon, 
each  of  about  7,000  tons.  A  battleship,  the 
PelayOy  and  a  large  armored  cruiser,  the  Carlos 
V,  were  not  yet  ready  for  service.  This  was  of 
course  a  hopeless  disparity  of  fighting  force  as 
compared  with  Admiral  Sampson's  fleet  of  five 
powerful  battleships  and  two  armored  cruisers. 
Admiral  Cervera,  who  had  been  placed  in  com 
mand  of  the  Spanish  squadron,  saw  this  clearly 
and  protested,  without  avail,  against  sending  it 
across  the  Atlantic.  On  April  29,  1898,  he 
left  the  Cape  Verde  Islands  with  the  four  ar- 


The  American  Navy  255 

mored  cruisers  first  mentioned  and  with  three 
torpedo-boat  destroyers,  with  orders  to  go  to 
San  Juan,  Puerto  Rico. 

Commodore  George  Dewey,  commanding  our 
naval  forces  in  Asia,  had,  under  the  orders  of  the 
department,  collected  his  whole  force  at  Hong 
Kong  in  anticipation  of  the  war,  and  had  made 
ready  for  the  eventuality.  The  Baltimore,  a 
large  cruiser  for  the  period,  had  fortunately 
reached  him  in  time  with  a  precious  supply  of 
extra  ammunition.  The  British  Declaration  of 
Neutrality  had  obliged  him  to  withdraw  on 
April  24th  his  force  consisting  of  the  Olympia, 
Baltimore,  Boston,  Raleigh,  Concord,  Petrel,  and 
the  revenue  cutter  McCulloch,  from  Hong  Kong 
to  Mirs  Bay,  thirty  miles  away  on  the  China 
coast.  Here,  on  April  26th,  he  received  a  tele 
gram  informing  him  officially  of  the  declaration 
of  war  and  adding:  "Commence  operations  at 
once,  particularly  against  the  Spanish  fleet. 
You  must  capture  vessels  or  destroy.  Use  ut 
most  endeavors."  The  last  three  words  were 
certainly  unnecessary.  He  left  as  soon  as  possi 
ble,  this  being  the  afternoon  of  May  27th.  It 
was  620  miles  to  Manila. 

It  must  be  confessed  that  the  outlook  for  the 


256  The  American  Navy 

Spanish  at  Manila  was  not  cheerful.  They  had 
but  two  vessels  of  any  considerable  size,  the 
Reina  Cristina  and  the  Castillo,,  of  3,100  and 
3,300  tons,  and  the  latter,  which  had  been  in  use 
as  a  receiving  ship,  had  no  motive  power.  In 
addition  there  were  available  two  small  cruisers 
of  1,152  tons,  two  of  1,040,  and  a  gunboat  of 
500.  Three  other  small  vessels,  one  the  Felasco, 
of  1,139  tons,  were  under  repairs,  with  some  of 
their  guns  in  the  batteries  at  the  entrance  of  the 
bay,  twenty-five  miles  away.  Dewey  had  the 
Olympia,  of  5,870  tons;  Baltimore,  4,413; 
Raleigh,  3,183;  Boston,  3,000;  Concord,  1,710; 
and  Petrel,  892.  The  guns,  besides  a  number  of 
3  and  6  pounders,  were: 

AMERICAN  SPANISH 

Ten  8-inch        Seven        6 . 3-inch 

Twenty-three  6-inch        Four          5 . 9-inch 
Twenty  5-inch       Twenty     4. 7-inch 

Eleven      3  . 4-inch 
2 . 24-inch 

The  complements  of  the  two  squadrons  were: 
American,  1,707  men;  Spanish,  1,664. 

It  was  a  ten-mile  stretch  across  the  entrance 
to  the  bay,  divided  into  two  deep  channels  by 
islands  upon  which  had  been  hastily  established 


The  American  Navy  257 

batteries  mounted  with  seventeen  guns  varying 
in  calibre  from  7  to  4.3  inch;  nine  of  these  were 
muzzle-loaders  and  thus  could  not  be  fired 
nearly  so  rapidly  as  the  4.3-inch,  which  were 
quick-firers.  At  Manila  were  mounted  226 
guns  of  all  kinds,  most  of  which  were  inefficient; 
but  there  were  twelve  good  breech-loaders  of 
from  945-inch  to  4.7-inch,  with  much  less  range, 
however,  than  the  modern  8-inch  carried  by  the 
Olympia.  The  Manila  defences,  however,  were 
such  that  it  would  have  been  much  wiser  for 
Montojo  to  have  anchored  close  as  possible  to 
the  fortifications  and  thus  obtain  such  support 
as  was  available.  As  it  was,  he  was  out  of  their 
protection,  supported  by  only  eight  guns,  mostly 
ineffective  weapons,  in  battery  at  Sangley  Point 
and  Cavite;  three  of  these,  two  6.3-inch  and  one 
4. 7-inch,  were  of  value. 

Dewey  was  off  Subig  Bay  on  Saturday,  April 
3Oth.  After  examining  the  bay  for  the  Spanish 
ships  he  stood  for  Manila,  fifty-seven  miles 
away.  At  midnight  he  passed  the  rock  El 
Fraile  in  Boca  Grande,  the  battery  on  which 
fired  upon  the  squadron,  which  answered  with  a 
few  shots.  At  five  o'clock  the  squadron  was 
near  the  mouth  of  the  river,  on  both  sides  of 
which  Manila  is  built,  when  the  Spanish  squad- 


258  The  American  Navy 

ron  was  sighted  at  anchor  off  Cavite,  six  miles 
to  the  southward,  and  our  ships  at  once  turned 
in  that  direction.  Fire  was  opened  at  5:41 
by  the  Olympia.  The  American  squadron  stood 
down  slowly  to  the  westward,  turned  and  turned 
again,  passing  thus  five  times  before  the  anch 
ored  Spanish  ships,  thrice  to  the  west,  twice 
to  the  east.  After  an  action  of  two  hours,  on  a 
report  of  shortness  of  ammunition  (which  proved 
incorrect)  the  squadron  hauled  ofF  for  a  count 
of  its  supply  and  to  give  the  men  breakfast,  the 
captains  being  called  aboard  to  report  damages. 
None  of  these  were  serious,  and  no  men  had 
been  killed,  though  several  were  wounded. 
During  this  time  the  Spanish  squadron  was  seen 
to  be  in  flames,  and  the  American  squadron 
then  stood  in  and  completed  its  work.  The 
victory  was  complete.  The  Americans  had 
fired  in  all  5,859  shots,  1,414  of  which  were  5, 
6,  and  8  inch;  there  remained  2,861  of  the 
heavier  shell  and  over  30,000  of  the  6,  3,  and  i 
pounders. 

The  result  of  the  action  depended  upon  gun 
nery  efficiency,  as  there  was  no  ship  on  either 
side  which  was  not  thoroughly  vulnerable  to 
the  guns  used.  And  though  our  gunnery  was 
(as  also  at  Santiago)  far  below  the  present  high 


The  American  Navy  259 

standard,  the  result  was  positive  proof  of  great 
superiority  to  that  of  the  Spanish. 

The  Americans  had  two  officers  and  six  men 
wounded  in  the  Baltimore.  Otherwise  they 
were  scathless.  The  Spanish  loss,  as  reckoned 
by  "painstaking  inquiry"  by  an  American  offi 
cer,  was  167  killed  and  214  wounded.  Admiral 
Montojo's  own  statement,  which  puts  his 
whole  force  at  but  1,134,  was  75  killed  and 
281  wounded. 

Dewey  cut  and  buoyed  the  cable  on  May  2d, 
took  position  in  the  bay,  and  awaited  the  com 
ing  of  troops  which  were  soon  to  be  on  their 
way.  He  sent  the  revenue  cutter  McCulloch, 
which  had  taken  no  part  in  the  action,  to  tele 
graph  his  victory  home.  Before  he  had  cut  the 
cable,  however,  the  news  had  been  telegraphed 
to  Madrid,  and  it  was  thence  received  on  May 
2d  with  great  enthusiasm  in  the  United  States. 
On  May  loth  Dewey  received  the  thanks  of 
Congress  and  was  raised  to  the  rank  of  Admiral 
of  the  Navy. 

While  the  victory  was  to  have  great  results  in 
determining  our  attitude  toward  the  Philip 
pines,  it  could  in  no  sense  determine  the  result 
of  the  war;  this  could  only  be  attained  by  the 
destruction  of  one  or  the  other  battle  fleets 


260  The  American  Navy 

now  in  the  Atlantic.  The  event,  however,  put 
a  very  different  complexion  upon  the  attitude 
of  Europe.  There  was  to  be  no  further  Euro 
pean  talk  of  putting  limitations  upon  our  con 
duct  of  the  struggle. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

NAVAL  action  now  shifts  almost  entirely  to 
the  Caribbean.  Until  in  the  last  days  of  the 
war  there  was  to  be  in  the  Pacific  no  further 
special  naval  movement  beyond  the  seizure 
of  Guam  by  the  Charleston  on  June  nth  and 
the  sending  to  Manila  the  monitors  Monterey 
and  Monadnock  to  reinforce  Dewey.  The  first 
of  the  army  sailed  from  San  Francisco  on  May 
28th. 

The  departure  of  Cervera  from  the  Cape 
Verdes  caused  Admiral  Sampson  to  move  from 
Havana  east  970  miles  to  San  Juan,  Puerto 
Rico,  with  the  expectancy  of  finding  there  the 
Spanish  fleet.  This  move  was  based  upon  the 
view  that  as  it  was  but  from  1,200  to  1,400  miles 
from  San  Juan  to  important  points  on  our  coast, 
it  was  an  absolute  necessity  to  make  sure  that 
if  the  Spanish  squadron  arrived  there  it  should 
not  be  allowed  to  leave  and  be  free  to  raid  our 
seaboard.  Sampson's  prescience  was  right. 
Cervera's  orders  were  to  go  there  and  then  do  as 

261 


262  The  American  Navy 

he  thought  best.  Had  he  not  himself  been  so 
slow  in  crossing  the  Atlantic,  Sampson  would 
have  found  him  at  San  Juan,  and  the  Spanish 
fleet  would  have  been  destroyed  on  May  I2th 
instead  of  July  3d. 

Continuous  breakdowns  of  the  two  monitors 
accompanying  Sampson  caused  such  delay  that 
his  squadron  was  not  off  San  Juan  until  May 
1 2th.  An  attack  on  the  fortifications  began  at 
5  A.M.,  and  continued  for  three  hours,  when 
Sampson  withdrew  with  no  damage  to  the  ships 
and  with  the  loss  of  one  man  killed  and  four 
wounded  aboard  the  New  York.  As  Cervera 
was  clearly  not  in  port,  and  as  it  was  necessary 
not  to  risk  overmuch  the  American  ships  before 
he  could  be  met,  it  was  thought  inadvisable 
to  continue  the  action,  though  as  known  later 
the  place  was  ready  to  surrender  to  another 
attack.  As  Cervera  was  much  overdue  and 
no  word  had  as  yet  been  received  of  his  where 
abouts,  the  American  squadron  stood  west  (with 
a  view  to  covering  Havana),  sending  into  St. 
Thomas,  only  sixty  miles  to  the  east,  for  news. 

It  was  not  until  in  the  early  morning  of  May 
1 5th,  off  Puerto  Plata,  that  word  came  of  Cer- 
vera's  having  reached  Curacao.  At  the  same 
time  a  dispatch  from  Washington  was  received 


The  American  Navy  263 

by  Sampson  informing  him  that  the  Flying 
Squadron  was  en  route  to  Key  West  and  direct 
ing  Sampson  himself  to  proceed  there  with  all 
possible  dispatch. 

Cervera  had  arrived  off  Martinique  on  the 
evening  of  May  I  ith  and  had  sent  in  a  destroyer 
for  news,  which  brought  next  morning  the  word 
of  Sampson's  being  off  Puerto  Rico.  Unable 
now  to  go  to  San  Juan  without  meeting  the 
American  fleet,  a  council  of  war  was  called,  and 
on  its  decision  Cervera  shaped  his  course  for 
Curacao  in  search  of  coal,  leaving  the  destroyer 
Terror,  whose  boilers  had  given  out,  at  Marti 
nique.  Leaving  Curacao  in  the  evening  of  May 
1 5th,  he  entered  the  harbor  of  Santiago  de  Cuba 
at  dawn  on  May  I9th. 

Sampson  was  now,  as  mentioned,  standing  at 
full  speed  for  Key  West.  It  is  very  remarkable 
that  he  had  the  same  instinct  as  to  Cervera's 
second  destination  as  to  his  first;  as  in  a  tele 
gram  to  the  scout  Harvard  (the  New  York  of  the 
American  line  of  steamers)  he  mentioned  Santi 
ago  or  San  Juan  as  the  ports  likely  to  be  entered. 
The  peremptory  orders  from  Washington  left  no 
freedom  of  action,  however,  and  on  May  i8th 
Key  West  was  reached.  There  were  found  the 


264  The  American  Navy 

ships  of  the  Flying  Squadron,  the  Brooklyn, 
Massachusetts,  and  Texas,  just  arrived  from 
Hampton  Roads  and  coaling. 

On  May  nth,  the  day  before  Sampson's  at 
tack  at  San  Juan,  there  were  two  affairs  of  great 
gallantry:  the  one  the  cable-cutting  at  Cien- 
fuegos;  the  other  an  action  at  Cardenas.  The 
former  was  carried  out  by  two  sailing  launches 
for  lifting  and  cutting  the  cables  and  two  steam 
launches  carrying  marines  to  "stand  off"  the 
Spaniards.  The  Marblehead  and  Nashville  kept 
up  a  fire  against  the  forces  entrenched  on  the 
edge  of  the  low  bluff  which  finally  had  to  be 
approached  within  150  feet  before  the  work  was 
accomplished.  Grappling  for  the  cables  was 
long  and  tedious,  and  the  operation  of  sawing 
through  each  took  nearly  half  an  hour.  To  per 
form  such  work  under  a  constant  fire  from  the 
Spaniards  in  trenches  not  more  than  200  yards 
away  showed  a  cool  courage  of  which  Americans 
can  be  proud.  The  boats  were  back  to  their 
ships  in  a  little  over  three  hours,  with  two  killed 
and  seven  wounded,  one  of  the  latter  being 
Lieutenant  Winslow  in  command. 

The  action  on  the  same  day  at  Cardenas  on 
the  north  side  of  Cuba,  but  seventy-five  miles 
from  Cienfuegos  by  land,  but  500  by  sea,  was 


The  American  Navy  265 

between  the  Wilmington,  the  Machias,  the 
revenue  cutter  Hudson,  and  the  torpedo  boat 
Winslow  against  three  Spanish  gunboats  which 
lay  well  within  the  harbor  in  water  which  could 
not  be  entered  by  our  heavier  draft  vessels. 
"The  torpedo  boat,  which  of  course  was  never 
intended  for  such  service,  ventured  in  too  far 
and  was  severely  handled.  Ensign  Bagley 
and  four  of  the  men  were  killed,  and  three, 
one  being  Lieutenant  Bernadou  in  command, 
were  wounded.  The  Winslow,  wholly  disabled, 
was  towed  out  of  her  dangerous  position  by  the 
intrepid  handling  of  the  Hudson. 

We  return  to  Key  West,  where  all  was  move 
ment  to  take  measures  to  intercept  Cervera. 

The  Navy  Department  had  become  convinced 
from  information  received  that  Cervera  had 
imperative  orders  to  go  either  to  Cienfuegos  or 
Havana  to  land  material  necessary  for  the  de 
fence  of  Havana,  and  urged  the  utmost  dispatch 
in  blockading  both  ports.  Thus  next  morning, 
May  I9th,  Commodore  Schley  sailed  with  the 
three  ships  of  his  squadron  mentioned,  to  be 
followed  next  day  by  the  Iowa,  our  newest  bat 
tleship  of  the  time,  and  which  reached  Cienfue 
gos  only  seven  hours  after  Commodore  Schley. 
There  followed  the  torpedo  boat  Dupont,  the 


266  The  American  Navy 

collier  Merrimac,  the  cruisers  Marblehead,  Cas- 
tine,  and  two  auxiliary  vessels;  an  ample  force, 
should  Cervera  be  met. 

Events  were  now  following  one  another  with 
the  utmost  rapidity.  To  deal  with  these  in 
detail  is  quite  beyond  our  scope.  One  must  look 
to  the  larger  histories  of  the  war  for  the  full 
account  of  the  happenings  of  this  stirring  time.* 
One  can  give  here  but  a  running  mention  of  the 
reception  on  the  late  afternoon  of  May  I9th  of 
the  news  by  the  way  of  Havana  of  Cervera's 
arrival  that  morning  at  Santiago  de  Cuba;  the 
repetition  of  this  news  with  an  expression  of 
doubt  in  the  telegram  from  Washington  to 
Sampson  during  that  night;  its  verification  next 
day,  the  2Oth;  the  dispatch  of  the  news  to  Schley 
with  orders,  if  convinced  that  Cervera  was  not 
in  Cienfuegos  Bay,f  to  go  to  Santiago  and 
blockade;  Sampson's  movement  300  miles  east 
with  the  rest  of  the  fleet  available  into  the  nar 
row  waters  of  Nicholas  Channel,  to  intercept 
Cervera  should  he  leave  Santiago  and  attempt 
to  reach  Havana;  the  delay  of  Schley  at  Cien- 

*See  Long,  "Our  New  Navy,"  Chadwick,  "Relations  of  the 
United  States  and  Spain,"  I,  "Diplomacy,"  II  and  III.  "The 
Spanish  War." 

fBy  standing  close  in  and  going  aloft,  the  usual  anchorage  in 
the  bay  is  visible.  (Commander  Dayton's  report,  "Report  of 
Bureau  of  Navigation,"  1898,  219.) 


The  American  Navy  267 

fuegos,  not  being  satisfied  that  Cervera  was  not 
there;  the  final  assurance  that  Cervera  was  not 
at  Cienfuegos  received  from  insurgents  on  May 
24th,  and  the  departure  that  evening  of  Com 
modore  Schley's  squadron  for  Santiago;  his 
arrival  twenty-two  miles  south  of  the  entrance 
on  May  26th;  Cervera's  intention  (but  given 
up  through  vacillation)  to  leave  Santiago  that 
evening  at  almost  the  same  moment  when 
Schley  started  with  intention  to  return  to  Key 
West  on  the  plea  of  inability  to  coal  his 
ships;  his  change  of  mind  on  May  28th  and 
arrival  that  evening  off  Santiago;  the  arrival  of 
the  Oregon  at  Key  West  on  May  26th,  complet 
ing  her  remarkable  journey  of  14,000  miles  from 
the  west  coast;  Sampson's  finally  determining 
to  go  to  Santiago  on  account  of  Schley's  dispatch 
that  he  could  not  blockade  for  want  of  coal;  the 
recognition  of  the  Colon  in  the  harbor  entrance 
on  May  29th;  the  ineffectual  attack  on  the 
Colon  on  May  3Oth;  the  arrival  of  Sampson  on 
June  1st  with  the  New  York,  Oregon,  Mayflower, 
and  torpedo  boat  Porter;  the  establishment  of  a 
close  blockade;  the  sinking  of  the  Merrimac  in 
the  entrance  channel;  the  stationing  every 
evening  of  a  battleship  with  searchlights  upon 
the  harbor  entrance;  the  occupancy  of  Quanta- 


268  The  American  Navy 

namo  Bay;  the  driving  off,  by  the  battalion  of 
marines  established  there  in  camp,  of  the  Span 
ish  troops  in  the  vicinity;  the  frequent  bom 
bardment  of  the  Spanish  batteries  at  Santiago 
entrance;  the  arrival  on  June  2Oth  of  the  army 
under  General  Shafter;  its  debarkation  and 
movement  against  Santiago;  the  attack  of  July 
1st  on  El  Caney  and  San  Juan  Hill;  the  sortie 
of  Cervera's  squadron;  its  destruction:  these 
are  but  the  chief  events  of  the  many  which  hap 
pened  between  May  i8th  and  July  3d.  On  the 
forenoon  of  Sunday,  this  latter  date,  was  decided 
the  fate  of  Spain  in  America. 

More  than  half  the  crews  of  the  Spanish  ships 
had  been  used  ashore  on  July  ist  in  the  defence 
of  Santiago,  and  the  commander  of  these,  Cap 
tain  Bustamante,  Cervera's  chief-of-staff,  had, 
to  the  great  grief  of  all  who  knew  him  both  in 
the  Spanish  and  American  services,  been  mor 
tally  wounded.  Cervera  had,  after  the  battle 
of  July  ist,  received  orders  to  leave  the  harbor 
and  endeavor  to  save  his  squadron.  He  and  his 
captains  accepted  the  situation  with  calm  cour 
age  and  prepared  to  leave  the  evening  of  July 
2d.  The  slow  work  of  returning  the  crews 
aboard  ship  caused  delay  until  the  next  morning. 

At  9:30  the  crews  of  the  American  ships  were 


The  American  Navy  269 

just  falling  in  for  the  usual  Sunday  "inspec 
tion."  The  admiral  had  started  a  little  before 
nine  in  the  New  York  under  easy  steam  to  ar 
range  with  General  Shafter  a  plan  of  combined 
attack.  The  New  York  had  gone  about  five 
miles  when  a  shot  was  heard  from  the  battery 
at  the  entrance  and  a  ship  almost  immediately 
after  seen  coming  out.  The  New  York  at  once 
turned. 

In  accord  with  the  admiral's  standing  order, 
all  the  ships  immediately  started  to  close  in 
on  the  entrance.  The  flagship  Infanta  Maria 
Teresa,  which  was  the  ship  first  sighted,  was 
naturally  exposed  for  some  little  time  to  the 
fire  of  all,  and  was  quickly  a  mass  of  flames  and 
heading  in  for  the  land.  She  was  run  ashore 
about  six  miles  west  of  the  harbor  entrance; 
the  Oquendo,  though  she  was  the  last  of  the 
large  ships  to  come  out,  was  beached,  also  burn 
ing,  soon  after  the  Maria  Teresa,  about  a  quarter 
of  a  mile  west  of  the  latter;  the  Fizcaya,  afire, 
went  on  to  the  reef  fifteen  miles  west  of  San 
tiago  about  1 1 130,  shortly  after  which  her  for 
ward  magazine  exploded.  The  destroyer  Furor 
had  been  sunk,  and  the  Pluton  was  ashore 
destroyed,  having  made  only  three  miles  to  the 
west.  The  Colon  only  was  left,  in  full  flight 


270  The  American  Navy 

and  practically  uninjured,  pursued  by  the  Ore 
gon,  Brooklyn,  New  York,  and  Texas.  At  1:15 
she  turned  ashore,  the  1 3-inch  shell  of  the  Ore 
gon,  fired  at  9,000  yards,  going  over  her.  Her 
sea-valves  had  been  opened,  and  though  she 
was  pushed  on  to  the  beach  stern  foremost  by  the 
New  York,  her  bow  overhung  into  deep  water 
and  as  she  filled  she  turned  on  her  side.  She  was 
never  raised.  The  heroic  efforts  of  the  Amer 
ican  crews  in  saving  life  from  the  burning  ships 
are  deserving  every  praise. 

The  Spanish  loss  may  be  taken  as  about  264 
killed  and  drowned  and  151  wounded;  the 
prisoners,  including  officers,  numbered  1,813. 
The  Americans  lost  i  killed,  i  wounded,  both 
in  the  Brooklyn. 

The  Spanish  could  not  have  expected  to  es 
cape,  nor  did  they.  They  went  to  their  death 
like  heroes.  There  has  been  nothing  finer  than 
the  calm  bravery  of  their  exit  from  the  narrow 
harbor  entrance  without  accident  or  delay  on 
the  part  of  any  ship.  We  had  against  them  six 
heavy  ships  to  four;  fourteen  1 2-inch  and  13- 
inch  guns  against  six  n-inch;  thirty  8-inch 
against  none  of  that  calibre;  forty-four  6,  5,  and 
4  inch  against  thirty-six  5.5  and  4.7  inch,  and 
ninety-six  6-pounders  against  thirty-eight  Span- 


The  American  Navy  271 

ish.  We  had  a  like  superiority  in  armor.  In 
one  point,  speed,  the  Spanish  were,  nominally 
at  least,  decidedly  superior,  all  their  ships 
being  of  twenty  knots.  Only  two  of  the 
Americans:  the  New  York  and  Brooklyn,  had 
such. 

There  remained  now  only  the  question  of 
reducing  the  city  of  Santiago,  in  which  the  navy 
took  an  active  part  in  bombardment  of  the  city 
from  the  sea.  On  July  iyth  it  surrendered. 

The  success  of  the  navy  at  Santiago  was  due 
to  the  circular  blockade  instituted  by  Admiral 
Sampson  on  his  arrival,  and  to  the  lighting  up 
the  harbor  entrance  nightly  with  the  search 
lights  of  the  battleships,  which  were  relieved 
every  two  hours.  Escape  at  night  was  thus,  by 
Cervera's  own  report,  made  impossible.  The 
circular  form  of  Sampson's  blockade  during  the 
day  and  night  left  no  such  chance  of  finding  an 
extensive  unguarded  space,  such  as  existed  in 
steaming  in  column  to  and  fro  across  the  en 
trance.  The  whole  is  summed  up  in  the  report 
of  Captain  (now  Rear-Admiral)  Clark  of  the 
Oregon  to  Admiral  Sampson:  "We  went  ahead 
at  full  speed  with  the  determination  of  carrying 
out  to  the  utmost  your  order:  'If  the  enemy 
tries  to  escape,  the  ships  must  close  and  engage 


272  The  American  Navy 

as  soon  as  possible  and  endeavor  to  sink  his  ves 
sels  or  force  them  to  run  ashore/ 


With  their  only  battle  fleet  destroyed,  the 
preservation  by  the  Spanish  of  communication 
with  Cuba  was  now  impossible  and  the  fall  of 
the  island  certain.  Thus  an  expedition  under 
the  command  of  Admiral  Camara  left  Cadiz  on 
June  1 7th  for  the  Philippines.  It  reached  Port 
Said  on  June  25th.  A  strong  force  was  detailed 
from  Admiral  Sampson's  fleet  to  go  to  the  Phil 
ippines  under  Commodore  Watson,  to  be  ac 
companied  through  the  Mediterranean  by  the 
rest  of  the  available  ships  of  the  fleet  under 
Sampson  himself.  The  news  of  the  jd  of  July, 
and  also  of  the  preparation  of  this  fleet,  caused 
Spain  to  recall  Camara's  force  before  it  had  left 
the  vicinity  of  Suez.  Meanwhile  a  large  num 
ber  of  ships  had  taken  a  prominent  part  in  the 
convoying  of  part  of  General  Miles's  force  to 
Puerto  Rico  and  in  the  seizure  of  the  south 
coast  of  that  island. 

Spain,  with  full  recognition  of  the  meaning  of 
ler  loss,  opened  negotiations  for  peace,  and  on 
1  August  12,  1898,  the  protocol  was  signed  by 
which  she  relinquished  all  sovereignty  over 
ceded  to  the  United  States  Puerto  Rico 


The  American  Navy  273 

and  an  island  in  the  Ladrones  to  be  selected, 
and  agreed  to  our  occupancy  of  the  city  of 
Manila  pending  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of 
peace  which  would  determine  the  future  of  the 
i  Philippines. 

~"~At  the  moment  of  the  signing  of  the  protocol 
our  fleet  and  troops  were  preparing  for  the  as 
sault  at  Manila.  By  noon  the  city  had  sur 
rendered  and  was  in  our  possession.  The  date 
at  Manila,  owing  to  difference  in  time,  was 
August  i  jth.  Thus  there  were  but  a  few  hours 
between  the  surrender  and  the  signing,  but  the 
latter  had  preceded  the  surrender  and  Manila 
could  not  be  claimed  as  ours  by  right  of  con 
quest.  Although  the  claim  was  put  forward,  it 
was  soon  withdrawn,  and  we  now  possess  the 
archipelago  by  right  of  purchase,  though  indeed 
it  must  be  said  that  the  sale  by  Spain  was  an 
enforced  one.  The  war  thus  ended  with  Puerto 
Rico  and  Guam  as  possessions  by  conquest, 
with  the  Hawaiian  Islands  a  United  States 
territory  by  annexation,  with  Cuba  a  protec 
torate,  and  the  Philippines  a  purchased  posses 
sion.  We  had  gone  far  afield  and  had  incurred 
heavy  responsibilities  which  stretched  eight 
thousand  miles  westward  from  California,  and 
had  taken  up  a  naval  base  adjacent  to  what  is 


274  The  American  Navy 

sure  to  be  one  of  the  great  fields  of  future  world 
action — Eastern  Asia. 

It  is  difficult  to  leave  the  subject  of  the  Phil 
ippines  without  a  word  as  to  the  continuation 
of  naval  action  among  the  islands  and  the  share 
taken  by  the  navy  in  the  release  of  Spaniards 
held  by  the  natives,  in  frequent  punitive  ex 
peditions,  and  in  the  general  pacification  of  the 
region.  For  several  years  our  ships  were  active 
equally  with  the  army  in  this  work.  In  Febru 
ary,  1899,  the  important  point  of  Ilo-Ilo  was 
bombarded  and  captured  by  the  small  cruiser 
Petrel.  Constant  work  of  patrol  and  block 
ade  was  carried  out,  not  always  without  loss. 
Throughout  there  was  active  cooperation  with 
the  army  in  transporting  troops  and  in  attack 
and  defence,  with  for  some  years  separate  ex 
peditions  by  the  marines  of  great  hardship  and 
courage. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

THE  losses  of  the  navy  in  the  war  with  Spain 
were  extraordinarily  small.  There  were  but 
sixteen  killed  and  sixty-eight  wounded,  of 
whom  two  died  later.  But  even  more  remark 
able,  and  it  reflects  the  highest  praise  upon  the 
service,  was  the  state  of  health  of  the  26,102 
men  during  this  war  of  114  days  (April  2ist  to 
August  1 2th,  inclusive).  There  were  but  fifty- 
six  deaths  in  this  period  from  disease,  or  at  the 
rate  of  6.85  per  thousand  a  year.  There  were 
but  thirteen  cases  of  typhoid  fever,  and  no  death 
aboard  ship  from  this  disease  and  but  one  in 
hospital.  There  were  but  eighteen  cases  of 
dysentery.  The  marine  battalion  at  Guanta- 
namo  numbered  588 — 21  officers  and  567  men. 
There  was  no  death  from  disease;  only  nineteen 
cases  of  malaria  and  no  typhoid. 

The  whole  was  a  very  remarkable  showing; 
one  never  equalled  elsewhere.     And  it  should  be 
remembered  that  it  was  in  a  climate,  and  in 
deed  very  largely  in  the  same  region,  where,  a 
275 


276  The  American  Navy 

century  and  a  half  before,  the  crews  of  some 
British  ships  were  so  swept  by  disease  that  they 
had  in  some  cases  to  be  renewed  three  times  in 
but  a  moderate  period  of  service.  The  health 
conditions  of  the  American  fleet  showed  an  en 
lightened  care  which  reflects  honor  upon  all 
concerned. 

The  situation  left  us  by  the  Spanish  War  is  one 
which  can  be  maintained  only  by  a  powerful 
fleet,  though  our  acquisitions  in  themselves 
scarcely  add  to  the  necessity  of  such  a  fleet,  for 
meanwhile  we  have  built  the  Panama  Canal. 
And  while  the  canal  has  lightened  our  strategic 
difficulties  in  that  our  battle  fleet  can  now  reach 
San  Francisco  from  the  Caribbean  in  a  fourth  of 
the  time  it  took  the  Oregon  to  make  her  cele 
brated  passage  from  San  Francisco  to  Key  West, 
there  is  upon  us  the  heavy  burden  of  the  defence 
of  the  isthmus,  its  position  being  in  effect  insu 
lar.  It  can  only  remain  in  our  hands  by  our 
controlling  the  sea.  Fortifications  assist  in  its 
defence  for  the  time  being,  but  should  we  go  to 
war  it  must  finally  go  into  the  hands  of  the 
power  with  a  superior  navy.  And  being  thus 
isolated  and  having  this  insular  character,  the 
canal  and  its  fortifications  should  be  in  naval 


The  American  Navy  277 

control  in  order  that  there  should  be  complete 
unanimity  of  effort  in  its  defence. 

It  is  safe  to  say  that  however  anti-imperialist 
one  may  be,  there  is  no  American  who  would  see 
the  canal  go  into  foreign  control  with  equanim 
ity.  The  most  pronounced  would  halt  at  such 
a  danger.  Thus  whatever  one's  attitude  may 
be  toward  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  there  are  few 
who  would  not  uphold  the  contention  that  we 
shall  not  permit  any  further  extension  of  foreign 
influence  in  the  Caribbean  or  in  any  part  of  the 
neighboring  Pacific  littoral,  or  in  neighboring 
islands  such  as  the  Galapagos.  This  is  not 
a  question  of  extension  of  influence,  but  of 
safety. 

A  word  must  be  said  as  to  the  navy's  diplo 
matic  work.  International  law  is  mostly  both 
made  and  administered  by  navies.  The  navy 
is  thus  a  great  and  constant  school  of  diplomacy, 
the  right  hand  of  the  Department  of  State.  We 
have  had  a  notable  instance,  almost  as  I  write,  in 
the  events  in  Mexico,  and  from  none  have  naval 
officers  received  higher  praise  for  their  work 
than  from  the  late  lamented  Secretary  of  State, 
John  Hay.  It  is  duty  such  as  this  which  gives 
the  naval  profession  its  breadth  and  importance 
in  peace,  as  great  in  its  way,  as  in  war.  And* 


278  The  American  Navy 

the  diplomacy  of  naval  officers  is  always  in  the 
direction  of  peace,  though  it  may  sometimes  be 
peace  with  a  strong  hand,  as  in  Admiral  Ben- 
ham's  most  admirable  handling  of  the  situation 
in  the  harbor  of  Rio  de  Janeiro  during  the  revolt 
of  1895.  He  brought  instantaneous  peace  be 
tween  the  revolutionary  forces  and  the  Govern 
ment;  he  upheld  international  law,  stood  by 
the  rights  of  our  merchant  captains,  and  ren 
dered  a  service  beyond  price  to  Brazil. 

Such  international  uses  of  the  navy. accentu 
ate  the  value  of  the  Marine  Corps,  now  a  naval 
army  of  10,267  men  a°d  officers.  Little  has 
been  said  heretofore  in  this  book  of  this  valuable, 
indeed  invaluable,  force,  as  its  duties  are  merged 
largely  in  the  general  duties  of  the  navy.  It 
differs  from  the  army  proper  in  its  mobility  and 
ever-readiness  for  foreign  service.  Its  mobility 
is  that  of  the  navy  itself;  its  transport  is  ever 
ready;  its  supply  train  is  the  fleet. 

It  is  an  international  understanding  that  sea 
men  or  marines  may  be  landed  in  any  part  of 
the  world  for  the  protection  of  life  and  property, 
and  that  such  action  may  even  extend  to  the  use 
of  force  without  being  regarded  as  an  act  of  war. 
There  is  no  need  to  expand  the  value  of  such  a 
convention  which  gives  the  navy  such  an  ex- 


The  American  Navy  279 

tension  of  its  field  of  forceful,  and  at  the  same 
time  peaceable,  action. 

We  speak  much  of  our  development  into  a 
world  power  through  the  war  of  1898.  We  were 
such  a  power  potentially  as  soon  as  we  had  a 
navy  of  a  strength  to  enable  us  to  say  to  another 
power,  "I  forbid."  And  we  can  only  remain  a 
world  power  through  a  navy  which  can  com 
mand  safety  and  peace.  Linked  to  such  power 
there  must  be  political  good  sense  and  just 
dealing.  Long  habit  in  obedience  and  in  com 
mand,  a  life-long  study  of  international  rela 
tions,  a  knowledge  of  the  races  of  men  such  as 
no  other  great  profession  can  offer,  an  ideal 
which  puts  duty  as  its  first  law;  these  enable 
the  navy  to  furnish  its  just  quota  of  both  the 
high  qualifications  mentioned.  To  it  the  coun 
try  can  securely  trust  its  honor  and  safety.  It 
will  ever  do  its  duty. 


A  SHORT  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

IT  WOULD  take  a  great  many  pages  to  give  a 
complete  bibliography  of  the  subject  of  the 
American  navy.  I  must  content  myself  with 
mentioning  only  a  few  of  the  more  prominent 
works. 

There  were  two  navies:  that  of  the  Revolution, 
which  disappeared  wholly  in  1785;  and  that  of 
to-day,  which  had  its  origin  in  1794.  The  two 
most  complete  works  regarding  the  former  are 
those  of  Gardner  W.  Allen,  "A  Naval  History 
of  the  Revolution,"  2  vols.,  Boston  -and  New 
York,  Houghton  Mifflin  Company,  1913,  and 
Oscar  Charles  Paullin,  "The  Navy  of  the  Ameri 
can  Revolution:  Its  Administration,  Its  Policy, 
and  Its  Achievements,"  Cleveland,  The  Burrows 
Brothers  Company,  1906.  This  latter  deals 
chiefly  with  the  legislative  action  respecting  the 
navy  and  its  administration;  it  is  the  only  one  of 
its  class.  To  these  two  authors,  Dr.  Allen  and 
Dr.  Paullin,  I  desire  to  express  my  special  ob 
ligations. 

280 


The  American  Navy  281 

The  naval  classic,  J.  Fenimore  Cooper,  "The 
Navy  of  the  United  States  of  America,"  a  book 
which  fascinated  the  author  of  the  present 
volume  as  a  boy,  carries  one  from  1775  through 
the  War  of  1812  only. 

The  publications  of  the  Naval  History  So 
ciety,  Vol,  i,  being  the  logs  of  the  Serapis, 
Alliance,  and  Ariel  under  the  command  of  John 
Paul  Jones,  ed.  by  John  S.  Barnes,  1911.  Vol. 
2  is  "Fanning's  Narrative,"  also  edited  by  Mr. 
Barnes,  1912.  Fanning's  account  of  the  cap 
ture  of  the  Serapis  by  the  Bonhomme  Richard 
is  the  best  existent.  There  are  other  volumes, 
all  of  much  interest. 

Robert  Beatson,  "Naval  and  Military 
Memoirs  of  Great  Britain  from  1727  to  1783," 
by  far  the  best  work  of  its  period  on  the  subject. 

Wm.  Laird  Clowes,  "The  Royal  Navy,"  a 
monumental  work  in  which  Admiral  Mahan, 
U.  S.  N.,  and  Colonel  Theodore  Roosevelt  had 
part,  covers  in  vols.  3-6  our  Revolution  and  the 
War  of  1812.  It  is  a  work  of  the  highest  value. 

The  same  should  be  said  of  Admiral  Mahan's 
books,  "The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon 
History,"  and  "Sea  Power  in  its  Relations  to 
the  War  of  1812,"  Boston,  Little,  Brown  & 
Company,  1905.  All  his  works  are  important. 


282  The  American  Navy 

G.  Lacour-Gayet,  "La  Marine  Militaire 
de  la  France  sous  le  Regne  de  Louis  XVI,"  Paris, 
Honore  Champion,  9  Quai  Voltaire,  1905,  is  the 
best  French  history  of  the  naval  events  of  the 
time. 

Henri  Doniol,  "Histoire  de  la  Participation 
de  la  France  a  I'Etablissement  des  Etats- 
Unis  d'Amerique,"  6  vols.,  Paris,  Imprimerie 
Nationale,  1892.  This  monumental  work  was 
prepared  for  the  universal  exhibition  of  1889 
and  is  of  highest  value  to  the  student. 

Charlemagne  Tower,  "The  Marquis  de  la 
Fayette  in  the  American  Revolution."  A  valu 
able  work. 

Henry  Adams,  "The  History  of  the  United 
States,  1800-1817,"  9  vols.,  New  York,  C. 
Scribner's  Sons,  1891.  A  book  of  the  first  rank 
and  importance. 

Edgar  Stanton  Maclay,  "A  History  of  the 
United  States  Navy,"  from  1775  to  1902,  3  vols., 
New  York,  D.  Appleton  &  Company,  1902. 
One  of  our  best  and  completest  histories  on  the 
subject. 

Gardner  W.  Allen,  "Our  Navy  and  the  Bar- 
bary  Corsairs,"  New  York,  etc.,  Houghton 
Mifflin  Company,  1905.  An  excellent  book 
and  a  complete  account. 


The  American  Navy  283 

E.  Dupuy,  "Americains  et  Barbaresques," 
Paris,  R.  Roger  et  F.  Chernoviz,  99  Boulevard 
Raspail,  1910,  A  book  very  highly  to  be  praised. 

Robert  W.  Neeser,  "Statistical  and  Chrono 
logical  History  of  the  United  States  Navy," 
New  York,  the  Macmillan  Company,  1909,  2 
vols.  folio.  An  invaluable  work  for  the  student. 

Robert  W.  Neeser,  "Our  Many  Sided  Navy," 
Yale  University  Press,  1914.  Well  done. 

Theodore  Roosevelt,  "The  Naval  War  of 
1812,"  New  York,  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  1882. 
A  good  and  fair  book. 

The  literature  of  the  Civil  War  is  so  vast  that 
barest  mention  can  be  made  of  a  few  works 
only. 

Loyall  Farragut,  "Life  and  Letters  of  Ad 
miral  D.  G.  Farragut,"  New  York,  D.  Appleton 
&  Company,  1891. 

A.  T.  Mahan,  "Admiral  Farragut,"  New 
York,  D.  Appleton  &  Company,  1903. 

James  Russel  Soley,  "Admiral  Porter,"  New 
York,  D.  Appleton  &  Company. 

John  Randolph  Spears,  "David  G.  Farragut," 
Philadelphia,  Geo.  W.  Jacobs  &  Company,  1905. 

James  Russel  Soley,  "The  Blockade  and  the 
Cruisers,"  New  York,  Charles  Scribner's  Sons, 
1890. 


284  The  American  Navy 

A.  T.  Mahan,  "The  Gulf  and  Inland  Waters," 
New  York,  Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  1883. 

Daniel  Ammen  (Rear-Admiral),  "The  At 
lantic  Coast,"  New  York,  Charles  Scribner's 
Sons,  1883. 

"Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War," 
New  York,  The  Century  Company,  1888. 

All  these  are  very  interesting  and  valuable. 

For  the  Spanish  War,  John  D.  Long  (ex- 
Secretary  of  the  Navy),  "The  New  American 
Navy,"  2  vols.,  New  York,  The  Outlook  Com 
pany,  1903. 

F.  E.  Chadwick,  "The  Relations  of  the 
United  States  and  Spain,"  vols.  2  and  3  being 
"The  Spanish  War,"  New  York,  Charles  Scrib 
ner's  Sons,  1911. 

There  are  admirable  bibliographies  in  the 
works  of  Dr.  Paullin  and  Dr.  Allen  covering 
the  periods  of  which  their  books  treat.  The 
reader  is  referred  to  these  and  other  general 
bibliographies  for  more  complete  information 
than  can  be  given  here. 


A  WORD  ABOUT 
THE  AMERICAN  BOOKS 


The  American  Books 

A  Library  of  Good  Citizenship 

TO  vote  regularly  and  conscientiously  and 
never  to  have  been  arrested  for  disorder 
is  not  the  be-all  and  end-all  of  good  citi 
zenship.  The  good  citizen  is  he  or  she  who  bears 
an  active  hand  in  cleansing  and  making  merry 
the  black  spots  of  the  neighborhood;  who  cher 
ishes  a  home  however  small;  who  takes  an 
increasingly  intelligent  interest  in  all  that  con 
tributes  to  the  country's  welfare,  and  feels  a 
keenly  patriotic  hope  for  the  future  of  the  nation. 

For  such  citizens  THE  AMERICAN  BOOKS  are 
designed — a  series  of  small  volumes  on  current 
American  problems.  The  keynote  of  the  series 
will  be  the  discussion  of  distinctively  American 
movements  and  questions  connected  with  the 
future  prosperity  of  the  United  States. 

The  series  was  planned  long  before  the  great 
war,  but  it  has  derived  added  importance  from 
the  position  which  that  great  struggle  has  given 
America  on  the  face  of  the  globe.  The  United 
States,  standing  aloof  from  the  suicidal  blood 
shed  of  the  Old  World,  has  necessarily  become 
the  peaceful  arbiter  of  the  earth's  destinies  and 
the  flywheel  to  keep  the  world's  industry  re 
volving. 


An  inquiry  into  the  meaning  and  tendency  of 
American  civilization  to-day  is  thus  not  only  a 
matter  of  interest  but  of  patriotic  duty.  The 
publishers  wish  THE  AMERICAN  BOOKS  to  be  a 
series  of  brief,  authoritative  manuals  which  will 
attempt  to  lay  bare  some  of  the  problems  that 
confront  us  to-day ;  written  in  popular  terms  that 
will  inspire  rather  than  discourage  the  casual 
reader.  The  series  should  prove  not  only  of 
great  interest  to  all  American  citizens  who  wish 
to  aid  in  solving  their  country's  pressing  prob 
lems,  but  to  every  foreigner  visiting  this  country 
who  seeks  an  interpretation  of  the  American 
point  of  view. 

The  publishers  wish  THE  AMERICAN  BOOKS  to 
be  written  by  the  best  men,  and  to  this  end  they 
seek  the  widest  publicity  for  the  plan.  They 
will  be  glad  to  receive  suggestions  as  to  appro 
priate  titles  for  inclusion  in  the  series  and  will 
welcome  authoritative  MSS  submitted  from  any 
quarter.  In  particular  they  submit  the  plan  to 
the  consideration  of  the  American  colleges  where 
the  problems  of  the  country  are  being  studied. 
In  science,  literature,  business,  politics,  in  the 
arts  of  war  and  the  arts  of  peace,  the  publishers 
will  seek  writers  who  have  stood  for  fearless 
achievement  or  equally  fearless  failure,  who  will 
build  up  A  LIBRARY  OF  GOOD  CITIZENSHIP. 

(For    complete  list  of  volumes  in 
this  series  see  opposite  title  page.) 


THE   COUNTRY   LIFE   PRESS 
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